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Preface
In this thesis, we present the analyses of theoretical horizontal mergers in both the contexts of
private oligopoly and mixed oligopoly. In chapter 1, we review the statements and discussions
given in the previous literature, which are closely related to the result obtained in this thesis,
and subsequently, from chapters 2 to 5, we provide our original results on theoretical horizontal
mergers in both the private oligopoly and the mixed oligopoly. In Conclusion of the final chap-
ter, we discuss the contributions of this thesis, and argue several future researches and possible
extensions, which are left for us. The concrete contents of this thesis are given as follows:
In chapter 1, we first discuss the result obtained in the previous literature on the modern
game theoretical horizontal mergers in the context of the private oligopoly where only profit-
maximizing private firms exist in the market. More concretely, we argue that they are classifies
with the following two categories: (1) exogenous merger analysis; (2) endogenous merger anal-
ysis. Furthermore, the respective results obtained in the works belonging to the two categories
are treated in detail. Second, we review the discussion provided in the literatures on the influence
of each firm’s managerial delegation and the bargaining over its content between her/his owner
and manager on her/his merger incentive. Finally, in the context of the mixed oligopoly where
a welfare-maximizing public firm and profit-maximizing private firms coexist and compete, we
state the results obtained in the literature on the horizontal mergers, and subsequently, we argue
the relationship and different points between the results obtained in this thesis and them.
In chapter 2, in the context of the private oligopoly, we examines how managerial delega-
tion contracts within each firm affect the correspondence between the equilibrium ownership
structure and the most preferred ownership structure with respect to social welfare. We consider
the problem of the disclosure of managerial delegation contracts prescribed in modern corporate
i
ii
governance codes by studying the bargaining over the relative weightage of each firm’s sales in a
sales delegation contract between an owner and a manager with respect to a model of endogenous
merger formation in a three-firm asymmetric Cournot industry. We show that within a large range
of the relative bargaining power of each firm’s manager, there exists a degree of cost asymmetry
among firms in the industry, to have that the equilibrium ownership structure coincides with the
most preferred ownership structure with respect to social welfare. Thus, the bargaining between
an owner and a manager may reduce the requirement of an antitrust policy.
In chapter 3, we investigate the achievablity of the productivity-improving merger activities
between a public firm and a private firm in mixed oligopoly. We assume that the merged firm
has two plants (formerly, firms). We show that both the owners of a public firm and a private
firm want to merge by coordinating their shareholding ratios in the merged firm, whenever the
number of private firms is larger than a critical value, while the public firm does not want to
merge without the effect of improving the productivity in the merged firm. In chapter 3, we
further discuss the case wherein the public firm is less efficient than the private firms.
Furhermore, in chapter 4, we present the theoretical analysis of each firm’s merger activity
in a mixed oligopoly with respect to the stability of market structures. More precisely, by defin-
ing the core of market structures which describes market structures occurring after each firm’s
free merger activity on the basis of the core solution concept in the cooperative game, we con-
sider the endogenous merger formation in the case wherein her/his technology is represented
as the quadratic cost function in terms of her/his quantity. We analyze productivity-improving
mergers in the mixed triopoly composed of one welfare-maximizing public firm and two profit-
maximizing private firms and explore stable market structures. We find the only stable market
structure contains a merged public-private firm and one private firm with about 57% of shares
owned by the public firm. Moreover, we derive the core of market structures after each firm’s
merger activity in the case wherein the owner offers her/his managers the incentive contract that
deviates from profit maximization.
In chapter 5, we examine endogenous merger formations in a mixed oligopoly. Applying
the core as a solution concept, we analyze which market structure(s) remain(s) stable when three
firms — two symmetric private firms and one inefficient public firm — are allowed to merge with
each other in a mixed Cournot industry. We show that according to the value of the marginal cost
of the public firm, there always exists a pair of share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-
merged) public firm and the (pre-merged) private firm to have that the market structure with the
merger between the public firm and one private firm belongs to the core. When the initial market
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structure is a mixed triopoly, it can only be blocked when one public firm and one private firm
merge. Furthermore, we conduct a similar analysis in a general mixed oligopoly with one public
firm and n private firms.
In Conclusion of the final chapter of this thesis, in detail, we rearrange the contribution of
the result obtained in this thesis, and we present several topics which should tackle as our future
research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and overview
In this chapter, we review the results obtained in the existing literature on theoretical horizontal
mergers from both the viewpoints of the private oligopoly and the mixed oligopoly, and we
discuss the relationship between the result obtained in this thesis and them.
1.1 The general discussion on horizontal mergers in oligopoly
– exogenous merger vs. endogenous merger –
Mergers are common practices in many markets. In order to provide economic explanations for
many merger phenomena occuring in the real world, many theoretical literature on horizontal
mergers have sought to reply the following two questions: (i) why firms merge; (ii) how firms
merge.1
The modern game theoretical work on horizontal mergers which attempted to reply the ques-
tion of (i) can be traced back to the seminal paper of Salant et al. (1983). In several literatures
including Salant et al. (1983), the researchers exogenously set a group of firms which merges
with each other in order to clarify under what the economic environment each firm would like
to merge, which are referred to as the analysis of the exogenous merger, being regarded as be-
longing to a classic category. Their works basically compared the benefits of going together with
the benefits of standing alone. On the basis of such an analytical method, Salant et al. (1983)
showed that only the merger in which more than 80% of the firms participate can be profitable in
the absence of cost savings. The result obtained Salant et al. (1983), which may be inconsistent
with the fact that the merger among relatively small-numbered firms is frequently observed in
1In particular, during the past decades, not only national mergers but also cross-border mergers have become
increasingly widespread. As in Hijzen et al. (2008), the number of M&As worldwide in excess of one million
dollar from 2000 to 2001 is more than twice, relative to that from 1990 to 1991. Most recently, as firms grow
larger and larger, mergers increasingly tend to be international. UNCTAD (2000) announced the increasing share of
cross-border mergers in FDI, rising on their measure to 78% in the late 1990’s.
1
2the real world, is referred to as the merger paradox, and it becomes the driving force to expand
the theoretical analyses of horizontal mergers on the basis of the exogenous merger approach
under many economic situations. This extreme result is led from the fact that under Cournot
competition, non-merged firms respond to the merger by producing more, which hurt the merged
firms. Thus, if the result of the merger paradox can be resolved, the expansion of the production
of non-merged firms should be restricted after any merger activity. Then, Perry and Porter (1985)
and Qiu and Zhou (2007) tackled a resolution to the unprofitability of the merger involving the
small-numbered firms, by taking into account decreasing returns to scale and product differentia-
tion, respectively. Furthermore, Hennessy (2000) proposed the result that each firm’s convex cost
function can be an answer to resolve the merger paradox.2 Daughety (1990) and Levin (1990)
tackled such a problem by introducing a disadvantageous position for non-merged firms. More-
over, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) considered horizontal mergers under Bertrand competition,
and showed that in contrast to the result under the quantity-setting competition, the mergers in-
volving any-sized participants are beneficial, and the degree of its profitability increases, as its
size becomes larger.
In order to predict a final market structure after each firm’s merger when s/he can endoge-
nously choose whether or not to merge and how to react a merger, many researchers recently
adopted the other approach towards the problem of (ii) how firms merge, which is referred to as
the endogenous merger analyses. To give an appropriate reply to the question of (ii) how firms
merge, each firm’s merger formation must be explicitly determined in this research category.
Furthermore, the works on the endogenous merger formation are investigated on the basis of the
two following different game theoretical approaches: (1) the non-cooperative game theoretical
approach; (2) the cooperative game theoretical approach. In the endogenous merger formation,
the works which adopt the non-cooperative game approach have been dominant since the pio-
neering paper of Kamien and Zang (1990). The studies which is based on the non-cooperative
game approach including Kamien and Zang (1990) attempted to explain the dynamic merger
process under several economic environments.3 On the other hand, although the works adopting
2Subsequently, Heywood and Mcginty (2007a) returned to the contention that convex costs may provide a reso-
lution to the merger paradox, which was considered in Hennessy (2000) and so on. Heywood and Mcginty (2007a)
found that the relevance of convex costs as a resolution to the merger paradox may reduce by showing that for rea-
sonable degrees of convexity, the minimum market share which is needed for a merger to be profitable remains close
to that associated with constant marginal cost functions.
3Previous contributions which belong to this category are Faulı´-Oller (2000), Gowrisankaran (1999), and
Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004). Most recently, Qiu and Zhou (2007) proposed two necessary conditions for
mergers to occur; heterogeneity among firms and negative demand shocks, and further Fumagalli and Vasconcelos
(2009) studied the effect of the trade policy on firms’ choices between intra-national and cross-border mergers in an
international Cournot oligopoly.
3the cooperative game approach still have been few, their purposes are common. The literature
which treated endogenous merger formation as a cooperative game did not describe the dynamic
merger process in detail. However, they sought to check whether a market structure is stable
since any firm has no incentive to change the market structure through her/his merger process. In
the literature on the endogenous merger formation based on the cooperative game approach, two
different equilibrium solutions were introduced by Barros (1998) and Horn and Persson (2001a),
respectively, both of which were based on the core solution concept that is most familiar in the
economic theory.4 Due to the simplicity of their solution concept, in particular, in the context of
the private oligopoly, many papers derived the final market structure after each firm’s horizontal
merger under several economic situations, following Horn and Persson (2001a). For example,
Horn and Persson (2001b) considered cross-border mergers by focusing on each firm’s trade and
her/his production cost, and subsequently, Banal-Estan˜ol et al. (2008) explored how each firm’s
investment decision and her/his internal organization influence the efficiency and stability of hor-
izontal mergers. Except for chapter 3, in this thesis, from both the viewpoints of the private
oligopoly and the mixed oligopoly, we will consider the endogenous merger formation under
several economic situations by adopting the cooperative game approach.
1.2 Managerial delegation and merger incentives
Although the literature on horizontal mergers considered many economic contexts, one of their
main streams has been examining the effect of each firm’s internal structure with the separation
between ownership and management on her/his merger incentive.5 A theoretical analysis of the
separation between ownership and management tackled the validity of the traditional assumption
of a firm as the sole profit maximizing agent. As the development of a principal-agent model,
Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985) conducted to clarify the inter-
action between owner-manager contracts and market behaviors in the context of an oligopolistic
industry with managerial delegation. More precisely, they considered the situation wherein each
4Brito and Gata (2006) discussed a theoretical difference between the two equilibrium notions which were intro-
duced in Barros (1998) and Horn and Persson (2001a).
5As described in Footnote #1 at the front of this chapter, most recently. the works on cross-border mergers
including DaimlerChrysler as one of the most famous examples have been extensively increasing, and thus, if we
restrict our focus into the analyses of horizontal mergers, the participants in such a merger should be frequently
composed of large enterprises with the separation between ownership and management. In this sense, when we tackle
the problem of horizontal mergers, one may consider that it is inevitable duty to take into account the separation
between ownership and management in order to sufficiently reflect the examples in the real world economy. Thus,
in this thesis, we would like to emphasize the point that we regard considering such each firm’s separation between
ownership and management as our evident duty to capture the real world examples.
4firm’s owner offers her/his manager the type of delegation contract which is defined as the convex
combination between her/his profit and revenue (the FJSV delegation contact), and they showed
that in both the quantity- and price-setting oligopolistic competitions, profit-maximizing owners
frequently choose to divert the preference of their managers away from profit maximization.
Gonza´lez-Maestre and Lo´pez-Cun˜at (2001) and Ziss (2001) first considered the interaction
between the use of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract and her/his merger incentive, and they
showed that the FJSV delegation would generally increase the profitability of horizontal mergers
in symmetric Cournot industries, since the decrease of the merged firm’s profit with her/his output
contraction is relaxed through the aggressive behavior led by the use of her/his FJSV delegation
contract. Subsequently, based on the cooperative game approach presented in Horn and Persson
(2001a), in an asymmetric Cournot industry with respect to each firm’s marginal cost, Straume
(2006) found that the use of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract leads to wrong type of merger
from a viewpoint of social welfare because of excess market concentration, while the use of each
firm’s FJSV delegation contract further increases her/his profitability with any merger through
the rationalization effect that the merged firm can produce with her/his superior technology by
regarding her/him as the agent operating the two pre-merged firms (plants). In chapter 2 of this
thesis, in an asymmetric Cournot industry, we will tackle the non-coincidence between the market
structure induced by each firm’s merger incentive and the most preferred market structure with
respect to social welfare.
1.3 Bargaining over managerial contracts and merger incen-
tives
In chapter 2 of this thesis, by considering the situation wherein not only the owner but also the
manager influence the content of her/his FJSV delegation contract, we attempt to resolve the neg-
ative result that in an asymmetric Cournot competition with each firm’s FJSV delegation contract,
the equilibrium market structure does not coincide with the most preferred market structure with
respect to social welfare. Modern corporate governance codes include clauses that the disclosure
of each firm’s managerial delegation should be required in order to protect her/his owner from
the opportunistic behavior of her/his manager. The presence of such a code is deeply related
to the transparency in deciding the content of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract. Without
such a transparency, each firm’s manager would boost her/his remuneration against the interest
of her/his owner, and thus the managerial power between the owner and the manager within each
5firm may determinately influence market outcomes under the economic situation that the dis-
closure of her/his FJSV delegation contract is required. Then, van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007)
modeled the bargaining over the content of the FJSV delegation contract between the owner
and the manager within each firm in a symmetric Cournot competition with each firm’s constant
marginal cost function. More precisely, van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) considered the following
two-stage game: In the first stage, the owner and the manager within each firm simultaneously
and independently bargain over her/his FJSV delegation parameter, and in the second stage, each
firm’s manager simultaneously chooses her/his output level in terms of the maximization of the
FJSV delegation contract offered by her/his owner. In their 2007 paper, van Witteloostuijn et al.
showed that both the equilibrium consumer surplus and the equilibrium social welfare increases,
while the equilibrium profit of each firm decreases, as the relative bargaining power of her/his
manager to her/his owner increases.6
In chapter 2 of this thesis, taking into account the bargaining power between each firm’s
owner and manager, we consider the influence of the bargaining over the FJSV delegation param-
eter on each firm’s merger incentive in an asymmetric Cournot competition.7 More precisely, we
6van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) also conducted the similar analysis to the case of the FJSV delegation contract
under the situation wherein each firm adopts the relative performance delegation, which is introduced in Salas Fumas
(1992) and Miller and Pazgal (2001) and is applied in Miller and Pazgal (2002), that the owner employs her/his
manager who cares about other firms’ profits as well as her/his own profit. In the relative performance delegation
case, van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) showed that as the relative bargaining power of each firm’s manager increases,
the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare decrease while her/his equilibrium profit increases, resulting
from cartel-like behavior, in contrast to the result obtained in the FJSV delegation contract.
7In chapter 2, we rule out the monopoly from the merger among all the existing firms by the assumption that
the authority corresponding to each firm’s horizontal merger prohibits such a monopoly, whereas in chapters 4 and
5, in the context of mixed oligopoly, when the stability analysis on market structures before and after each firm’s
merger activity is conducted, we allow for the monopoly from such an all-firm-merger. This difference results from
those of the welfare implications of horizontal mergers between the private oligopoly and the mixed oligopoly.
More precisely, in the context of the private oligopoly, each firm’s horizontal merger may yield the deterioration of
social welfare because of the decrease of the equilibrium total output through decreasing the competition pressure
(specifically, without the effect of the merged firm’s productivity-improving), whereas in the context of the mixed
oligopoly, since the payoff of the public firm’s owner is assumed to be social welfare, the merger including the public
firm is allowed by the merger authority, if the equilibrium social welfare improves after the merger. Thus, the works
on theoretical horizontal mergers in the private oligopoly have been showing that the merger among all the firms
must be strictly regulated by the merger authority, and therefore, many previous literature including Davidson and
Ferret (2007), Lommerud et al. (2006), Qiu and Zhou (2006), Matsushima et al. (2008), and Matsushima et al. (2009)
have assumed that the merger among all the firms is eliminated before their concrete analyses. On the other hand, in
the context of the mixed oligopoly on theoretical horizontal mergers, the analyses conducted in chapters 4 and 5 are
the first challenges against of the endogenous merger formation using our original cooperative game approach. In
addition, in chapters 4 and 5, since we employ the assumption that the merger between arbitrary firms has an effect
of increasing the productivity of the merged firm, relative to the pre-merger situation, the effect of the merger among
all the firms on social welfare is not obvious. Thus, before our concrete stability analysis among market structures,
we cannot straightforwardly obtain the result of whether or not the market structure with the merger among all the
firms is stable, and hence, in the analysis of the mixed oligopoly on horizontal mergers in chapters 4 and 5, we take
into account the monopoly from the merger between all the public and private firms, different from the analysis of
the private oligopoly in chapter 2.
6change the way of determining each firm’s FJSV delegation parameter from the setting employed
in Straume (2006), by taking into account explicitly the relative bargaining powers between both
her/his owner and manager. As described above, Straume (2006) showed that each firm’s merger
incentive leads to the wrong type of market structure with respect to social welfare in an asym-
metric Cournot competition, when each firm’s delegation parameter is determined with respect to
the maximization of her/his profit which is the objective function of her/his owner. Thus, Straume
(2006) concluded that the active merger policy must be required in the asymmetric industry com-
posed of firms with the separation between ownership and management. The analysis conducted
in chapter 2 of this thesis provides the result that for a comparatively large area of the relative
bargaining power of each firm’s manager to her/his owner, the equilibrium market structure based
on each firm’s merger incentive coincides with the most socially preferred structure in the case
wherein the degree of asymmetry among the existing firms is middle-leveled, if her/his FJSV
delegation parameter is determined through the bargaining between her/his owner and manager.8
Thus, if each firm’s manager influences the determination of her/his FJSV delegation parameter,
the necessity of an active merger policy may decrease. Moreover, we may be able to consider that
the presence of the codes in modern corporate governance that the disclosure of each firm’s man-
agerial contract is needed contributes to the increase of the relative bargaining power of her/his
owner. Therefore, from the combination of the result in Straume (2006) and that in chapter 2 of
this thesis, the presence of the corporate governance codes that such a disclosure is excessively
required can lead to the wrong type of market structure with respect to social welfare.
1.4 Horizontal mergers in mixed oligopoly
Although in chapter 2 of this thesis, we present a theoretical analysis of horizontal mergers in
the private oligopoly which is composed of profit-maximizing firms, throughout the rest three
chapters of this thesis, we will consider the merger between the public firm and the private firm
in mixed oligopoly.9 In not only the developing countries and former communist economies, in
8More precisely, this result holds as long as the relative bargaining power of each firm’s manager to her/his owner
is over about one fifth.
9In the european automobile industry, we frequently observe the merger and acquisition between the public
enterprise and the private enterprise. As a typical example of the merger between the public firm and the private
firm in the real world mixed oligopolistic industry, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) introduced the merger between
SEAT which was a Spanish publicly owned automobile manufacturer and Volkswagen which is a German private
enterprise in 1986. If the business collaboration can be allowed for discussing as one type of horizontal mergers,
Renault which is a French partially privatized public-private firm enters into the business agreement with Nissan
Motor and Nissan Diesel, both of which are Japanese private enterprises. Moreover, in Japanese telecommunication
industry, in 1998, Teleway Japan which was a private enterprise is acquired by KDD (Kokusai Denshin Denwa)
which was a public enterprise, and subsequently the merged firm, KDD corporation merged with IDO and DDI into
7but also the developed countries, many public firms compete and coexist with private firms in
many kinds of industries such as banking services, housing loans, life insurance, broadcasting
services, and overnight deliveries.
The seminal paper which formulated the competition between the public firm and the private
firm on the basis of the modern game theoretical approach can be traced back to De Fraja and
Delbono (1989). De Fraja and Delbono (1989) first established the theoretical mixed oligopolis-
tic model in which the public firm maximizes social welfare, while the private firm maximizes
her/his own profit. Although many works on mixed oligopoly have dealt with several eco-
nomic situations, one of them tackled the merger between the public firm and the private firm.10
Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) and Coloma (2006) presented the theoretical merger analyses
between the public firm and the private firm, and subsequently Me´ndez-Naya (2008) extended
the Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003)’s model in a mixed duopoly composed of a public firm and
a private firm to the merger activity in a general mixed oligopoly wherein one public firm and
n private firms exist. Although the above two papers of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) and
Me´ndez-Naya (2008) considered the efficiency gains with any merger, both of them divert their
focuses from such an effect of the productivity-improving of the merged firm.11 In chapter 3
of this thesis, explicitly taking into account the productivity-improving effect with any merger,
we will present a theoretical analysis of the merger between a public firm and a private firm
in a mixed oligopoly. More precisely, in chapter 3 of this thesis, we assume the effect of the
productivity-improving in the merged firm a` la McAfee and Williams (1992). In chapter 3, the
achievablity of the merger between a public firm and a private firm is explained through the fol-
lowing two effects: the share effect with in/decreasing a shareholding ratio of the public firm’s
KDDI corporation in 2000.
10The recent literature on mixed oligopoly has become more increasing. For example, Ishibashi and Matsumura
(2006), Nishimori and Ogawa (2002), and Poyago-Theotoky (1998) considered the competition of R&D investments
between the public firm and the private firm. Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998),
and Matsumura and Matsushima (2006) investigated the international competition. Ohori (2006) and Ba´rcena-Ruiz
and Garzo´n (2006) explored the role of optimal environmental tax. Furthermore, Pal (1998), Matsumura (2003a,b),
Lu (2006), and Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007) discussed the endogenous determination of the competition style when both
the public firm and the private firm select when to choose their output levels.
11More precisely, regarding the achievablity of the horizontal mergers between the public firm and the private
firm, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) focused his attention on the relationship between the degree of substitution
of the goods produced by them and the share ratios of their owners in the merged firm, whereas Me´ndez-Naya
(2008) noticed the relationship between the number of the existing private firm in the market and the share ratios of
their owners in the merged firm. Thus, both of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) and Me´ndez-Naya (2008) did not
pay their attentions into the effect of the efficiency gains with the merger. On the other hand, in the context of the
analysis of horizontal mergers in private oligopoly, such an efficiency gains have been extensively investigated. The
theoretical literature has showed that if the merger yields such efficiency gains, social welfare may increase. For
the general discussion on the efficiency gains with any merger, see Farrell and Shapiro (1990) as a classic work and
Banal-Estan˜ol et al. (2008) and Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) and so on as more recent studies.
8owner in the merged firm and the competition effect with in/decreasing the number of the private
firms. When the relatively small-numbered private firms exist before any merger, the achievablity
of such a merger is mainly explained by the share effect, since the share ratios of both the own-
ers as the merger participants drastically influence their payoffs. As the number of the private
firms increases, whether or not the merger is achieved is mainly determined by the competition
effect, since the impact of the presence of the public firm on social welfare is sufficiently small.
In addition, we will consider the achievablity of the merger between a public firm and a private
firm in the following two cases: (1) there does not exist any productivity-improving effect with
mergers; (2) the public firm is less efficient than the private firms.
Although the analyses conducted in chapter 3, in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003), and in
Me´ndez-Naya (2008) clarified under what conditions the merger between one public firm and one
private firm is achieved, several theoretical restrictions still have been preserved. First, the above
three analyses dealt with the merger between one public and one private firm, and thus, in the
assumption of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) that the market structure occurring before any
merger is a mixed duopoly, the market structure after the merger is under the monopoly composed
of only the merged (partially privatized) firm. It is doubtful whether such an assumption is
realistic or not, and whether such a merger is allowed for in the real world or not.12 Second,
although the general mixed oligopoly which is composed of one public firm and n private firms
as the market structure before any merger was supposed in the analyses of both the chapter 3 of
this thesis and Me´ndez-Naya (2008), only the merger between one public firm and one private
firm was explored in their analyses. Thus, their analyses did not deal with the decision makings
of whether or not to merger for all the firms’ owners, although multiple symmetric private firms
exist. Third, in all the above three analyses, the researchers took the merger participants and
its size as given, and hence their analyses belong to the classic category of exogenous merger
analyses. Fourth, in all the three analyses, the reactions of relevant merger participants against
the change of several economic situations including other firms’ mergers and their dissolutions
were totally ignored, and thus, in their analyses, the dynamic change of such a market situation
could not be considered.
In chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, taking into account the restrictions preserved in the previous
literature as described above, we will present the theoretical analyses of horizontal mergers in
12In addition, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) showed that when the ratio of the shares owned by the owner of
the public firm takes an intermediate value, and the degree to which goods are substitutes is low enough, both the
public firm and the private firm would like to merge. In particular, the latter condition on the substitutability of their
production goods may be inconsistent with that in the merger observed in the real world.
9mixed oligopoly on the basis of the cooperative game approach, which belong to the category
of endogenous merger analyses. Thus, in chapters 4 and 5, we explicitly consider the decision-
makings of whether or not to merge for the owners of all the existing firms. More precisely, in
chapter 4, we will derive the core of market structures after each firm’s free merger activity in the
mixed triopoly which one public firm and two private firms with their production technologies,
which are represented as the quadratic cost functions with respect to their output levels. Focusing
our attention on the efficiency gains with mergers a` la McAfee and Williams (1992), which was
considered in chapter 3, in the analysis of chapter 4, we show that only the market structure
including the merged firm involving one public firm and one private firm with about 57% of shares
owned by the owner of the public firm can belong to the core. Thus, even though the decision-
makings of whether or not to merge for the owners of all the existing firms are explicitly taken
into account, the merger between one public firm and one private firm can be also supported on
the basis of the stability of market structures occuring after each firm’s merger activity. Moreover,
in chapter 4 of this thesis, we discuss the figure of the core in the following two cases: (1) only
the private firms exist in the market (after the full privatization of the public firm); (2) the public
firm is less efficient than the private firms.13
However, throughout a series of the analyses in chapter 4 of this thesis, we assumed the mixed
(private) triopoly as the market structure before any merger activity.14 Then, in the final chapter 5
of this thesis, on the basis of the cooperative game approach which is the same as that adopted in
chapter 4, we will derive the core of market structures after each firm’s free merger activity in the
general mixed oligopoly composed of one public firm and n private firms with their production
technologies which are represented as the constant marginal cost functions with respect to their
quantities.15 In chapter 5, we provide a sufficient condition with respect to the level of the public
13In addition with the two cases (1) and (2), in chapter 4 of this thesis, we consider the case wherein each
firm adopts her/his FJSV delegation contract a` la Lambertini (2000) and Straume (2006). As described in detail in
Introduction of chapters 4 and 5, similar to the private oligopoly, the horizontal merger phenomena in the real world
mixed oligopoly involve large enterprises with the separation between ownership and management, like the mergers
between Volkswagen and SEAT in the European automobile industry. Thus, it is inevitable for us to consider the
separation between ownership and management within each firm by adopting her/his FJSV delegation contract in
conducting our analysis on horizontal mergers in the context of mixed oligopoly. In all the three cases, we obtained
tha result that the core of market structures can be empty. The (non-)emptiness of the core will be discussed in detail
in Conclusion of the final chapter in this thesis.
14In a general mixed oligopoly with respect to the number of the existing private firms, because of computational
problems, we can not obtain the general result on the figure of the core of market structures after each firm’s merger
activity, when the technology of each firm is represented as her/his quadratic cost function.
15Note that as the beginning of the analyses in chapter 5, we tackle the merger activity in the mixed triopoly
wherein one public firm and two symmetric private firms exist. In such an analysis, we show that in accordance with
the level of the public firm’s marginal cost, the three types of market structures can belong to the core: (1) the mixed
triopoly; (2) the merger between a public firm and a private firm; (3) the merger among all firms. Neverthless, we
find that through the appropriate adjustment of the shareholding ratio of the public firm’s owner in the merged firm,
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firm’s marginal cost to have that the market structure with the merger between one public firm
and one private firm can belong to the core of market structures after each firm’s merger activity.
The analyses conducted in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis are the pioneering studies applying the
endogenous merger approach into the horizontal mergers in the (general) mixed oligopoly. We
believe that these contributions are not small.
Finally, in Conclusion of the final chapter, we review our contributions obtained in this thesis
and discuss future researches which are left for us.
1.5 Comparison with vertical mergers
Although in this paper, we exclusively deal with the problem of horizontal mergers, there exist
the analyses of vertical mergers as other merger problem in the economic theory. The competitive
effects of vertical mergers have long been a source of controversy in antitrust economic. Tradi-
tional literature on the vertical mergers claimed that a vertically integrated firm has no incentive
to exclude her/his rivals, and if s/he attempted to exclude them, rivals could protect themselves
by contracting with other unintegrated firms. However, this classical theory of the vertical merg-
ers and vertical foreclosure has been criticized by the researchers including the Chicago School.
More precisely, taking such a criticism into account, the new equilibrium approach on the basis
of the modern industrial organization theory has been presented in Salop and Scheffman (1987)
and Ordover et al. (1983) which were pioneering papers in this field: Both of them showed
how vertical mergers can lead to anticompetitive effects under several economic environments.16
More precisely, the works based on the equilibrium approach revealed that an vertically merged
firm benefits from the higher costs imposed on her/his downstream opponent firms when s/he
refrains from pricing aggressively in the input market. In particular, Chen (2001) showed that
in the price-setting vertical oligopolistic model wherein h ¸ 2 upstream firms produce a ho-
mogeneous input for the downstream industry and two downstream firms produce differentiated
products, under more general conditions relative to those in Ordover et al. (1983) and Salop and
Scheffman (1987), whether or not a vertical merger occurs strikingly depends on the magnitude
between the productivity-improving effect of the vertically merged firm with some sort of verti-
cal merger and the collusive effect that the vertically merged firm has a less incentive to decrease
the market structure with the merger between a public firm and a private firm can always belong to the core.
16As other important contributions in this area, there exist Salinger (1988) and Chen (2001). Furthermore, there
exist the following two different approaches on the vertical merger. Frist, focusing their attentions on the notion of
the incomplete contract as the organizational problem within each firm, Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Tirole
(1990), and Williamson (1985) considered the vertical integration. Second, Arrow (1975) and Gal-Or (1999) paid
their attentions to the problem of asymmetric information in analyzing the the vertical merger.
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her/his downstream price. In addition, the 2001 paper of Chen revealed that vertical merger is
achieved in equilibrium if and only if there exists any efficiency gain with vertical mergers.
The above findings in Chen (2001) are closely related with those in the literature on horizontal
mergers in private oligopoly as shown in Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and so on. More precisely,
similar to the case of the vertical mergers, in the horizontal merger case, each firm’s horizontal
merger yields the two effects: The first effect is that collusive behaviors of merger participants
and the decrease of competitive pressure with decreasing the number of the existing firm leads
to the decrease of the total output and the increase of the market price, while the second effect
is the effect of the merged firm’s productivity-improving, which leads to the increase of the total
output and the decrease of the market price, for example, in the situation wherein the technology
of each firm is represented by the quadratic cost function with respect to her/his output. Thus,
analogous to the vertical mergers, in the horizontal merger, the tradeoff of the above two effects
determines the competitive effect of each firm’s horizontal merger.
Moreover, the result that the vertical merger occurs if and only if it yields the efficiency
gain of the merged firm is similar to the key point to resolve the merger paradox in horizontal
mergers. As in Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Salant et al. (1983), the horizontal merger in which
less than 80% of all the firms participate is not profitable because of the aggressive behavior of
the non-merged firm. Then, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Salant et al. (1983) indicated that
in order to increase the profitability of the horizontal mergers in which a few firms take part,
relative to their individual profits before such a merger, the merged firm must enjoy the more
advantageous position than that of the non-merged firm such as the situations wherein (i) s/he
becomes a Stackerlberg leader in the market and (ii) the effect of productivity-improving effect
with the merger is sufficiently strong (for example, in the case wherein each firm’s cost function
is quadratic with respect to her/his output level, the merged firm can most efficiently operate all
the plants after the merger, which are regarded as the individual merger-participant firms before
the merger).
As described above, in chapter 2 of this thesis, we investigate the problem of horizontal
mergers in the private oligopolistic industry which is composed of managerial firms with their
asymmetric constant marginal costs. In particular, we depart away from Straume (2006) which is
the main reference in the analysis of chapter 2 by considering the situation wherein an owner and
a manager within each firm bargain over the contents of her/his managerial delegation contract,
and subsequently in the market, each firm’s manager simultaneously sets her/his output level
for the viewpoint of the maximization of her/his managerial delegation contract (her/his FJSV
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delegation contract). In chapter 2, we obtain the result that the market structure with the merger
including the least efficient firm can not only be observed in equilibrium but also become the
most preferred market structure with respect to social welfare which is defined as the sum of
consumer surplus and the profits of all the existing firms, different from the result obtained in
Straume (2006). This result strictly depends on the assumption that any horizontal merger yields
the productivity-improving of the merged firm in the asymmetric private oligopoly in the sense
that the technology of a more efficient firm between merger participants can be adopted by the
merged firm.17 Therefore, we realize that the results between the vertical merger in price-setting
private oligopoly which was considered in Chen (2001) and the horizontal merger considered in
chapter 2 of this thesis are closely related in the sense that they strikingly depend on the fact of
whether or not the merger leads to the cost-reducing effect in the merged firm.
In the context of the mixed oligopoly, the literature on the vertical merger with a downstream
firms and a upstream firm includes Willner (2008) only. Willner (2008) found that when the
vertical merged public firm whose objective function is a weighted sum of her/his profit and
consumer surplus competes with the profit-maximizing private downstream firms, there is no
weight for the consumer surplus in the objective function of the merged public firm such that the
vertical merged public firm and the private firms coexist under the quantity-setting Cournot and
Stackelberg competition within the same downstream market. More precisely, the output of the
downstream private firm is zero because of the aggressive behavior of the vertically merged firm.
Taking such an above result into account, Willner (2008) concluded that a market is less likely to
remain a mixed oligopoly with vertical relations than without vertical relations. However, Willner
(2008) did not consider the possibility of the merger between the public firm and the private firm
in the mixed oligopoly with the vertical relationship.18 Therefore, the merger between the public
firm and the private firm which is our main remarkable point in the analyses of chapters 3, 4, and 5
of this thesis, has not been examined in the previous literature on the vertical merger/integration
in the context of mixed oligopoly. The analyses of the horizontal mergers between the public
firm and the private firm which are conducted in three chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this thesis should be
regarded as one of footholds in order to reveal the linkages of the results and their implications
17If there exists no productivity-improving effect with any horizontal merger in the private oligopoly composed
of managerial firms which are symmetric with respect to their marginal costs, this result cannot be obtained. More
precisely, in such a case, the market structure(s) in equilibrium never coincide(s) with the most preferred market
structure(s) with respect to social welfare.
18In order to conduct such an analysis, for example, taking into account the situation that the vertically merged
public firm can further-merge with the downstream private firm, in the context of the differentiated goods quantity –
or price-setting competition, the achievablity of the merger should be investigated through the comparison between
the payoffs of the owners of all the merger participants before and after such a merger.
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between the merger between the public firm and the private firm in mixed oligopoly with the
vertical relationship and the merger between the public firm and the private firm without the
vertical relationship.19
19Most recently, in the context of private oligopoly, Ziss (1995, 2005) and Mizuno (2009) investigated the effect
of horizontal mergers between upstream firms or between downstream firms in a vertical relationship. We must
tackle such a problem as one of first steps to clarify the linkages of the results and their implications between the
merger between the public firm and the private firm in the context of mixed oligopoly.
Chapter 2
Bargaining over managerial delegation
contracts and merger incentives with
asymmetric costs
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a theoretical analysis of horizontal mergers in a private oligopoly while con-
sidering the strategic managerial delegation contracts presented by Fershtman and Judd (1987),
Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985).1 These works considered a situation in which each firm’s
owner delegates the production decision to a manager in order to improve the firm’s strategic
position in the market. In this chapter, we apply the managerial delegation contract a` la Fersht-
man and Judd and Sklivas and Vickers—the so-called FJSV contract—to horizontal mergers in
a Cournot game. In particular, we focus our attention on the bargaining over the FJSV contract
between an owner and a manager within a single firm. The objective is to consider the merger
problem in a private oligopoly in terms of the official announcement of managerial delegation
contracts which is a significant issue from the perspective of modern corporate governance.
Although there are numerous works on horizontal mergers in a private oligopoly considered
under several environments, recent literature on horizontal mergers focuses her/his attention on
answering the question of how firms merge. The works in this category are referred to as analyses
of endogenous mergers. Further, the works on endogenous mergers are classified according to
two analytical tools: the noncooperative game approach and cooperative game approach. The
noncooperative game approach is extensively adopted in the literature on endogenous mergers.2
However, their results may depend on several assumptions that researchers arbitrarily postulate,
1All the analyses conducted in this chapter are based on those of Nakamura (2009a).
2For example, Kamien and Zang (1990), Gowrisankaran (1999), Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004), Qiu and
Zhou (2007), and Fumagalli and Vasconcelos (2009).
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the order of moves and information structure among players. Thus, we follow the cooperative
game approach presented by Horn and Persson (2001a) in order to comprehensively determine
the market structure(s) that is/are stable after the horizontal mergers, even at the expense of
describing the dynamic processes of merger formation.3 Horn and Persson adopted the core, a
newly defined concept in the context of horizontal mergers in an oligopolistic market. Based
on the idea of the core in Horn and Persson (2001a), Straume (2006) compared the equilibrium
ownership structure(s) with the most preferred ownership structure(s) for social welfare.
In recent works, in the context of managerial delegation contracts, van Witteloostuijn et al.
(2007) studied the bargaining between a firm’s owner and manager over their managerial con-
tracts in order to explain the influence of the disclosure of managerial delegation contracts that
are prescribed in modern corporate governance clauses on market outcomes.4 They showed that
when the FJSV contract is considered, the relative bargaining power of managers is positively
associated with social welfare.5 In this chapter, we examine the role of the bargaining between a
firm’s owner and manager over their managerial delegation contract during the merger process.
In particular, similar to Straume (2006), this chapter considers the stability problem of market
structures a` la Horn and Persson in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly and examines how the in-
ternal organization of firms affects the correspondence between private and social incentives for
horizontal mergers. Through this process, we investigate the bargaining over the FJSV delegation
parameter between an owner and a manager within a single firm.
The main purpose of this chapter is to confirm the scope of Straume’s (2006) results by intro-
ducing the bargaining over the delegation parameter between an owner and a manager within a
single firm in the case of FJSV delegation contracts. Similar to Straume (2006), we consider an
asymmetric three-firm Cournot industry in which the merger process is controlled by the firms’
owners.6 In such a setting, we consider the following three-stage game. In the first stage, the
3Barros (1998) has already investigated the stability of horizontal mergers using the cooperative game approach.
See Brito and Gata (2006) for a detailed discussion on the difference in the definition adopted by Barros (1998) and
that considered by Horn and Persson (2001a).
4According to Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), such a corporate governance code has been codified since
the early 1990s in the UK and US, and subsequently, 24 countries has introduced the corporate governance codes by
the end of the 1990s. Furthermore, van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) indicated that they have been prescribed in more
than 50 countries by the end of 2005.
5Nakamura (2008a) and Kamaga and Nakamura (2008a) extended their scope to the cases of a differentiated
good and a sequential competition, respectively. In both papers, they confirmed the robustness of the result in van
Witteloostuijn et al. (2007). Subsequently, Nakamura (2008b) considered a different cost structure from those in van
Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), Nakamura (2008a), and Kamaga and Nakamura (2008a). Thus, he obtained the result
that if the managers’ relative bargaining power is sufficiently high, its increase leads to the deterioration of social
welfare because of the excessively high total cost in the market.
6Following the sizeable literature on horizontal mergers such as Barros (1998), Faulı´-Oller (2002), Straume
(2006), and Qiu and Zhou (2007), in this chapter, we assume that mergers can yield rationalization gains through
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ownership structure(s) is/are cooperatively determined by the owner of each firm through each
firm’s merger activity. In the second stage, all the firms’ owners negotiate with their managers
over managerial delegation contracts. Subsequently, in the third stage, Cournot competition with
homogeneous goods is observed.7 We find that there exists a degree of cost asymmetry in the in-
dustry such that the equilibrium ownership structure coincides with the most preferred ownership
structure with respect to social welfare. Our result fairly contrasts with that of Straume (2006)
that each firm directly adopts the FJSV contract without the bargaining between the owner and
manager within each firm. Hence, this implies that the importance of the antitrust policy de-
creases if each firm’s manager has bargaining power relative to that of each owner, provided the
degree of cost asymmetry among firms is in the relevant interval. We find that if each firm’s man-
ager can influence the decision of her/his delegation contract, the merger may lead to a socially
preferred ownership structure.8 Therefore, the result of Straume (2006) that the use of strategic
delegation increases the scope for an antitrust policy crucially depends on the fact that the del-
egation parameter of the FJSV contract is determined by the sole profit maximization problem
with respect to each firm’s owner.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2:2 introduces the basic components
of the model. In Section 2:3, we explain the assumptions of the endogenous merger process
based on Horn and Persson (2001a) and Straume (2006). Section 2:4 presents the equilibrium
payoff for each firm’s owner for the four possible regimes: decentralized ownership structure,
merger between low-cost and medium-cost firms, merger between low-cost and high-cost firms,
and merger between high-cost and medium-cost firms. Furthermore, we derive the equilibrium
ownership structure for managerial firms with the bargaining over managerial contracts between
each firm’s owner and manager. In Section 2:5, we discuss the relation between the equilibrium
ownership structures and the social ranking of ownership structures. Section 2:6 presents the con-
cluding remarks. The equilibrium delegation parameters and market outcomes in each ownership
structure and the proofs of all the propositions are available in the Appendix.
the reallocation of production from high-cost to low-cost plants.
7Note that we rule out the possibility of a merger to monopoly a` la Barros (1998) and Straume (2006).
8In particular, whenever the bargaining power of each firm’s manager exceeds one-fifth relative to that of the
owner, there always exists a degree of cost asymmetry among the firms such that the equilibrium ownership structure
coincides with the most preferred ownership structure with respect to social welfare.
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2.2 The model
We consider the stable ownership structure in an industry to be comprised of three initial man-
agerial firms producing homogeneous goods. The inverse demand function is linear in the total
output Q =
P3
i=1 qi as follows:
p (Q) = 1¡Q: (2.1)
Each firm i’s output is sold at the market-clearing price in (2:1) and competes a` la Cournot
(i = 1; 2; 3). We assume that each firm i has an asymmetric constant marginal cost function ci
with each of the other firms, such that c1 < c2 < c3. Similar to Barros (1998) and Straume
(2006), we assume that the differences among the production costs of each firm are symmetric,
and thus, each firm’s cost function is represented as follows:
ci = (i¡ 1) c; i = 1; 2; 3;
where c > 0 indicates a direct measure of production efficiency in the industry. In order to ensure
that the most inefficient firm (firm 3) is active in any ownership structure, we assume that c is
upper-bounded, i.e., c¯.9 The profit of firm i is given by
Πi = [p (Q)¡ (i¡ 1) c] qi; i = 1; 2; 3:
Moreover, if owners i and j decide to merge into a newly merged firm ij, they earn the following
combined profit of firm ij:
Πij = [p (Q)¡min f(i¡ 1) c; (j ¡ 1) cg] qij; i; j = 1; 2; 3 ; i 6= j:
As usual, social welfare, denoted by W , is measured as the sum of the consumer surplus (CS)
and producer surplus (PS):
W = CS + PS;
where PS =
P
iΠi, and consumer surplus is given by
CS =
1
2
Q2:
Similar to Straume (2006), we exclude the possibility of a merger to monopoly because com-
plete monopolization, i.e., merger among all firms, may not be permitted by antitrust authori-
9Further analysis of this chapter shows that c 2 (0; c¯ = (1¡ ¯) = (11 + 7¯)).
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ties.10 Thus, with respect to whether a merger among the firms is realized, we have four possible
ownership structures: (o) the decentralized structure, Mo = ff1g ; f2g ; f3gg; (a) merger be-
tween low-cost and medium-cost firms, Ma = ff1; 2g ; f3gg; (b) merger between high-cost and
low-cost firms, Mb = ff1; 3g ; f2gg; and (c) merger between high-cost and medium-cost firms,
Mc = ff1g ; f2; 3gg.
In each ownership structure, the firm’s owner hires a manager and delegates her/his output
decision to the manager. Each manager sets the output to maximize her/his payoff denoted by an
incentive contract presented by the firm’s owner. Owners are able to assess the performance of
their managers based on two easily observable indicators: profit (Π) and sales (q). In each firm
i, the owner presents the following type of incentive contract Ui to the manager:
Ui (Πi; qi) = Πi + µiqi: (2.2)
The manager of firm i can maximize her/his payoff by setting the value of output qi that max-
imizes Ui.11 In this chapter, on the basis of the managerial delegation contract in (2:2), we
10Taking into account the definition of the decisive owners and the domination relation, similar to the model on
horizontal mergers with international trades which was considered in Horn and Persson (2001b), our model has
the property that whenever a monopoly with the merger among all the three firms makes a larger profit than their
combined profits in more decentralized market structures, such a monopoly will occur if it is permitted. We can
realize that the foundation of the monopoly with the merger among all the firms results from the facts that each
firm’s is free to communicate on the possibility of any merger and to write binding contracts on the distribution
way of the merged firm’s profit among the merger participants. However, similar to many previous literature on
theoretical horizontal mergers including Horn and Persson (2001b), we are not interested in the case wherein the
monopoly for the three-firm merged firm is formed, since in the analysis of this chapter, we focus our attention on
replying the question of whether the market structure(s) with either the merger between two efficient firms or the
merger between two relatively inefficient firm, or the merger between an efficient firm and an inefficient firm can
be stable in the economic environment wherein an owner and a manager bargain over the the content of her/his
delegation contract in an asymmetric private oligopoly. As described in Horn and Persson (2001b), there are two
ways of ruling out the monopoly market structure resulting from all-firm-merger. The first way is that we adopt
the assumption that the monopoly makes a smaller profit than the combined profit in more decentralized market
structure. As the economic situation which such an assumption implies, Porter (1985) indicated the following
situation: The increases of both the absolute size of the merged firm that all the firms are participants and the lack of
competitive pressure lead to her/his organizational inefficiency, and consequently, her/his profit becomes sufficiently
low. Athough we can succeed in being absence of the monopoly for all-firm-merged firm endogenously by taking
into account such a situation, relative to the present model, we must newly adopt further several (probably, somewhat
opaque) assumptions such as the assumption that there is no production-improvement with any merger irrespective
of the facts that the cost function of each firm is asymmetric and constant-marginal-cost typed, and/or the assumption
that there exists some sort of fitting cost between any merger participants which represents the cost incurring in order
to transfer technological know-how between them. Under the above assumptions, we will consider an extremely
restrictive economic situation. Then, as the second alternative way, following Horn and Persson (2001b), we assume
that the monopoly is not permitted for the reason why the monopoly is prohibited in most countries.
11This fact can be supported by the assumption that the payoff to the manager of firm i is defined as ¸i +
¹iUi for some real number ¸i and some positive real number ¹i. Moreover, this type of delegation contract has
been employed by Lambertini (2000), Lambertini and Trombetta (2002), Nakamura (2008c), Nakamura and Inoue
(2009), van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007). Throughout this chapter, we adopt this type of managerial delegation
contract used in Lambertini (2000), Lambertini and Trombetta (2002), and van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), which
is slightly changed from that introduced in Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985), i.e.,
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consider a situation in which the owner and manager bargain over the delegation parameter µi,
where the owner wants to maximize her/his profit, while the manager wants to maximize her/his
payoff (i = 1; 2; 3). The outcome of the bargaining process in firm i is the incentive parameter µi
that maximizes the following Nash product:12
Bi = U
¯
i Π
(1¡¯)
i :
Note that ¯ 2 [0; 1) represents a measure for the bargaining power of each firm’s manager.13
FJSV delegation contract. More precisely, the original FJSV delegation contract in Fershtman and Judd (1987),
Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985) is the weighted sum of each firm’s profit and her/his revenue, and thus, as the
level of the delegation parameter becomes lower in the original FJSV delegation contract, each firm’s manager more
aggressively attempts to produce in the market, while in the delegation contract of the model in this chapter, the
higher level of the delegation parameter yields the more aggressive behavior in the market. Thus, although the
delegation parameters reversely work on market outcomes between the the original FJSV model and the model in
this chapter, the similar results on each firm’s merger incentive and its welfare implications in the two models are
obtained. We have the following two reasons why we employ the delegation contract a` la van Witteloostuijn et al.
(2007) in eq. (2:2), which is slightly changed from the original FJSV delegation contract: First, this is so because
we take into account the firm without any cost owing to the normalization with respect to the cost asymmetry among
existing firms. More precisely, in this case, since the revenue of the firm which can produce without any cost is
the same as her/his profit, if we adopt the approach regarding the original FJSV delegation contract, the objective
function of the manager of the firm becomes her/his revenue/profit, and thus, her/his delegation parameter does not
function in her/his quantity-setting. Thus, we use the approach of the delegation contract a` la Straume (2006) and
van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) in order to avoid such a somewhat problematic situation. Second, this is so because
we would like to investigate the influence of the bargaining over the delegation parameter between an owner and
a manager on each firm’s merger incentive and its welfare implications under the economic situation wherein the
settings of both Straume (2006) and van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) are faithfully and simultaneously reflected.
Thus, in this chapter, the settings of both the delegation contract type and its bargaining style correspond to those in
Straume (2006) and van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007), respectively.
12Throughout this chapter, the bargaining power of each firm’s manager relative to her/his owner, ¯ is exoge-
nously given. Note that both the concrete value of ¯ and the in/decrease of its value depend on the business quality
of the existing firms in the industry, each firm’s adhesive terms and conditions, the degree of progress of the owner-
shareholder’s sovereignty in the industry or the country, and so on. The industry in which the level of ¯ becomes
lower corresponds to the one that the owner-shareholder’s sovereignty more deeply proceeds, since its situation im-
plies the fact that the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner is sufficiently high. For example, in most of
the developing countries, since the owner-shareholder’s sovereignty is not likely to prevail, the bargaining power of
the owner relative to that of the manager may stay low. In addition, even in the developed countries, if the develop-
ment of the legal system with respect to corporate governances does not proceed, the relative bargaining power of
the owner similarly becomes low. Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985) considered the
situation wherein each firm’s owner can choose the content of her/his delegation which is represented as her/his del-
egation parameter from a viewpoint of her/his objective function, i.e., her/his profit. However, one may consider that
such a modelling does not reflect the industry where each firm’s manager opportunistically behaves against her/his
owner’s interest within each firm. In this sense, we can regard the economic situation considered in Fershtman and
Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985) as the situation in which the right of each firm’s owner-shareholder
is extremely guaranteed. Most recently, as described in Introduction of this chapter, taking into account that the
clauses in the modern governance codes such that the disclosure of each firm’s managerial delegation contract is
required are prescribed to protect the right of her/his owner from the opportunistic behavior of her/his manager, the
presence of such a clauses in the modern governance codes should lead to increasing the relative bargaining power of
the owner within each firm, i.e., decreasing the level of ¯. In this chapter, we consider the influence of the presence
of such a clauses in the modern governance codes which has an effect of increasing the bargaining power of each
firm’s owner relative to that of the manager on her/his managerial incentive and welfare implications.
13The bargaining between the owner and the manager is modeled on the generalized Nash bargaining solution in
Binmore et al. (1986). Note that we adopt the generalized Nash bargaining in order to reflect the influence of the
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In this chapter, we assume that all the firms’ managers have the same bargaining power. The
disagreement point of both the owner and the manager is zero: This fact is supported by assuming
that all the owners do not have the ability to operate their own firms and all the managers cannot
obtain employment elsewhere.
2.3 Merger as a coalition formation and the core
In this section, in order to analyze the owners’ decision-making on merger activities, we will use
an approach developed by Horn and Persson (2001a) and applied by Straume (2006). In the rest
of the chapter, we use the notations 1, 2, and 3 to denote firms 1, 2, and 3, respectively, as well
as to denote their respective owners.
First, we define the domination relations among the ownership structures to introduce the
formal definition of the core of ownership structures. An ownership structure Mi is defined as a
partition of the set f1; 2; 3g of owners into coalitions. An ownership structure Mj is said to be
dominated by Mi via a decisive group of owners if the combined profit of the decisive group
of owners is larger in Mi than in Mj . Here, the decisive owners indicate the smallest group of
owners that can induce a new market structure Mi from the present markets structure Mj . Similar
to Straume (2006), we do not permit any side-payment between the coalitions of owners. Thus,
when Mi is formed from Mj , the decisive owners are all the remaining owners, except the owners
that belong to the same coalitions in Mi and Mj .14
We illustrate this notion of decisive owners with the help of some examples. First, let us
consider ownership structures Mo and Mi (i = a; b; c). In this case, the decisive group of owners
is the subset of f1; 2; 3g to which only the independent owner in Mi does not belong (i = a; b; c).
For example, in the case of Mo and Ma, the decisive group of owners is f1; 2g. Second, we
consider Mi and Mj , (i; j = a; b; c ; i 6= j), i.e., a pair of ownership structures with merger. In
all three cases, the decisive group of owners is equal to f1; 2; 3g. For example, in the case of Ma
and Mb, if both owners 1 and 2 prefer Ma to Mb, while owner 3 disagrees on the foundation of
the ownership structure Ma from Mb, it would be natural that owner 1, who has jointly operated
manager within each firm in deciding her/his delegation parameter which denotes the content of her/his managerial
delegation contract with respect to her/his salary, different from the determination type of the FJSV delegation in
the original setting of Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985), i.e., the maximization of
each firm’s profit. This is so because we would like to attempt to consider the effect of the disclosure of managerial
delegation contract which increases the influence of the owner within each firm on her/his merger incentive and its
welfare implication by taking into account the situation that the influence of the manager within her/his firm is high,
when her/his delegation parameter is determined through the bargaining between the owner and the manager.
14See Horn and Persson (2001a) for the formal definition of the decisive group.
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firm 13 with owner 3 in Mb must seek owner 3’s cooperation in order to create a new ownership
structure Ma. Thus, all the three owners are decisive.
Finally, in accordance with the above domination relation, we specify the concept of the core
as our solution concept in order to predict the outcome of the merger formation based on the
ranking of any pair of ownership structures. As usual, the core is defined as a set composed of
ownership structures that are not dominated by any other ownership structure. Following Horn
and Persson (2001a) and Straume (2006), we refer to ownership structures belonging to the core
as equilibrium ownership structures (EOSs).
2.4 Equilibrium ownership structure
We now discuss the equilibrium outcomes in each ownership structure. Let µi (Mj) denote the
equilibrium outcome of the delegation parameter of owner i in the ownership structure Mj .15
We find that µi (Mj) > 0 for all ¯ 2 [0; 1), i, and j. Thus, similar to a standard delegation
game such as that in Straume (2006), the bargaining between a firm’s owner and manager over the
delegation parameter leads to more competitive equilibrium in each ownership structure. Further,
we observe the same result as that in Straume (2006) that µi < µj if cj < ci for all i and j. Thus,
we also obtain the result that the use of the sales delegation reinforces the asymmetry of each
firm’s market outcome caused by the initial difference of their marginal costs, which is similar
to the results obtained in Fershtman and Judd (1987), Das (1997), Saracho (2002), and Straume
(2006) under various environments.
Moreover, the increase of the relative bargaining power of the manager in each firm yields
further differences in the outputs of a strong firm and a weak firm in all the market structures,
i.e., given that c 2 (0; c¯),
@µ1 (Mo)
@¯
>
@µ2 (Mo)
@¯
>
@µ3 (Mo)
@¯
; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) ;
@µ12 (Ma)
@¯
>
@µ3 (Ma)
@¯
; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) ;
@µ13 (Mb)
@¯
>
@µ2 (Mb)
@¯
; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) ;
and
@µ1 (Mc)
@¯
>
@µ23 (Mc)
@¯
; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) :
15In each ownership structure, the equilibrium delegation parameter of each firm and the equilibrium market
outcomes are represented in the Appendix.
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Consequently, in all the ownership structures, the bargaining within each firm over the delegation
parameter between an owner and a manager leads to a further increase in the market share of the
strong firm, as compared to the case when the sales delegation is undertaken by firms’ owners
for profit-maximizing.16
Next, we present the payoff of each firm’s owner in all the four ownership structures.17 Let
Vi (Mj) denote an payoff of each firm i’s owner in ownership j (j = o; a; b; c).
(o) Decentralized ownership structure ff1g ; f2g ; f3gg: In this case, the three firms with inde-
pendent operations, and the payoffs of the three firms’ owners are respectively given as follows:
V1 (Mo) = Π1 (Mo) =
3 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ + 9c (1 + ¯)]2
4 (1¡ ¯) (5 + 4¯)2 ; V2 (Mo) = Π2 (Mo) =
3 (1¡ c)2 (1¡ ¯2)
4 (5 + 4¯)2
;
and V3 (Mo) = Π3 (Mo) =
3 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (11 + 7¯)]2
4 (1¡ ¯) (5 + 4¯)2 :
(a) Merger between the low-cost and medium-cost firms ff1; 2g ; f3gg: In this structure,
firms 1 and 2 merge into a new firm 12, while firm 3 operates independently. Then, the sum of
the payoffs of the owners of the pre-merged firms 1 and 2 obtained in firm 12, and the payoff of
firm 3’s owner are respectively given as follows:
V12 (Ma) = Π12 (Ma) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ + 4c (1 + ¯)]2
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 ;
and V3 (Ma) = Π3 (Ma) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ 2c (3 + ¯)]2
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 :
(b) Merger between the high-cost and low-cost firms ff1; 3g ; f2gg: In this case, firms 1 and
3 merge into a new firm 13, while firm 2 operates independently. The sum of the payoffs of the
16In addition, the value of the partial differentiation of the delegation parameter of the relative weak firm with
respect to ¯ in each of the ownership structures may be negative when the degree of cost asymmetry among firms is
sufficiently large, as is illustrated below:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
@µ3 (Mo) =@¯ =
6[(1¡¯)2¡c(26+38¯+17¯2)]
(5¡¯¡4¯2)2 R 0, c Q
(1¡¯)2
26+38¯+17¯2 (< c¯; 8¯ 2 [0; 1)) ;
@µ3 (Ma) =@¯ =
4[3(1¡¯)2¡4c(7+6¯+3¯2)]
(5¡2¯¡3¯2)2 R 0, c Q
3(1¡¯)2
4(7+6¯+3¯2) (< c¯; 8¯ 2 (0:124647; 1)) ;
@µ2 (Mb) =@¯ =
4[3(1¡¯)2+2c(7+6¯+3¯2)]
(5¡2¯¡3¯2)2 R 0, c Q
3(1¡¯)2
2(7+6¯+3¯2) (< c¯; 8¯ 2 (0:504889; 1)) ;
@µ23 (Mc) =@¯ =
4[3(1¡¯)2¡2c(7+6¯+3¯2)]
(5¡2¯¡3¯2)2 R 0, c Q
3(1¡¯)2
2(7+6¯+3¯2) (< c¯; 8¯ 2 (0:504889; 1)) :
17The case where ¯ = 0 on the equilibrium payoffs of the firms’ owners in each ownership structure as described
below corresponds to that without the bargaining between an owner and a manager, which was obtained in Straume
(2006). Note that the equilibrium outcomes obtained in this chapter do not completely coincide with those in
Straume (2006) because he adopted a slightly different contract regime from that in this chapter; U 0i (Πi; qi) =
µiΠi + (1¡ µi) qi.
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owners of the pre-merged firms 1 and 3 obtained in firm 13 and the payoff of firm 2’s owner are
respectively given as follows:
V13 (Mb) = Π13 (Mb) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ + 2c (1 + ¯)]2
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 ;
and V2 (Mb) = Π2 (Mb) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (3 + ¯)]2
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 :
(c) Merger between the high-cost and medium-cost firms ff1g ; f2; 3gg: In this structure,
firms 2 and 3 merge into a new firm 23. The sum of the payoffs of the owners of the pre-merged
firms 2 and 3 obtained in firm 23 and the payoff of the owner of firm 1 are respectively given as
follows:
V1 (Mc) = Π1 (Mc) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ + 2c (1 + ¯)]2
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 ;
and V23 (Mc) = Π23 (Mc) =
2 (1 + ¯) (1¡ ¯ ¡ c (3 + ¯)]2
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 :
The game is characterized by the following order of moves: In the first stage, the equilibrium
ownership structure(s), i.e., the EOS(s) is/are determined by negotiation among the firms’ own-
ers. In the second stage, each firm’s delegation parameter is determined through the bargaining
between the owner and the manager within each firm, and subsequently, in the third and final
stage, each firm’s manager simultaneously chooses the output level with respect to the maxi-
mization of her/his FJSV delegation contract. The following illustrates each firm’s incentive for
a horizontal merger on the basis of the firm’s owner, determined by the bargaining between the
firm’s owner and manager over the delegation parameter.
Proposition 2.1. The EOSs are classified into the following two cases in accordance with a
direct measure of cost asymmetry in the industry, denoted below as c:8<:Mb or Mc if c 2
³
0; 2(1¡¯)
2
3(13+14¯+5¯2)
i
;
Ma if c 2
h
2(1¡¯)2
3(13+14¯+5¯2)
; c¯
´
:
Proof. See Appendix.
The statement of Proposition 2:1 coincides with that of Proposition 2 in Straume (2006).
Thus, as indicated in Straume (2006), our result is analogous to those in Gonza´lez-Maestre and
Lo´pez-Cun˜at (2001) and Ziss (2001). These papers showed that the optimal managerial dele-
gation contract a` la Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) will generally increase the
profitability of horizontal mergers in a symmetric Cournot system. Moreover, in the case where
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the original firms are cost-asymmetric, it is well-known that the use of the managerial delegation
contract increases the profitability of horizontal mergers as compared to its non-use. Thus, sim-
ilar to Straume (2006), in the case where the owner and manager within each firm bargain over
the delegation parameter, an ownership structure(s) with some type of merger is/are EOS(s) for
all c 2 (0; c¯). The increase in the relative bargaining power of each firm’s manager, ¯ implies
aggressive behavior of each firm in market competition, and the low-cost firm becomes a stronger
competitor in the ownership structure with some merger.18 Further, the effect of the increase of
cost asymmetry among the initial three firms plays the same role as that of the increase of ¯.19
Thus, in particular, when the degree of cost asymmetry of the industry is sufficiently high, the
efficient merged entity, as a result of the merger between firms 1 and 2, enjoys its near-monopoly
position, wherein the industry profit in Ma is higher than those in Mb and Mc. Hence, ownership
structure Ma is a unique EOS. On the other hand, in the case where the value of c is sufficiently
low, the other two types of ownership structures with different mergers are EOSs, and thus, are
in the core.
18In ownership structures with some type of merger, the market shares of the stronger firms in each structure are
as follows: for any ¯ 2 [0; 1),
q12 (Ma)
Q (Ma)
=
1¡ ¯ + 4c (1 + ¯)
2 (1¡ c) (1¡ ¯) >
1¡ ¯ + 2c (1 + ¯)
(2¡ c) (1¡ ¯) =
q13 (Mb)
Q (Mb)
=
q1 (Mc)
Q (Mc)
> 0; 8c 2 (0; c¯) :
Thus, the market share of the stronger firm in Ma is the highest among those in the three ownership structures with
some type of merger. Moreover, the partial differentiation of the market share of the stronger firm in each regime
with some merger with respect to ¯ is as follows: for any ¯ 2 [0; 1),
@
µ
q12 (Ma)
Q (Ma)
¶
=@¯ =
4c
(1¡ c) (1¡ ¯)2 >
4c
(2¡ c) (1¡ ¯)2 = @
µ
q13 (Mb)
Q (Mb)
¶
=@¯ = @
µ
q1 (Mc)
Q (Mc)
¶
=@¯ > 0;
8c 2 (0; c¯) :
Thus, as the value of the relative bargaining power of each firm’s manager, ¯ increases, the market share of the low-
cost firm in each structure with some form of merger increases. Consequently, the stronger firm in each ownership
structure with some type of merger enjoys a more advantageous position in this model with ¯ 2 [0; 1), relative to
Straume (2006)’s model, which corresponds to ¯ = 0.
19The partial differentiation of the market share of the stronger firm in each regime with some merger with respect
to c is as follows: for any ¯ 2 [0; 1),
@
µ
q12 (Ma)
Q (Ma)
¶
=@c =
5 + 3¯
2 (1¡ c)2 (1¡ ¯) >
5 + 3¯
(2¡ c)2 (1¡ ¯) = @
µ
q13 (Mb)
Q (Mb)
¶
=@c = @
µ
q1 (Mc)
Q (Mc)
¶
=@c > 0;
8c 2 (0; c¯) :
Therefore, similar to the increase in ¯, the increase in c provides the stronger firm in each ownership structure with
some type of merger with more advantage.
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2.5 Socially preferred ownership structure versus equilibrium
ownership structure
Our next interest is to examine whether the most preferred ownership structure with respect to
social welfare coincides with the EOS. If W (Mi) > W (Mj), Mi is considered to be socially
preferred to Mj and is represented as Mi Â Mj . In this section, since W (Mb) = W (Mc), the
two ownership structures Mb and Mc are together referred to as Mb. By comparing the social
welfare in different ownership structures, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. In accordance with the value of c, the most preferred ownership structure with
respect to social welfare is classified according to the following two cases:(
Mb if c 2 (c¤; c¤¤) ; when ¯ 2 (0:174504; 1) ; and
Mo otherwise;
where
c¤ =
·
1275 + 950¯ ¡ 852¯2 ¡ 1062¯3 ¡ 311¯4
¡4 (25 + 10¯ ¡ 23¯2 ¡ 12¯3)p¡39 + 194¯ + 169¯2
¸
26875 + 71510¯ + 71692¯2 + 31692¯3 + 5321¯4
and
c¤¤ =
·
1275 + 950¯ ¡ 852¯2 ¡ 1062¯3 ¡ 311¯4
+4 (25 + 10¯ ¡ 23¯2 ¡ 12¯3)p¡39 + 194¯ + 169¯2
¸
26875 + 71510¯ + 71692¯2 + 31692¯3 + 5321¯4
:
Proof. See Appendix.
The merger among relatively low-cost firms yields a higher market concentration, resulting in
an increase in the market price, and thus, distorting the market allocation. In ownership structure
Ma, the large cost difference between firms 12 and 3 increases the market price. Consequently,
its negative effect toward social welfare outweighs the positive effect of cost saving arising from
such a merger. Moreover, by applying the discussion in Straume (2006), the intuition behind the
fact that Mo is the most socially preferred ownership structure of the four, in the large range of
direct measures of cost asymmetry in the industry c is explained as follows. With an increase in
the relative bargaining power of the manager, ¯, vis-a`-vis that of the owner, production becomes
aggressive. This deters the output from rival firms and results in a greater market share of the
low-cost firm in this case than in the case of the managerial delegation a` la Straume. Thus, the
increase in the value of ¯ enhances the efficiency of production allocation in Mo. As a result,
the social welfare in ownership structures with some type of merger is lower than that of the
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decentralized ownership structure in the large range of the value of parameter c. On the other
hand, at the medium level of c, either ownership structure — Mb or Mc — becomes the most
preferred ownership structure with respect to social welfare within a large range of parameter
¯. At the medium level of c, the positive effect toward social welfare, whereby the merger
involving the highest cost firm leads to the saving of the total cost in the industry, outweighs the
negative effect of underproduction arising from such a merger. In contrast to Proposition 4 in
Straume (2006), in the case where each firm’s owner and manager bargain over the delegation
parameter, we find that there exist certain values of parameter c such that the social welfare in
both ownership structures Mb and Mc is higher than that in Mo. Considering the above two
propositions, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2.3. In the case where an owner and a manager bargain over the delegation param-
eter, the EOS, Mb or Mc, coincides with the most preferred ownership structure with respect to
social welfare for any c 2 ¡c¤; 2 (1¡ ¯)2 =3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2)¤ when ¯ 2 (0:193340; 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
Unlike Proposition 5 in Straume (2006), we find that the bargaining between a firm’s owner
and manager over the delegation parameter decreases the necessity for regulating merger policies
by antitrust authorities in the medium level of a direct measure of cost asymmetry in the industry,
c, when the relative bargaining power of the manager of each firm exceeds one-fifth. As described
in Introduction of this chapter, modern corporate governance codes include clauses requiring the
disclosure of managerial delegation contract in order to protect the owner-shareholders from the
opportunistic behaviors of the managers. Thus, since the presence of such clauses in corporate
governance lead to increasing the influence of the owner within each firm, it results in decreasing
the level of ¯. From Proposition 2:3, we realize that the revelation of each firm’s delegation
contract may increase the necessity of a more active merger policy, if the value of ¯ is around
1=5 and the direct measure of cost asymmetry in the industry, c is intermediate-level.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examined horizontal mergers in a private oligopoly composed of asymmetric firms
with respect to productivity, where owners and managers bargain over FJSV delegation contracts.
We found that there exists a range of values of the direct measure of cost asymmetry in the
industry, c, such that the social welfare in the ownership structure with some type of merger is
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higher than that in the decentralized ownership structure, when the bargaining over the delegation
parameter between each firm’s owner and manager occurs. Thus, in our setting, the disclosure
of managerial delegation contracts required by modern corporate governance codes may lead to
an appropriate type of merger with respect to social welfare, and consequently, the scope for an
antitrust policy may decrease. It is worth mentioning that a socially preferred merger occurs as
an equilibrium where the relative bargaining power of each firm’s manager influences her/his
managerial contract through the bargaining between an owner and a manager, in contrast to the
result in Straume (2006) where the relative bargaining power of the manager is not considered.
An interesting extension of our model would be to investigate the robustness of our result the
sequential-movement of each firm in the market, for example, the two types of Stackelberg com-
petitions for the merged firm’s leader and follower. As another plausible next step, it would be
fruitful to examine the implications of international trade in an international oligopoly. Note that
the extension of the analysis in this chapter towards such a direction has been already attempted
in Nakamura (2010). Although Nakamura (2010) considered the influence of the bargaining over
the delegation parameter between an owner and a manger within each firm on her/his merger
incentive and its welfare implications in the context of the international oligopoly, he restricted
his attention into the situation wherein each firm’s cost function is symmetric. Thus, the re-
search on the horizontal mergers in the international oligopoly with asymmetric firms which was
investigated in this chapter is still left.
Furthermore, as one of our future researches, we should consider the other managerial delega-
tion regimes except for the sales delegation, for example, the market share delegation presented
in Jansen et al. (2007) and Ritz (2008), and the relative-performance delegation case in Miller
and Pazgal (2001, 2002) and Salas Fumas (1992), but in the above two delegation regimes, the
market share delegation regime that each firm i’s delegation contract is the weighted sum of
her/his profit (Πi) and market share (qi=Q) and the relative performance delegation regime that
each firm i’s delegation contract is the weighted sum of her/his profit (Πi) and the other firm j’s
profit (Πj), (i 6= j), we cannot obtain the result on each firm’s merger incentive and its welfare
implication from the calculational problem occuring in solving the subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium of each ownership structure.20 Therefore, if in the other managerial delegation regimes
except for the sales delegation, we would like to attempt to clarify the influence of the bargain-
20In both the market share delegation and the relative performance delegation, the subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium in each ownership structure cannot be obtained owing to the asymmetry of her/his marginal cost among firms,
although they can be explicitly obtained in the main previous works regarding the market share delegation of Jansen
et al. (2007) and Ritz (2008), and regarding the relative performance delegation of Miller and Pazgal (2001, 2002)
and Salas Fumas (1992), respectively, in the case wherein the cost function of each firm is symmetric.
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ing over the delegation parameter between an owner and a manager within each firm on her/his
merger incentive and its welfare implications under the same setting as that in this chapter which
the existing firm’s productivity is different with each other, we must engage in simulation and
numerical analyses using computer softwares in order to obtain some sort of tractable results.
Extending our model into these directions remains for our future researches.
Appendix
Equilbrium outcomes in four types of market outcomes
(o) Decentralized ownership structure ff1g ; f2g ; f3gg: In this structure, we consider that the
equilibrium outcome of the bargaining between the owners and managers over the delegation
parameter within each of the three firms. In the third stage, the three firms’ managers simul-
taneously choose their output levels with respect to the maximization of their FJSV delegation
contract. The delegation contract of the firm’s manager is
Ui (qj; j = 1; 2; 3) =
Ã
1¡
3X
i=1
qi
!
qi ¡ [(i¡ 1) c¡ µi] qi; i = 1; 2; 3:
Then, as a consequence of the simultaneous quantity-setting competition among the three firm’s
managers in the third stage, the output level of each firm is obtained as follows:
qi (µj; j = 1; 2; 3) =
1
4
"
1 + (7¡ 4i) c+ 3µi ¡
3X
j=1;j 6=i
µj
#
; i = 1; 2; 3:
Further, the bargaining function of each firm in the second stage is as follows:
Bi (µj; j = 1; 2; 3) = U
¯
i Π
(1¡¯)
i ; i = 1; 2; 3;
where
Ui (µj; j = 1; 2; 3) =
1
16
"
1 + (7¡ 4i) c+ 3µi ¡
3X
j=1;j 6=i
µj
#2
;
Πi (µj; j = 1; 2; 3) =
1
16
"
1 + (7¡ 4i) c+ 3µi ¡
3X
j=1;j 6=i
µj
#"
1 + (7¡ 4i) c¡
3X
i=1
µi
#
;
i = 1; 2; 3:
The solution to the bargaining problem of each firm in the second stage is
µi (µj; i 6= j) = argmax
µi
Bi (µj; j = 1; 2; 3)
, 1 + (1 + 2¯) (7¡ 4i) c¡ 3µi ¡
3X
j=1;j 6=i
µj + 2¯
Ã
1¡
3X
j=1;j 6=i
µj
!
= 0; i = 1; 2; 3;
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yielding
µ1 (Mo) =
(1 + 2¯) [1¡ ¯ + 9c (1 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 4¯) ; µ2 (Mo) =
(1 + 2¯) (1¡ c)
5 + 4¯
;
µ3 (Mo) =
(1 + 2¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (11 + 7¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 4¯) :
The equilibrium market outcomes of each firm’s output, consumer surplus, and social welfare are
obtained as follows:
q1 (Mo) =
3 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ + 9c (1 + ¯)]
2 (1¡ ¯) (5 + 4¯) ; q2 (Mo) =
3 (1¡ c) (1 + ¯)
2 (5 + 4¯)
;
q3 (Mo) =
3 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (11 + 7¯)]
2 (1¡ ¯) (5 + 4¯) ; Q (Mo) =
9 (1¡ c) (1 + ¯)
2 (5 + 4¯)
;
CS (Mo) =
81 (1¡ c)2 (1 + ¯)2
8 (5 + 4¯)2
;
W (Mo) =
3 (1 + ¯) [3 (1¡ 2c) (1¡ ¯) (11 + 7¯) + c2 (433 + 628¯ + 235¯2)]
8 (1¡ ¯) (5 + 4¯)2 :
(a) Merger between low-cost and medium-cost firms ff1; 2g ; f3gg: Next, we consider the
case where the two relatively low-cost firms merge into a new firm denoted by 12. Let q12 and
Π12 be the output level and profit of firm 12, respectively. In this structure, in the third stage, the
delegation contracts of the managers of both firm 12 and firm 3 are(
U12 (q12; q3) = [1¡ (q12 + q3) + µ12] q12; and
U3 (q12; q3) = [1¡ (q12 + q3)] q3 ¡ [2c¡ µ3] q3;
respectively. As a consequence of the market competition in the third stage, the output level of
each firm is obtained as follows:
q12 (µ12; µ3) =
1
3
(1 + 2c+ 2µ12 ¡ µ3) ; q3 (µ12; µ3) = 1
3
(1¡ 4c¡ µ12 + 2µ3) :
Then, the bargaining function of firm 12 in the second stage is as follows:
B12 (µ12; µ3) =
1
9
£
(1 + 2c+ 2µ12 ¡ µ3)2
¤¯
[(1 + 2c¡ µ12 ¡ µ3) (1 + 2c+ 2µ12 ¡ µ3)](1¡¯) :
Moreover, the bargaining function of firm 3 in the second stage is as follows:
B3 (µ12; µ3) =
1
9
£
(1¡ 4c¡ µ12 + 2µ3)2
¤¯
[(1¡ 4c¡ µ12 + 2µ3) (1¡ 4c¡ µ12 ¡ µ3)](1¡¯) :
The solution to the bargaining problem of each firm in the second stage is obtained as follows:(
µ12 (µ3) = argmaxµ12 B12 (µ12; µ3), 1 + c (2 + 6¯)¡ 4µ12 + 3¯ (1¡ µ3)¡ µ3 = 0;
µ3 (µ12) = argmaxµ3 B3 (µ12; µ3), 1¡ 4c (1 + 3¯) + 3¯ (1¡ µ12)¡ µ12 ¡ 4µ3 = 0;
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yielding
µ12 (Ma) =
(1 + 3¯) [1¡ ¯ + 4c (1 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) ; µ3 (Ma) =
(1 + 3¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ 2c (3 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) :
In the equilibrium, we obtain the following market outcomes:
q12 (Ma) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ + 4c (1 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) ; q3 (Ma) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ 2c (3 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) ;
Q (Ma) =
4 (1¡ c) (1 + ¯)
5 + 3¯
; CS (Ma) =
8 (1¡ c)2 (1 + ¯)2
(5 + 3¯)2
;
W (Ma) =
4 (1 + ¯) [(1¡ 2c) (1¡ ¯) (3 + ¯) + 4c2 (7 + 7¯ + 2¯2)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 :
(b) Merger between low-cost and high-cost firms ff1; 3g ; f2gg: In this structure, the most
efficient and inefficient firms—firms 1 and 3, respectively—merge into a new firm 13. Let q13
and Π13 denote the output and profit, respectively, of the merged firm 13. In this structure, the
delegation contracts of both firm 13 and firm 2 in the third stage are obtained as follows:(
U13 (q13; q2) = [1¡ (q13 + q2) + µ13] q13;
U2 (q13; q2) = [1¡ (q13 + q2)] q2 ¡ (c¡ µ2) q2:
In the market competition, the following result on each firm’s output level in the third stage is
q13 (µ13; µ2) =
1
3
(1 + c+ 2µ13 ¡ µ2) ; q2 (µ13; µ2) = 1
3
(1¡ 2c¡ µ13 + 2µ2) :
Then, the bargaining function of firm 13 in the second stage is obtained as follows:
B13 (µ13; µ2) =
1
9
£
(1 + c+ 2µ13 ¡ µ2)2
¤¯
[(1 + c¡ µ13 ¡ µ2) (1 + c+ 2µ13 ¡ µ2)](1¡¯) :
Furthermore, the bargaining function of firm 2 in the second stage is as follows:
B2 (µ13; µ2) =
1
9
£
(1¡ 2c¡ µ13 + 2µ2)2
¤¯
[(1¡ 2c¡ µ13 + 2µ2) (1¡ 2c¡ µ13 ¡ µ2)](1¡¯) :
The solution to the bargaining problem of each firm in the second stage is obtained as follows:(
µ13 (µ2) = argmaxµ13 B13 (µ13; µ2), 1 + c+ 3c¯ ¡ 4µ13 + 3¯ (1¡ µ2)¡ µ2 = 0;
µ2 (µ13) = argmaxµ2 B2 (µ13; µ2), 1¡ c (2 + 6¯) + 3¯ (1¡ µ13)¡ µ13 ¡ 4µ2 = 0;
yielding
µ13 (Mb) =
(1 + 3¯) [1¡ ¯ + 2c (1 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) ; µ2 (Mb) =
(1 + 3¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (3 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) :
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Moreover, the equilibrium market outcomes are obtained as follows:
q13 (Mb) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ + 2c (1 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) ; q2 (Mb) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (3 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) ;
Q (Mb) =
2 (2¡ c) (1 + ¯)
5 + 3¯
; CS (Mb) =
2 (2¡ c)2 (1 + ¯)2
(5 + 3¯)2
;
W (Mb) =
4 (1 + ¯) [(1¡ c) (1¡ ¯) (3 + ¯) + c2 (7 + 7¯ + 2¯2)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 :
(c) Merger between high-cost and medium-cost firms ff1g ; f2; 3gg: Finally, we examine the
case where the two relatively inefficient firms—firms 2 and 3—merge into one firm denoted by
23. Let q23 and Π23 be firm 23’s output level and profit, respectively. In the third stage, the
delegation contracts of both the firms 1 and 23 are obtained as follows:(
U1 (q1; q23) = [1¡ (q1 + q23) + µ1] q1;
U23 (q1; q23) = [1¡ (q1 + q23)] q23 ¡ (c¡ µ23) q23:
The following output level of each firm is obtained as a result of market competition:
q1 (µ1; µ23) =
1
3
(1 + c+ 2µ1 ¡ µ23) ; q23 (µ1; µ23) = 1
3
(1¡ 2c¡ µ1 + 2µ23) :
Then, the bargaining function of firm 1 in the second stage is obtained as follows:
B1 (µ1; µ23) =
1
9
£
(1 + c+ 2µ1 ¡ µ23)2
¤¯
[(1 + c¡ µ1 ¡ µ23) (1 + c+ 2µ1 ¡ µ23)](1¡¯) :
Moreover, the bargaining function of firm 23 is obtained as follows:
B23 (µ1; µ23) =
1
9
£
(1¡ 2c¡ µ1 + 2µ23)2
¤¯
[(1¡ 2c¡ µ1 + 2µ23) (1¡ 2c¡ µ1 ¡ µ23)](1¡¯) :
The solution to the bargaining problem of each firm is(
µ1 (µ23) = argmaxµ1 B1 (µ1; µ23), 1 + c+ 3c¯ ¡ 4µ1 + 3¯ (1¡ µ23)¡ µ23 = 0;
µ23 (µ1) = argmaxµ23 B23 (µ1; µ23), 1¡ c (2 + 6¯) + 3¯ (1¡ µ1)¡ µ1 ¡ 4µ23 = 0;
yielding
µ1 (Mc) =
(1 + 3¯) [1¡ ¯ + 2c (1 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) ; µ23 (Mc) =
(1 + 3¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (3 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) :
Furthermore, we obtain the equilibrium market outcomes as follows:
q1 (Mc) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ + 2c (1 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) ; q23 (Mc) =
2 (1 + ¯) [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (3 + ¯)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯) ;
Q (Mc) =
2 (2¡ c) (1 + ¯)
5 + 3¯
; CS (Mc) =
2 (2¡ c)2 (1 + ¯)2
(5 + 3¯)2
;
W (Mc) =
4 (1 + ¯) [(1¡ c) (1¡ ¯) (3 + ¯) + c2 (7 + 7¯ + 2¯2)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 :
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Proof of Proposition 2.1
We compare the three ownership structures with some type of merger involving the decentralized
ownership structure. Thus, we show that the ownership structure Mo is dominated by any of the
three ownership structures with a merger. First, we obtain the following result regarding the two
ownership structures Mo and Ma. Considering that
d (V12 (Ma)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V2 (Mo)))
dc
=
(1¡ ¯) [100 + 205¯ + 33¯2 ¡ 217¯3 ¡ 121¯4 ¡ c (1475 + 3930¯ + 3638¯2 + 1242¯3 + 83¯4)]
(1¡ ¯) (25 + 35¯ + 12¯2)2
R 0, c Q (1¡ ¯) (100 + 305¯ + 338¯
2 + 121¯3)
1475 + 3930¯ + 3638¯2 + 1242¯3 + 83¯4
;
and
c¯¡ (1¡ ¯) (100 + 305¯ + 338¯
2 + 121¯3)
1475 + 3930¯ + 3638¯2 + 1242¯3 + 83¯4
=
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 4¯) (75¡ 85¯ ¡ 375¯2 ¡ 191¯3)
(11 + 7¯) (1475 + 3930¯ + 3638¯2 + 1242¯3 + 83¯4)
R 0, ¯ Q 0:328092;
we will analyze the following two cases: (a) ¯ ¸ 0:328092 and (b) ¯ < 0:328092.
Case (a) : ¯ ¸ 0:328092
In this case, we obtain the result that
min
c2[0;c¯)
[V12 (Ma)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V2 (Mo))] = [V12 (Ma)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V2 (Mo))]
¯¯¯¯
c=0
=
(1¡ ¯) (1 + ¯) (25 + 70¯ + 37¯2)
2 (25 + 35¯ + 12¯2)2
> 0; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) :
Case (b) : ¯ < 0:328092
In this case, we obtain the result that
min
c2[0;c¯]
[V12 (Ma)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V2 (Mo))]
= min
½
[V12 (Ma)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V2 (Mo))]
¯¯¯¯
c=0
; [V12 (Ma)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V2 (Mo))]
¯¯¯¯
c=c¯
¾
= [V12 (Ma)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V2 (Mo))]
¯¯¯¯
c=0
=
(1¡ ¯) (1 + ¯) (25 + 70¯ + 37¯2)
2 (25 + 35¯ + 12¯2)2
> 0; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) :
Thus, from the analysis of the above two cases, we obtain that V12 (Ma) > (V1 (Mo) + V2 (Mo))
for any c 2 (0; c¯).
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Second, we compare both the values of V13 (Mb) and (V1 (Mo) + V3 (Mo)). Since
d (V13 (Mb)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V3 (Mo)))
dc
=
(1 + ¯) [275+260¯¡150¯2¡284¯3¡101¯4¡c(7175+19500¯+19886¯2+8964¯3+1499¯4)]
(1¡ ¯) (25 + 35¯ + 12¯2)2
R 0, c Q (1¡ ¯) (275 + 535¯ + 385¯
2 + 101¯3)
7175 + 19500¯ + 19886¯2 + 8964¯3 + 1499¯4
;
and
c¯¡ (1¡ ¯) (275 + 535¯ + 385¯
2 + 101¯3)
7175 + 19500¯ + 19886¯2 + 8964¯3 + 1499¯4
=
2 (1¡ ¯) (1 + ¯) (5 + 4¯) (415 + 422¯ + 99¯2)
(11 + 7¯) (7175 + 19500¯ + 19886¯2 + 8964¯3 + 1499¯4)
> 0; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) ;
we get
min
c2[0;c¯]
[V13 (Mb)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V3 (Mo))]
= min
½
[V13 (Mb)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V3 (Mo))]
¯¯¯¯
c=0
;
£
V13 (Mb)¡
¡
V A1 (Mo) + V
A
3 (Mo)
¢¤ ¯¯¯¯
c=c¯
¾
= [V13 (Mb)¡ (V1 (Mo) + V3 (Mo))]
¯¯¯¯
c=c¯
=
2 (1¡ ¯) (1 + ¯) (19 + 54¯ + 27¯2)
(55 + 68¯ + 21¯2)2
> 0; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) :
Thus, we obtain the result that V13 (Mb) > (V1 (Mo) + V3 (Mo)) for any c 2 (0; c¯).
Third, we compare V23 (Mc) with (V2 (Mo) + V3 (Mo)). Since
d (V23 (Mc)¡ (V2 (Mo) + V3 (Mo)))
dc
=
(1 + ¯) [150 + 35¯ ¡ 105¯2 ¡ 63¯3 ¡ 17¯4 ¡ c (3675 + 9150¯ + 8726¯2 + 3758¯3 + 611¯4)]
(1¡ ¯) (25 + 35¯ + 12¯2)2
R 0, c Q (1¡ ¯) (150 + 185¯ + 80¯
2 + 17¯3)
3675 + 9150¯ + 8726¯2 + 3758¯3 + 611¯4
;
and
c¯¡ (1¡ ¯) (150 + 185¯ + 80¯
2 + 17¯3)
3675 + 9150¯ + 8726¯2 + 3758¯3 + 611¯4
=
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 4¯) (405 + 889¯ + 599¯2 + 123¯3)
(11 + 7¯) (3675 + 9150¯ + 8726¯2 + 3758¯3 + 611¯4)
> 0; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) ;
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we find that
min
c2[0;c¯]
[V23 (Mc)¡ (V2 (Mo) + V3 (Mo))]
= min
½
[V23 (Mc)¡ (V2 (Mo) + V3 (Mo))]
¯¯¯¯
c=0
; [V23 (Mc)¡ (V2 (Mo) + V3 (Mo))]
¯¯¯¯
c=c¯
¾
= [V23 (Mc)¡ (V2 (Mo) + V3 (Mo))]
¯¯¯¯
c=c¯
=
(1¡ ¯) (1 + ¯) (53 + 102¯ + 45¯2)
(55 + 68¯ + 21¯2)2
> 0; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) :
Thus, we find that V23 (Mc) > (V2 (Mo) + V3 (Mo)) for any c 2 (0; c¯). The above three results
show that the decentralized ownership structure is dominated by all three ownership structures
characterized by the presence of some form of merger.
Next, by comparing two different types of structures with any merger, we obtain the following
two results
V13 (Mb) + V2 (Mb) =
2 (1 + ¯)
£
2 (1¡ ¯)2 ¡ 2c (1¡ ¯)2 + c2 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2)¤
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2
= V1 (Mc) + V23 (Mc) ;
V12 (Ma) + V3 (Ma)¡ (V13 (Mb) + V2 (Mb)) =
2c (1 + ¯)
£
3c (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2)¡ 2 (1¡ ¯)2¤
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2
> 0, c 2
Ã
2 (1¡ ¯)2
3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2)
; c¯
!
( (0; c¯) ; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) :
Thus, Ma dominates both Mb and Mc if c > 2 (1¡ ¯)2 =3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2). Consequently, we
obtain the result that both Mb and Mc are not dominated by any other ownership structure and are
also not dominated by each other for any c 2 ¡0; 2 (1¡ ¯)2 =3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2)¤, whereasMa is
never dominated by any other ownership structure for any c 2 £2 (1¡ ¯)2 =3 (13 + 14¯ + 15¯2) ; c¯¢.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
First, we compare the values of both W (Mo) and W (Mb).
W (Mb)¡W (Mo)
= ¡
(1 + ¯)
·
5 (1¡ ¯)3 (15 + 11¯)¡ 2c (1275 + 950¯ ¡ 852¯2 ¡ 1062¯3 ¡ 311¯4)
+c2 (26875 + 71510¯ + 71692¯2 + 31692¯3 + 5321¯4)
¸
8 (1¡ ¯) (25 + 35¯ + 12¯2)2 > 0
, c¤ < c < c¤¤; 8¯ 2 (0:174504; 1) :
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Note that the condition on the value of ¯ for both c¤ and c¤¤ to become real roots is that ¯ 2
[0:174504; 1) and c¯ > c¤¤ for any ¯ 2 [0:174504; 1).
Second, by comparing W (Ma) with W (Mb), we obtain the following result:
W (Mb)¡W (Ma) = 4c (1 + ¯) [3¡ 2¯ ¡ ¯
2 ¡ 3c (7 + 7¯ + 2¯2)]
(1¡ ¯) (5 + 3¯)2 > 0;
, c 2
µ
0;
3¡ 2¯ ¡ ¯2
3 (7 + 7¯ + 2¯2)
¶
() (0; c¯)) ; 8¯ 2 [0; 1) :
Thus, we find that Mb ÂMa for any value of c 2 (0; c¯). Therefore, we have the desired result in
the statement of this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Let us recall that both the ownership structures, Mb and Mc, are in the core if c 2
¡
0; 2 (1¡ ¯)2
= (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2)
¢
for any ¯ 2 [0; 1). Then, we derive the condition of ¯, such that c¤ <
2 (1¡ ¯)2 =3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2) < c¤¤. By simple calculations, we obtain the following results:
for any ¯ 2 (0:174504; 1),
2 (1¡ ¯)2
3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2)
¡ c¤
=
(1¡ ¯)
·
4025¡ 51055¯ ¡ 165758¯2 ¡ 182630¯3 ¡ 86939¯4 ¡ 15307¯5
+12
p¡39 + 194¯ + 169¯2 (325 + 805¯ + 771¯2 + 343¯3 + 60¯4)
¸
3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2) (26875 + 71510¯ + 71692¯2 + 31962¯3 + 5321¯4)
R 0
, ¯ R 0:193340;
and
c¤¤ ¡ 2 (1¡ ¯)
2
3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2)
=
(1¡ ¯)
· ¡4025 + 51055¯ + 165758¯2 + 182630¯3 + 86939¯4 + 15307¯5
+12
p¡39 + 194¯ + 169¯2 (325 + 805¯ + 771¯2 + 343¯3 + 60¯4)
¸
3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2) (26875 + 71510¯ + 71692¯2 + 31962¯3 + 5321¯4)
> 0; 8¯ 2 (0:174504; 1) :
Thus, we find that the EOS, Mb or Mc, coincides with the most preferred ownership struc-
ture with respect to social welfare for any c 2 ¡c¤; 2 (1¡ ¯)2 =3 (13 + 14¯ + 5¯2)¤ when ¯ 2
(0:193340; 1).
Chapter 3
Mixed oligopoly and
productivity-improving mergers
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, on the basis of the non-cooperative game approach, we present the theoretical
analysis of the merger between a public firm and a private firm in mixed oligopoly.1 The literature
on horizontal mergers is roughly divided into two categories. The first deals with the profit effects
of mergers. Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985) examine whether mergers
are beneficial with regard to the profits of the participants in a quantity and price setting game,
respectively. The second category deals with the welfare effects of mergers. In particular, Farrell
and Shapiro (1990) indicate that mergers may have welfare-improving effects by redistributing
production from less efficient to more efficient firms.
Except for Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003), there exist few studies on the decision to merge
by public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly. They explore the case in which a public and
a private firm merge into a multiproduct firm and show that both firms want to merge when the
shareholding ratio of the owner of the public firm takes an intermediate value and the substi-
tutability of the goods produced by both the public and private firms is sufficiently low.
Although, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) considered the case where mergers improve pro-
duction efficiency, they hardly paid their attentions into such an efficiency gains effect of the
merged firm.2 In general, several reasons exist regarding why mergers may lead to an improve-
ment of productivity. One is the learning effect, in which a partner to the merger learns from the
other partner’s patents, management expertise, etc. Furthermore, if firms combine some form of
1All the analyses conducted in this chapter are based on those of Nakamura and Inoue (2007).
2They assume that firms have identical technologies represented by the quadratic cost function, and after the
merger between the public firm and the private firm, the merged firm utilize the scale of economics by having two
plants (formerly, firms).
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“capital” between their facilities after a merger, it certainly results in improving productivity of
the merged firm when economies of scale exist. However, there are no studies on the horizontal
mergers, focusing their attentions on productivity-improving mergers in the context of a mixed
oligopoly. This study aims to fill this gap and have an impact on the subject. For this purpose,
we investigate the productivity-improving merger as considered in McAfee and Williams (1992)
under the assumption that firms have identical technologies represented by the quadratic cost
function.
In our model, there exist one public firm and n identical private firms in a homogeneous goods
market; this is in contrast to Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003), who explore a mixed duopoly in
a differentiated goods market. We show that if a merger improves productivity, both a public and
a private firm want to merge when the shareholding ratio of the owner of the public firm takes
an intermediate value after the merger, even though there exist only a few private firms in the
market. In addition, we find that if the number of private firms is sufficiently large, the owner of
the public firm is always willing to merge whenever its shareholding ratio in the merged firm is
lower than a critical value.
One example in the real world as our subject of research is presented by European automobile
industry. In particularly, the German public firm Volkswagen acquired the Spanish firm SEAT in
1986. Similarly, Renault, which was privatized in 1986, owned parts of equities in both Nissan
Motor and Nissan Diesel in 1999.
This chapter has four sections and an appendix. Section 3:2 sets up the model. We refer
to McAfee and Williams (1992) for the cost function of the merged firm.3 In Section 3:3, we
explore the problem of a merger between a public firm and a single private firm. Our purpose
here is to analyze whether the public and the private firm want to merge, when the merger has an
effect of productivity improvement. Section 3:4 provides the concluding remarks. In Appendix,
we investigate in detail the case of a merger without any improvement in productivity.
3.2 The model
We consider a mixed market in which (n + 1) firms produce a homogeneous good. One of the
firms is a welfare-maximizing public firm (denoted by firm 0), and the others are symmetric
profit-maximizing private firms (denoted by firm 1, firm 2, ¢ ¢ ¢ , and firm n). We assume the
3They assume that the cost of firm i (i = 1; : : : ; n) is equal to (qi)2=2ki, where ki is the firm’s capital stock. In
addition, we assume that the capital stock of each firm is normalized to 1, i.e., k0 = k1 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = kn = 1.
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following linear inverse demand function:
P (Q) = a¡Q a > 0;
where Q is the total output of the good. Each firm produces the good using identical technology,
and the cost function of firm i is given by
Ci(qi) = (qi)
2 i = 0; 1; : : : ; n;
where qi (i = 0; 1; : : : ; n) is the output of each firm. The profit of firm i is expressed as
¼i = P (Q)¡ Ci(qi) = (a¡Q)qi ¡ (qi)2 i = 0; 1; : : : ; n: (3.1)
Each private firm chooses its output level in order to maximize (3.1). On the other hand, the
public firm chooses its output to maximize social welfare. Social welfare is represented by the
sum of consumer surplus (denoted by CS) and profits of all firms as follows:
W = CS +
nX
i = 0
¼i; (3.2)
where CS =
Z Q
0
P (z)dz ¡ P (Q)Q = 1
2
Q2:
We assume that the public firm and one of the private firms decide whether to merge and set
up a multiplant firm whose ownership is shared by the owners of the public and private firms. For
simplicity, we describe the owner of the public firm after the merger as the public sector and the
owner of the private firm as the private sector. Since the private firms are symmetric, we assume
that firm 1 can merge with the public firm without loss of generality. We consider that the merged
firm (denoted by firm m) has two plants, one of which is owned by the public firm and the other
by the private firm before the merger. Thus, the merged firm can produce the good at lower cost
than the other firms. The cost function of the merged firm is given by4
Cm(qm) =
1
2
(qm)
2;
where qm is the output of the merged firm. The profit of the firm is expressed as
¼m = (a¡Q)qm ¡ 1
2
(qm)
2:
4The merged firm may be regarded as a multiplant firm, operating the two former firms as “plants.” In this chapter,
we assume that a multiplant merged firm operates under a situation in which both plants perform most efficiently
(see McAfee and Williams, 1992). We assume that the productivity of the public and private firms is symmetric, i.e.,
the cost function of each firm is represented by the quadratic form of its own output. Therefore, a merged firm has
technology that is twice as efficient as that of the two pre-merger firms.
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Note that the total number of firms is reduced from (n+ 1) to n by the merger.
The public and private sectors share the ownership of the merged firm. Let ® 2 [0; 1] denote
the shareholding ratio of the public sector and let the merged firm choose its output qm to max-
imize the weighted average of social welfare and its own profit as in Matsumura (1998). This
objective function is given by
V = ®W + (1¡ ®)¼m: (3.3)
Since the total number of the firms is reduced by the merger, social welfare is as follows:
W = CS +
nX
k = 2
¼k + ¼m:
The profit of the merged firm is distributed according to the shareholding ratio. Thus, we
assume that the private sector receives profit at the rate of (1¡ ®).
Assumption 3.1. The payoff of the private sector that partially owns the merged firm is (1 ¡
®)¼m.
When social welfare improves and the profit received by the private sector increases as the result
of the merger, the public and the private firm merge.
We consider a two-stage game: In the first stage, both the public and the private firm decide
whether to merge. In the second stage, all firms choose their own output levels.
3.3 The decision by firms to merge
We consider the following two cases: First, the firms do not merge, resulting in the competition
between one public and n private firms. We denote this case as N (No merger). Second, the firms
merge; this case is denoted as M (Merger).
We first examine the second stage of the game in case N . As stated in the previous section,
the public firm chooses q0 to maximize (3.2), while the private firm j chooses qj to maximize
(3.1) (j = 1; : : : ; n). Solving these maximization problems simultaneously, we obtain the Nash
equilibrium in the second stage:
qN0 =
3a
9 + 2n
; qNj =
2a
9 + 2n
; ¼N0 =
9a2
(9 + 2n)2
; ¼Nj =
8a2
(9 + 2n)2
;
CSN =
a2(3 + 2n)2
2(9 + 2n)2
; WN =
a2(27 + 28n+ 4n2)
2(9 + 2n)2
; j = 1; : : : ; n:
The output of the public firm is larger than that of each private firm regardless of the number of
private firms, n. Consumer surplus and social welfare are increasing functions of n, while the
profit of each firm is a decreasing function of n.
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When the public firm (firm 0) and the private firm (firm 1) merge, they set up a multiplant
firm that chooses qm to maximize (3.3). The other firms choose their output level to maximize
(3.1). As a result, we obtain the Nash equilibrium in the second stage:
qMk =
a(2¡ ®)
7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n) ; q
M
m =
3a
7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n) ;
¼Mk =
2a2(2¡ ®)2
[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ; ¼
M
m =
9a2(3¡ 2®)
[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ;
CSM =
a2[1 + 2n¡ ®(n¡ 1)]2
2[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ;
WM =
a2(2¡ ®)(6 + 10n+ 2n2 + 3®¡ 2n®¡ n2®)
2[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 ; k = 2; : : : ; n:
The output of the merged firm is larger than that of each private firm irrespective of n and ®. In
addition, consumer surplus and social welfare are increasing functions of n, while social welfare
decreases as ® increases when the value of ® is sufficiently high.5 The rise of ® widens the output
gap between each private firm and the merged firm. Although the productivity-improving merger
enhances social welfare within the bounds of low ®, the widening gap reduces social welfare
because of the convexity of the cost function when ® is sufficiently high. In addition, when the
market is a monopoly after the merger (n = 1), social welfare is maximized at ® = 1.
Next, we analyze both the public and private firm’s incentives to merge in the first stage of the
game. In order to explain these incentives, we employ two effects: share effect and competition
effect. The share effect, which is represented by ®, affects the firms in case M through the weight
of social welfare in objective function of the merged firm (see Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n, 2003).
The competition effect, which is represented by n, affects them in both cases N and M . When
parameter n increases, for a given of parameter ®, consumer surplus and social welfare increase,
while profits of all the firms decrease.
First, we examine whether the public firm wishes to merge with the private firm. Since the
public firm aims at maximizing social welfare, it has an incentive to merge if WM > WN . Let
®¤0 and ®¤¤0 denote the values of ® such that WM = WN :
®¤0 =
378 + 122n+ 4n2 + 3(9 + 2n)
p
27¡ 2n+ 2n2
351 + 166n+ 14n2
;
®¤¤0 =
378 + 122n+ 4n2 ¡ 3(9 + 2n)p27¡ 2n+ 2n2
351 + 166n+ 14n2
:
We obtain the following proposition using ®¤0 and ®¤¤0 .
5Since @W
M
@® =
3a2[8+n¡®(7+2n)]
[7+2n¡®(2+n)]3 , W
M decreases as ® rises when ® > 8+n7+2n . In addition,
8+n
7+2n is a decreasing
function of n.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1. WM > WN if and only if ®¤¤0 < ® < ®¤0.
Proof. Subtracting WN from WM , we obtain the following equation:
WM ¡WN = ¡a
2[(351 + 166n+ 14n2)®2 ¡ (756 + 244n+ 8n2)®+ 351 + 76n¡ 4n2]
2(9 + 2n)2[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 :
The sign of RHS depends on that of its numerator. Since this numerator is a quadratic concave
function of ® and is equal to zero when ® = ®¤0 or ® = ®¤¤0 , WM > WN if and only if
®¤¤0 < ® < ®
¤
0.
This proposition shows that if the number of private firms is greater than or equal to 6 (n ¸ 6),
the public firm does not want to merge at ® = 1, since ®¤0jn = 6 < 1 and ®¤0 is a decreasing
function of n. In addition, when the number is greater than or equal to 23 (n ¸ 23), the public
firm wants to merge at ® = 0, because ®¤¤0 jn = 23 < 0 and ®¤¤0 is a decreasing function of n. In
other words, even if the public sector does not have a share of the merged firm, the public firm has
an incentive to merge in n ¸ 23. Figure 3.1 illustrates this incentive in relation with parameters
n and ®. The shaded area represents the range in which the public firm wants to merge. This
range broadens as n increases until n = nˆ, but when n > nˆ, it narrows conversely.6
The increase in the number of private firms reduces the public firm’s contribution to consumer
surplus, but the output gap between the public and private firms remains. Since the gap decreases
social welfare, the increase enhances the public firm’s incentive to merge. Thus, the shaded area
widens as n increases. This logic coincides with that of De Fraja and Delbono (1989), who show
that the privatization of a public firm can improve social welfare.
6The critical value is nˆ = (19 + 2
p
178)=2 ¼ 22:8417.
42
However, Proposition 3.1 depends heavily on our assumption that the merger improves the
productivity of the firm. If we do not assume this effect, the public firm will not wish to merge
with the private firm regardless of the number of private firms (see Appendix).
Next, we consider whether the private firm (firm 1) decides to merge with the public firm. By
Assumption 3.1, the private firm decides to merge if (1 ¡ ®)¼Mm > ¼N1 . Let ®¤1 and ®¤¤1 denote
the values of ® such that (1¡ ®)¼Mm = ¼N1 :
®¤1 =
3197 + 1268n+ 116n2 + 3(9 + 2n)
p
3289 + 1156n+ 100n2
2(1394 + 584n+ 56n2)
;
®¤¤1 =
3197 + 1268n+ 116n2 ¡ 3(9 + 2n)p3289 + 1156n+ 100n2
2(1394 + 584n+ 56n2)
:
We obtain the following proposition using these equations.
Proposition 3.2. (1¡ ®)¼Mm > ¼N1 if and only if ® < ®¤¤1 .
Proof. Subtracting ¼N1 from (1¡ ®)¼Mm , we obtain the following equation:
(1¡®)¼Mm¡¼N1 =
a2[(1394 + 584n+ 56n2)®2 ¡ (3197 + 1268n+ 116n2)®+ 1403 + 524n+ 44n2]
2(9 + 2n)2[7 + 2n¡ ®(2 + n)]2 :
The sign of RHS depends on that of its numerator. Since this numerator is a quadratic convex
function of ® and is equal to zero when ® = ®¤1 or ® = ®¤¤1 , (1 ¡ ®)¼Mm > ¼N1 if ® > ®¤1 or
® < ®¤¤1 . However, ®¤1 > 1 for all n, and thus the constraint of ® 2 [0; 1] is violated. Therefore,
(1¡ ®)¼Mm > ¼N1 if and only if ® < ®¤¤1 .
Proposition 3.2 is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Since the increase in the number of private firms
reduces the market price and the increment of profit by the merger, the private firm demands a
higher profit distribution ratio to compensate the profit reduction. Therefore, ®¤¤1 is a decreasing
function of n (in other words, (1¡ ®¤¤1 ) is an increasing function of n). Note that limn!1 ®¤¤1 =
1=2; thus, the private firm always decides to merge irrespective of n when the shareholding ratio
of the private sector is more than 1=2.
We present the following lemma in which we compare ®¤¤1 with ®¤0 and ®¤¤0 to determine
whether the public and private firms merge.
Lemma 3.1. ®¤0 > ®¤¤1 for n 2 [1;1) and ®¤¤0 > ®¤¤1 at n = 1, but there exists n˜ 2 (1;1) such
that ®¤¤1 ¸ ®¤¤0 for n ¸ n˜.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the number of private firms is sufficiently small, ®¤¤0 is greater than ®¤¤1 . However,
when the number exceeds the critical value n˜, this relation is reversed (®¤¤1 ¸ ®¤¤0 ). We obtain
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of Proposition 3.2
an approximate value of n such that ®¤¤0 = ®¤¤1 is 1.9907, i.e., the firms do not merge in mixed
“duopoly.” This coincides with the result of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003).7 By Propositions
3.1 and 3.2 and Lemma 3.1,8 we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3. The public firm 0 and the private firm 1 will merge when ®¤¤0 < ® < ®¤¤1 .
Figure 3.3 illustrates Proposition 3.3. If n 2 (n˜; nˆ), the area in which both the public and
private firm want to merge broadens as n increases.9 In addition, when n is larger than nˆ, both
firms want to merge even if the merged firm is owned only by the private sector (viz., ® = 0).
This is because the welfare loss due to the excess production of the public firm is larger than the
welfare improvement as a result of increasing consumer surplus as stated above.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.3 is as follows: The shareholding ratio is important for
both the public and private sector of the merged firm because it directly affects the behavior of
the firm. Thus, when parameter n is sufficiently small, the merger does not achieve around either
® = 0 or ® = 1. However, since an increase of n decreases q0=Q and thus reduces the impact of
the public firm on social welfare, the share effect decreases as n increases (interaction between
the share effect and the competition effect). In addition to this, the existence of more efficient
firm reduces total output cost. Therefore, the share effect for the public sector decreases with n
and ®¤¤0 is severely reduced by increase of n. On the other hand, the share effect for the private
sector is not affected by the competition effect so much because the payoff of the private sector,
(1¡®)¼M , is directly affected by the shareholding ratio. Thus, the share effect has a more crucial
7Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) do not consider the productivity-improving merger. However, even if the
merger improves the productivity of the merged firm, the firms do not merge in a mixed duopoly with a homogeneous
good.
8Lemma 3.1 guarantees the existence of the range in which ® 2 (®¤¤0 ; ®¤¤1 ).
9However, in n ¸ nˆ, ®¤¤0 is less than 0, and the area narrows as n increases by the constraint of ® ¸ 0.
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of Proposition 3.3
effect on the decision of the private sector than that of the public sector and ®¤¤1 is almost stable
against an increase of n. Accordingly, the area in which both the public and private firms want to
merge expands with the number of private firms.
3.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter investigated how a public and private firm’s decision whether to merge depends on
the shareholding ratio and the number of private firms. We showed that when the shareholding
ratio of the public sector is ® 2 (®¤¤0 ; ®¤¤1 ), which is achieved in n > n˜, both firms decide to
merge. Note that, in a mixed duopoly, the merger is not achieved.
Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) demonstrate that the firms do not merge in a mixed duopoly
with a homogeneous good. However, we proved that if mergers improve the efficiency of the
firms and the number of private firms is sufficiently large, the result is not necessarily the same
as theirs. In particular, the productivity-improving merger is critical to the result. If we do not
assume this effect, the public firm does not choose to merge regardless of the number of private
firms.
We assumed that each firm produces a homogeneous good using identical technology. We
also briefly mention the case that they have asymmetric technologies, in particular, a public firm
is less efficient than a private firm. If a public firm is inefficient compared to a private one,
the public one wants to merge with the private one more aggressively in pursuit of enhancing
social welfare with the improvement of productivity in the merged firm. Thus, in the case that
both firm’s cost functions are asymmetric, a curve corresponding to ®¤¤0 in Figure 3.1 and 3.3
is more rapidly decreasing with n around 1. On the other hand, the private firm is reluctant to
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merge with the public firm, since the productivity improvement rate is lower than that in the case
where the firms have identical technologies. Thus, a curve corresponding to ®¤¤1 in Figure 3.2
and 3.3 shifts down below. Therefore, when a public firm is less efficient than a private firm, it is
ambiguous whether the area in which both the public and private firms want to merge expands or
not compared to the case where their cost functions are symmetric. However, the area still exists
in (n; ®)-plane.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on mixed oligopoly by showing that a public firm
may have an incentive to merge with a private firm in a homogeneous goods market. However,
two interesting extensions of our model still remain. One is the situation in which the public
firm merges with multiple private firms, and another is where there exist foreign shareholders of
the private firms. Since it would appear that these situations would have an impact on the firms’
decision to merge, the investigation of these situations is important for future studies of mergers
in mixed markets.
Appendix
The public firm’s decision without productivity improvement
We show that the public firm does not have an incentive to merge with the private firm in the
case where the merger does not improve the productivity of the merged firm. In this case, social
welfare before and after the merger is as follows:
WN =
a2(27 + 28n+ 4n2)
2(9 + 2n)2
;
WM =
a2[36n+ 9n2 + (6¡ 18n¡ 6n2)®¡ (3¡ 2n¡ n2)®2]
2[9 + 3n¡ (2 + n)®]2 :
Subtracting WN from WM , we examine the public firm’s incentive to merge with the private
firm.
WM¡WN = ¡a
2[(351 + 166n+ 14n2)®2 ¡ (1458 + 576n+ 36n2)®+ 2187 + 810n+ 54n2]
2(9 + 2n)2[9 + 3n¡ (2 + n)®]2 :
The sign of RHS depends on that of its numerator. This numerator is a quadratic concave function
of ® and the discriminant of this quadratic equation, D, is10
D = ¡432(9 + 2n)2(27 + 14n+ n2) < 0:
Thus, for all n, WN is larger than WM and the public firm does not want to merge.
10a2 is omitted for simplicity.
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Proof of Lemma 3.1
We divide this proof into three steps.
First, we prove that ®¤0 > ®¤¤1 for n 2 [1;1). Evaluating ®¤0 and ®¤¤1 at n = 1, then
®¤0jn = 1 =
56 + 11
p
3
59
¼ 1:2721 > 0:5792 ¼ 509¡ 11
p
505
452
= ®¤¤1 jn = 1:
Using computer software, we obtain
lim
n!1
®¤0 =
2 + 3
p
2
7
¼ 0:8918 > ®¤¤1 jn = 1:
Since, in addition to this, ®¤0 and ®¤¤1 are decreasing functions of n, we obtain ®¤0 > ®¤¤1 for
n 2 [1;1).
Second, we prove that ®¤¤0 > ®¤¤1 at n = 1. Evaluating ®¤¤0 at n = 1, we obtain
®¤¤0 jn = 1 =
56¡ 11p3
59
¼ 0:6262:
Therefore, ®¤¤0 jn = 1 > ®¤¤1 jn = 1.
Finally, we prove that there exists n˜ 2 (1;1) such that ®¤¤1 ¸ ®¤¤0 for n ¸ n˜. As mentioned in
Section 3:3, both ®¤¤0 and ®¤¤1 are decreasing functions of n. In addition, we obtain the following
limit relations:
lim
n!1
®¤¤0 =
2¡ 3p2
7
¼ ¡0:3204 < 0:5 = lim
n!1
®¤¤1 :
Considering ®¤¤0 jn = 1 > ®¤¤1 jn = 1, there exists n˜ > 1 such that ®¤¤1 ¸ ®¤¤0 for n ¸ n˜.
Chapter 4
The Core and productivity-improving
mergers in mixed oligopoly
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical analysis on merger activities in the industry
composed of one public firm and two private firms.1 Such an industry is usually referred to as
mixed oligopoly, or more specifically mixed triopoly. The literature on mixed oligopoly can be
traced back to the paper of De Fraja and Delbono (1989). The mixed oligopoly is distinguished
from the oligopoly composed only of private firms especially in the objective of a public firm.
In many existing works on mixed oligopoly, it is assumed that the objective of a public firm is
social welfare maximization, whereas private firms aims to maximize their own profits. Since, in
the real world, public firms are financed by tax revenues, it seems quite reasonable to assume that
a public is devoted to improving social welfare. Although there have been many analyses of a
merger in private oligopoly (e.g. Salant et al. (1983), Deneckere and Davidson (1985), and Farrell
and Shapiro (1990)), not so many efforts have been carried out in studying merger activities in
mixed oligopoly. Exceptions are Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003), and Coloma (2006). Both of
the papers analyzed a merger in mixed duopoly, i.e., a merger in the industry composed of a public
firm and a private firm. In the paper of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n, the two firms were assumed
to produce heterogeneous products and the decision to merge by the firms was analyzed. On the
other hand, in his paper, Coloma considered the case where the two firms produce homogeneous
products and made welfare comparisons among possible market structures.
There are two respects in which this chapter contributes to the literature on mergers in mixed
oligopoly. First, although neither of the papers of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n nor of Coloma
considered a synergy effect of a merger, we assume that a merger yields a synergy effect to the
1All the analyses conducted in this chapter are based on those of Kamaga and Nakamura (2007).
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technology of the merged firm and entails the improvement on productivity. Without assuming
any synergy effects of a merger, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n obtained the result that, in their setting,
both of the private firm and the public firm want to merge only when the degree to which the two
heterogeneous products are substitutes is sufficiently low and, moreover, the merger does not
take place when the two products are perfectly substitutable. Since, in the real world, there are
many examples of mergers among firms which produce highly substitutable products, this result
is counterintuitive to what we would expect. In this chapter, we re-examine the mergers among
the firms producing homogeneous, i.e., perfectly substitutable, products in mixed triopoly under
the assumption that a merger yields the improvement on productivity. It seems very natural
to assume that the merger between the firms that produce highly substitutable heterogeneous
products entails a synergy effect because merger participants may easily learn a strong point of
each firm’s production skill and/or their patents from one another. In the study of the horizontal
mergers in private oligopoly, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) showed that the merger could improve
social welfare if the merged firm exploits economies of scale well. In order to analyze mergers
that entail the improvement on productivity, we follow McAfee and Williams (1992). In this
chapter, the technology of each of the three firms is identically represented by the quadratic cost
function C(qi) = q2i , where qi is the amount of the production of the firm i, and, as considered in
the paper of McAfee and Williams, the merged firm operates the plants which were previously
owned by the pre-merged firms most efficiently and thus the technology is represented by C(q) =
q2=n, where q is the amount of the output of the merged firm and n (= 2; 3) is the number of the
merger participants. Such a cost function of the merged firm clearly shows that a merger entails
the improvement on productivity.
The other respect in which our analysis is clearly distinguished from the earlier ones is that
we especially focus our attention on the stability of market structures. We extend the usual way
of analysis of mergers where solely the decision to merge by the firms is discussed. In this
chapter, we treat merger activities as coalition formations among the firms that are allowed to
freely merge and freely break off the merger . For example, the merger between firms, say 0
and 1, with leaving a firm, say 2, standing alone can be considered as the coalition formation
of ff0; 1g; f2gg. Viewing merger activities as coalition formations among the firms, to find the
stable coalition formations, i.e., stable market structures, is of our interest. In order to analyze
the stability of market structures, we adopt the core, the well-established solution concept in
cooperative game theory and examine which of all possible market structures is/are stable in the
sense that once any of such market structures is actually realized none of the owners of the firms
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wants to change this present market structure by merging with other firm or breaking off the
merger.
The motivation to analyze the stability problem of merger activities perhaps needs some elab-
oration. In this chapter, we consider the industry of mixed triopoly. In the mixed triopoly market,
the variation of possible forms of a merger among the firms increases and becomes more com-
plicated than in mixed duopoly. Consequently, it might be the case that, while the owners of
some two firms, say 0 and 1, have an incentive to merge into one firm by comparing their payoffs
obtained in each of the initial market structure, i.e., the coalition structure ff0g; f1g; f2gg, and
the one realized after the merger, i.e., f f0,1g ,f 2g g, the owner of the firm 0 could receive higher
payoff if s/he breaks off the merger with the firm 1 and alternatively merges with the firm 2, i.e.,
in the structure ff0; 2g; f1gg, than in the case of the merger with the firm 1. In this case, if the
owner of the firm 2 also has an incentive to merge with the firm 0, the merger between the firms 0
and 2 will be realized, and the merger between the firms 0 and 1 can never be realized. Therefore,
in the presence of more than two firms, it is not sufficient to analyze the decision to merge in each
particular case, and we should examine merger activities in terms of stable coalition formations.
In the literature on mergers in private oligopoly, Barros (1998), Horn and Persson (2001a), and
Straume (2006) adopted the same approach. However, with the only exception of Kamijo and
Nakamura (2009), there has not been any works that analyze mergers in mixed oligopoly along
the approach using the core property. Among these existing works, there is a slight difference
in the definitions of core property. The core property considered in this chapter is the same as
the one considered in Barros (1998) and Kamijo and Nakamura (2009). We refer the reader to
Brito and Gata (2006) for the detailed discussion about the difference between the core prop-
erty adopted by Barros (1998) and the one considered in Horn and Persson (2001a) and Straume
(2006). Using the core property a` la Barros (1998) and Kamijo and Nakamura (2009), this chap-
ter shows that, in our mixed triopoly model, the core of market structures is non-empty and the
core consists solely of the market structures derived by the merger between a public firm and one
of the two private firms with about 0:57 share ratio by the public firm.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces our model and presents
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each of four regimes; mixed triopoly; merger between private
firms; merger between a public firm and a private firm; and merger among all the three firms. Our
results are provided in Section 4:3. Section 4:4 concludes with some remarks. In the Appendix
A, we present the proof of Proposition 4:1, and subsequently in the Appendix B, we consider
the core of market structures after each firm’s merger activity in the case wherein s/he adopts the
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FJSV delegation contract.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Basic set-up of mixed oligopoly
We analyze stable market structures in the industry composed of one public firm, denoted by 0,
and two private firms, 1 and 2. Each firm produces a single homogeneous good and is assumed
to be entrepreneurial one, i.e., the owners themselves make every managerial decision making.
The public firm (resp. each of the private firms) is owned by the government (resp. a single
private shareholder). In accordance with whether a merger among the firms is realized or not,
we have four possible market regimes: (a) mixed triopoly ff0g; f1g; f2gg, (b) merger between
private firms ff0g; f1; 2gg, (c) merger between a public firm and a private firm ff0; ig; fjgg
(i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j), and (d) merger among all the three firms ff0; 1; 2gg. Although the details
of the formal descriptions of the four regimes are slightly different, we mainly introduce the set-
up of the mixed triopoly. The other regimes are easily understand as an extension of the mixed
triopoly.
As have been usually considered in the literature on mixed oligopoly, the inverse demand
function is given as a linear function of the total output Q,
P (Q) = a¡Q; (4.1)
where a is sufficiently large positive number. As assumed in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003),
each firm i (= 0; 1; 2) has an identical technology represented by the quadratic cost function
C(qi) = q
2
i ; (4.2)
where qi is the quantity of the good produced by the firm i. The profit function of the firm i
(= 0; 1; 2) is given as:
Πi = (a¡Q)qi ¡ q2i : (4.3)
As usual, social welfare W is measured by the sum of consumer surplus CS = Q2=2, and firms’
profits.
In their papers, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n have not discussed the case where a merger yields
the improvement on productivity. The productivity-improving merger has been analyzed in
McAfee and Williams (1992). As in the paper of McAfee and Williams and also of Nakamura
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and Inoue (2007) and Heywood and McGinty (2007a; 2007b), we consider that a merged firm
shows the improvement on productivity. The market regimes derived by mergers, i.e., (b), (c),
and (d), show the differences particularly in the forms of cost functions. If n (= 2; 3) firms merge
into one firm, the total cost of the merged firm Cm is represented as:
Cm(qm) =
q2m
n
; (4.4)
where qm is the output of the merged firm m. Such a cost function is supported by the assumption
that the merged firm adopts the most efficient operation plan of the plants previously owned by
the pre-merged firms. More precisely, the cost function in (4.4) corresponds to the case of the
most efficient operation rates (¸¤1; : : : ; ¸¤n) = (1=n; : : : ; 1=n) of the plants derived from the total
cost minimization problem:
min
(¸1;:::;¸n)
nX
i=1
(¸iqm)
2 ; subject to
nX
i=1
¸i = 1 and ¸i ¸ 0 for all i: (4.5)
The profit of the merged firm is given by replacing q2i with q2m=n in (3).
4.2.2 Equilibrium outcomes in the regimes (a) to (d)
We now examine the Cournot equilibrium for each regimes. Let U ri denote an objective function
that the firm i maximizes in the regime r (= a; b; c; d). In the rest of the chapter, functions and
variables with superscript r (= a; b; c; d) denote those considered in the regime r.
(a) Mixed triopoly ff0g; f1g; f2gg: In this regime, each of the three firms has the following
objective function, respectively:
Ua0 (q
a
0 ; q
a
1 ; q
a
2) = W
a =
1
2
Ã
qa0 +
2X
i=1
qai
!2
+Π0 +
2X
i=1
Πi; (4.6)
Uai (q
a
i ; q
a
0 ; q
a
j ) = Πi; (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j): (4.7)
The first order conditions of the maximization problems give the following Cournot equilibrium:
qa¤0 =
3
13
a and qa¤i =
2
13
a; (i = 1; 2): (4.8)
Therefore, in the Cournot equilibrium, we obtain the following equilibrium profits Πai , consumer
surplus, and social welfare:
Πa0 =
9
169
a2; Πai =
8
169
a2; (i = 1; 2); CSa =
49
338
a2; and W a = 99
338
a2:
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Notice that, in this regime, the equilibrium profit of the public firm 0 is larger than those of the
private firms 1 and 2. As has been shown in extensive literature on mixed oligopoly, in the case of
quantity competition, a public firm whose objective is welfare maximization chooses the output
larger than the one by a private firm, profit maximizer, because the choice of the output by the
public firm is largely affected by the level of consumer surplus. Consequently, this leads to the
larger market share and higher profit of the public firm. The payoffs to the owners of the firms,
denoted by V ai (i = 0; 1; 2), are
V a0 = W
a =
99
338
a2; and V ai = Πai =
8
169
a2 (i = 1; 2):
(b) Merger between private firms ff0g; f1;2gg: Next, we consider the case where the two
private firms merge into a new private firm denoted by 12. Let qb12 be the amount of the output of
the merged firm 12. The objective of the merged firm 12 is to maximize its profit:
U b12(q
b
12; q
b
0) = Π12 =
£
a¡ ¡qb0 + qb12¢¤ qb12 ¡ 12 ¡qb12¢2 : (4.9)
The objective function of the public firm is:
U b0(q
b
0; q
b
12) = W
b = CSb +Π0 +Π12 (4.10a)
=
1
2
¡
qb0 + q
b
12
¢2
+
£
a¡ ¡qb0 + qb12¢¤ qb0 ¡ ¡qb0¢2 + £a¡ ¡qb0 + qb12¢¤ qb12
¡ 1
2
¡
qb12
¢2
: (4.10b)
Note that, in the last term of its profit function, the merged firm 12 shows the improvement on
productivity. In the Cournot equilibrium, we obtain the following:
qb¤0 =
1
4
a; qb¤12 =
1
4
a; Πb0 =
1
16
a2; Πb12 =
3
32
a2; CSb =
1
8
a2; and W b = 9
32
a2:
Let ® 2 [0; 1] be a ratio of shareholding by the owner of the firm 1 in the merged firm 12. Then,
the payoff to the owner of the public firm 0, V b0 , and those to the pre-merged private firms 1 and
2, V b1 and V b2 , are
V b0 = W
b =
9
32
a2; V b1 = ®Π
b
12 =
3
32
®a2; and V b2 = (1¡ ®)Πb12 =
3
32
(1¡ ®)a2:
(c) Merger between a public firm and a private firm ff0; ig; fjgg: In this regime the
public firm 0 and one of the private firms i (= 1 or 2) merge into a new firm 0i. Let qc0i and Πc0i
denote the output and profit of the merged firm 0i. As the objective function of the public-private
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merged firm 0i, we consider the weighted average of social welfare and the profit of the merged
firm:
U c0i(q
c
0i; q
c
j) = ¯W
c + (1¡ ¯)Π0i (4.11a)
= ¯
·
1
2
¡
qc0i + q
c
j
¢2
+Π0i +Πj
¸
+ (1¡ ¯)Π0i; (i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j)
(4.11b)
where ¯ 2 [0; 1] is a ratio of shareholding by the government in the merged firm 0i and Π0i and
Πj are the profit functions of the firms 0i and j, respectively, given as:
Π0i =
£
a¡ ¡qc0i + qcj¢¤ qc0i ¡ 12 (qc0i)2 ; (4.12)¡
U cj
¡
qcj ; q
c
0i
¢ ´¢ Πj = £a¡ ¡qc0i + qcj¢¤ qcj ¡ ¡qcj¢2 : (4.13)
The weighted average of social welfare and the profit in the objective of a public-private merged
firm has first been suggested in Matsumura (1998) and also been adopted in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and
Garzo´n (2003). In the Cournot equilibrium of this regime, we get:
qc¤0i =
3
11¡ 4¯a; q
c¤
j =
(2¡ ¯)
11¡ 4¯a; Π
c
0i =
9(3¡ 2¯)
2(11¡ 4¯)2a
2; Πcj =
2(2¡ ¯)2
(11¡ 4¯)2a
2;
CSc =
(5¡ ¯)2
2(11¡ 4¯)2a
2; and W c = (68¡ 44¯ + 5¯
2)
2(11¡ 4¯)2 a
2:
The payoffs to the owners of the pre-merged public firm 0 and pre-merged private firm i, V c0 and
V ci , are
V c0 = W
c =
(68¡ 44¯ + 5¯2)
2(11¡ 4¯)2 a
2; and V ci = (1¡ ¯)Πc0i =
9(3¡ 2¯)(1¡ ¯)
2(11¡ 4¯)2 a
2;
and the one to the owner of the non-merged private firm j 6= i, V cj , is
V cj = Π
c
j =
2(2¡ ¯)2
(11¡ 4¯)2a
2:
(d) Merger among all the three firms ff0;1;2gg: Finally, we examine the case where all
of the three firms, 0, 1, and 2, merge into one firm denoted by 012. In the similar way to the
regime (c), the objective function of the merged firm is defined as follows:
Ud012(q
d
012) = °W
d + (1¡ °)Π012 (4.14a)
= °
·
1
2
¡
qd012
¢2
+Π012
¸
+ (1¡ °)Π012; (4.14b)
where ° 2 [0; 1] is a ratio of shareholding by the government in the merged firm 012 and Π012 is
the profit function of the merged firm given as:
Π012 =
¡
a¡ qd012
¢
qd012 ¡
1
3
¡
qd012
¢2
: (4.15)
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Note that the merged firm in this regime shows further improvement on productivity than in the
regimes (b) and (c). In the Cournot equilibrium, we obtain the following:
qd¤012 =
3
8¡ 3° a; Π
d
012 =
3(4¡ 3°)
(8¡ 3°)2 a
2; CSd =
9
2(8¡ 3°)2a
2; and W d = 3(11¡ 6°)
2(8¡ 3°)2 a
2:
The payoffs to the owners of the pre-merged firms, V di (i = 0; 1; 2), are
V d0 = W
d =
3(11¡ 6°)
2(8¡ 3°)2 a
2; V d1 = (1¡ °)±Πd012 =
3(4¡ 3°)(1¡ °)±
(8¡ 3°)2 a
2; and
V d2 = (1¡ °)(1¡ ±)Πd012 =
3(4¡ 3°)(1¡ °)(1¡ ±)
(8¡ 3°)2 a
2;
where ± 2 [0; 1] measures a ratio of profit distribution among the private sector, i.e., (1 ¡ °)± is
a ratio of shareholding by the owner of the firm 1 in the merged firm 012.
Table 4:1 summarizes objective functions and payoffs of the firms in each of the four regimes.
Table 4.1: Firms’ objectives and owners’ payoffs
regime (r) firms’ objectives: Uri owners’ payoffs: V ri
regime (a)
Ua0 = W
a
Ua1 = Π1
Ua2 = Π2
V a0 = W
a(qa¤)
V a1 = Π1(q
a¤)
V a2 = Π2(q
a¤)
regime (b) U
b
0 = W
b
U b12 = Π12
V b0 = W
b(qb¤)
V b1 = ®Π12(q
b¤)
V b2 = (1¡ ®)Π12(qb¤)
regime (c) U
c
0i = ¯W
b + (1¡ ¯)Π0i (i = 1; 2)
U cj = Πj (j 6= i)
V c0 = W
c(qc¤)
V ci = (1¡ ¯)Π0i(qc¤)
V cj = Πj(q
c¤)
regime (d) Ud012 = °W d + (1¡ °)Π012
V d0 = W
d(qd¤)
V d1 = (1¡ °)±Π012(qd¤)
V d2 = (1¡ °)(1¡ ±)Π012(qd¤)
4.2.3 Market structures and the core
Each of the four regimes, except for the mixed triopoly which itself represents the market struc-
ture, includes more than one market structure, each of which can be identified in terms of share-
holding ratio in the merged firm and of merger participants, i.e., a coalition formation. For
example, in the regime (c), we can find one particular market structure that is composed of the
merged firm 01 with the government’s shareholding ¯ = 0:5 and the private firm 2. Which of the
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possible market structures will actually occur fairly depends on the managerial decision making
of the three owners of the firms 0, 1, and 2: merge, not to merge, or break off the merger.
In the preceding subsection, given the market structure that will actually occur as a result
of coalition formation among the owners, we have examined the Cournot equilibrium for each
market structure. Now, a natural question to ask is which of the market structures will occur as
a consequence of the owners coalition formation. This problem can be analyzed in terms of the
game of coalition formation among the owners. As discussed in the introduction, in the case of
more than two firms’ owners, it is not sufficient to analyze the decision by the owners for each
particular case, and the stability problem will be of importance. Thus, we especially focus on
which market structure, or coalition formation among the owners, will be stable in the sense that
once a market structure in question is realized, it never shift into any other market structure. To
analyze this stability problem we invoke the core, the well-established solution concept in co-
operative game theory. We assume that each of the owners determines the managerial decision
on a merger to maximize her/his own payoff Vi. The reader may notice that the market struc-
tures and the payoffs in our framework corresponds to the feasible allocations and the utilities
(or preferences) in the market game in exchange economy which is well-established topic in
microeconomic theory (see for example, Varian (1992) pp.387-388).
To define the core of the market structures, we should start with the definition of a blocking
market structure. A market structure M is said to block another market structure M 0 if there
exists a deviant coalition of the owner(s) of the pre-marged firm(s) such that:
(i) M can be constructed from M 0 by solely the decision by the owner(s) in the
deviant coalition, and
(ii) every owner in the coalition achieves strictly higher payoff in M than in M 0.
An example will help understanding the definition of blocking. Let Mff0;1g;f2gg¯=0:5 be the market
structure composed of the merged firm 01 with ¯ = 0:5 and the private firm 2. In this case, for ex-
ample, the coalition of the owners of the firms 0 and 2, f0; 2g, can construct, if they want, the new
market structure that consists of the merged firm 02 with ¯ = 0:45 and the private firm 1, denoted
by Mff0;2g;f1gg¯=0:45 . If the owner of the firm 2 gains more payoff, i.e., the distributed profit, and the
owner of the firm 0, i.e., the government, also achieves higher payoff, i.e., social welfare, in the
new structure Mff0;2g;f1gg¯=0:45 than in M
ff0;1g;f2gg
¯=0:5 , then the structure M
ff0;2g;f1gg
¯=0:45 blocks M
ff0;1g;f2gg
¯=0:5 .
Note that it is also possible that a deviant coalition consists of a single owner of a pre-merged
firm. In the above example, it is possible for each of the owners of the pre-merged firms 0 and
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1 to deviate from the structure by breaking off the merger and to operate their own pre-merged
firms respectively, i.e., to shift into the mixed triopoly, as well. The core of the market structures
is defined as:
the set of market structures that are never blocked by any other market structure.
We denote the core of the market structures by Co. If a market structure is in the core, all of the
three owners of the pre-merged firms have no incentive to construct a new market structure. In
this sense, the market structure in the core can be regarded as the stable one. In the next section,
we examine which of the market structures is/are in the core.
4.3 Results
We now explore the core of the market structures, i.e., stable structures. Our argument proceeds
through some lemmata, each of which points out the market structures which are blocked by
some other market structure. Our first lemma shows that the market structure of the merged firm
012 is not in the core no matter what a ratio of shareholding by the pre-merged firms is adopted.
Lemma 4.1. For any ratio of shareholding by the three owners of the pre-merged firms, the
market structure of the merged firm 012, Mff0;1;2gg°;± , can not belong to the core, i.e., Mff0;1;2gg°;± 62
Co, for any ° 2 [0; 1] and any ± 2 [0; 1].
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps.
Step 1. Let Mff0;1;2gg°2[0;1];±=1=2 be the market structure of the merged firm 012 with ° 2 [0; 1] and
± = 1=2, and Mff0;1g;f2gg¯2[0;1] be that of the public-private merged firm 01 and the private firm 2 with
a ratio of shareholding ¯ 2 [0; 1] in the merged firm 01. We will show that the owner of the
private firm 2 wants to deviate from the merger among the three firms. Since
dV c2 (¯)
d¯
=
12(2¡ ¯)
(¡11 + 4¯)3a
2 < 0; 8¯ 2 [0; 1]; (4.16)
we have
min
¯2[0;1]
V c2 (¯) = V
c
2 (¯)
¯¯
¯=1
=
2
49
a2: (4.17)
Then, solving the following equation:
V d2 (°; ±)
¯¯
±=1=2
=
2
49
a2; (4.18)
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we obtain the result
V d2 (°; ±)
¯¯
±=1=2
= min
¯2[0;1]
V c2 (¯) if ° =
93¡ 7p41
90
¼ 0:5353: (4.19)
Since d
¡
V d2 (°; ±)j±=1=2
¢
=d° = ¡3a2 (32¡ 27°) =2 (8¡ 3°)3 < 0, 8° 2 [0; 1], we obtain
V d2 (°; ±)
¯¯
±= 1
2
< min
¯2[0;1]
V c2 (¯); 8° 2
Ã
93¡ 7p41
90
; 1
#
: (4.20)
Therefore, if ° >
¡
93¡ 7p41¢ =90, the owner of the pre-merged firm 2 deviates fromMff0;1;2gg°2[0;1];±=1=2
and operates her/his own firm regardless of what a ratio ¯ is, i.e.,Mff0;1g;f2gg¯2[0;1] blocksM
ff0;1;2gg
°2[0;1];±=1=2.
In cases where ± 6= 1=2, the same conclusion also follows for one of the owners of the pre-merged
private firms, 1 or 2, because one of them inevitably receives strictly less payoff than in the case
of ± = 1=2.
Step 2. Let I be the interval £0; ¡93¡ 7p41¢ =90¤. To complete the proof, we have to show
that Mff0;1;2gg°2I;±2[0;1] is blocked by some other market structure. Consider the market structure of
the public-private merged firm 01 and the private firm 2 with a ratio of shareholding ¯ = °, i.e.,
M
ff0;1g;f2gg
¯=° . We show that the coalition f0; 1g has an incentive to deviate from the merger among
the three firms if ± = 1=2. Let ¯ : R ! R be such that ¯(t) = t. When ° = ¡93¡ 7p41¢ =90,
the difference between the payoffs to the owner of the firm 0 across the two market structures is
¡
V c0 (¯(°))¡ V d0 (°)
¢ ¯¯
°=(93¡7
p
41)=90 =
25(1024237 + 79947
p
41)
98(32396969 + 4258989
p
41)
a2 > 0: (4.21)
Moreover, we have
d
¡
V c0 (¯(°))¡ V d0 (°)
¢
d°
= ¡3(6859¡ 13655° + 9324°
2 ¡ 2682°3 + 279°4)
(8¡ 3°)3(11¡ 4°)3 a
2
< 0; 8° 2 [0; 1] : (4.22)
Therefore, the government can achieve higher payoff, i.e., higher social welfare, in Mff0;1g;f2gg¯=°
than in Mff0;1;2gg°2I;±=1=2. Similarly, we obtain the following results on the payoff to the owner of the
pre-merged firm 1,
¡
V c1 (¯(°))¡ V d1 (°; ±)
¢ ¯¯
°=(93¡7
p
41)=90;±=1=2 =
(2267 + 51177
p
41)
196(309 + 14
p
41)2
a2 > 0; (4.23)
and, for all ° 2 [0; 1],
d
¡
V c1 (¯(°))¡ V d1 (°; ±)j±=1=2
¢
d°
= ¡3(5024¡ 8031° + 5460°
2 ¡ 1759°3 + 216°4)
2(8¡ 3°)3(11¡ 4°)3 a
2 < 0:
(4.24)
58
Thus, the owner of the pre-merged firm 1 can gain more payoff in Mff0;1g;f2gg¯=° than in M
ff0;1;2gg
°2I;±=1=2.
Thus, the joint deviation by f0; 1g is beneficial to each of the owners of the firms 0 and 1. The
same argument as in the step 1 can be directly applied to any case of ± 6= 1=2 to show that the
market structures of the merger among the three firms is blocked through the joint deviation of
the government and one of the owners of the pre-merged private firms.
The intuition behind the lemma is explained as follows. In the cases of high values of °,
the merged firm 012 sets relatively high output because of the considerable influence of the
owner of the pre-merged public firm 0, and this hurts the payoffs to the owners of the pre-
merged private firms. On the other hand, for low values of °, the merged firm 012 attaches
relatively high importance to its profit, then the owner of the pre-merged public firm 0 can do
better by breaking off the merger. This trade-off in the owners’ interests in the merged firm
012 makes the merger unstable. Indeed, as shown in the proof of the lemma, in the case of
high values of ° 2 £¡93¡ 7p41¢ =90; 1¤, either of the two owners of pre-merged private firms,
say i, has an incentive to deviate from the merged firm 012. On the other hand, in the case of
° 2 £0; ¡93¡ 7p41¢ =90¤, the owners of public firm 0 has an incentive to break off the merger
and to make an offer of organizing new merged firm 0i to the one of the two private owners 1
and 2. In both cases, the key is that the positive effect of the improvement on productivity in the
merger among the three firms is relatively small to the merger between two firms.
Next, we provide our second lemma which tells that at least one of the two owners of the
pre-merged private firms prefers the mixed triopoly rather than the merger between these two
private firms regardless of what a ratio of the shareholding between them is adopted, i.e., the
market structure of the merger between the private firms is not in the core no matter what a ratio
of shareholding is in the merged firm.
Lemma 4.2. For any ratio of shareholding ® 2 [0; 1], the market structure of the merger between
the private firms, Mff0g;f1;2gg® , is blocked by the mixed triopoly, Mff0g;f1g;f2gg.
Proof. Since we have P2i=1Πai = 16a2=169 > 3a2=32 = Πb12, it is obvious that there exists no
® 2 [0; 1] such that ®Πb12 ¸ Πa1 and (1¡ ®)Πb12 ¸ Πa2.
This result is due to the strengthened market share of the public firm. It is known that two-firm
mergers in the Cournot oligopoly tend often to be unprofitable, due to the aggressive response
from the firms not participating in the merger (see for example, Salant et al. (1983)). Although
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the private merged firm 12 gets an advantage of the improvement on productivity in the current
framework, the subsequent expansion of the market share of the non-merged firm, the public firm
0 which aims to maximize not profit but social welfare, becomes larger than in the case of the
private Cournot oligopoly. Consequently, the profit of the merged firm 12 can not exceed the sum
of the profits gained by the pre-merged private firms, and the merger between the private firms
will never be beneficial to the owners of the pre-merged private firms in the current framework,
either.
We now move to our third lemma. While the mixed triopoly, as stated in Lemma 4:2, blocks
the market structures of the regime (b) and, consequently, excludes them from the core, the
following lemma shows that the mixed triopoly can not belong to the core, either. To state the
lemma, we let
¯ =
638¡ 39p31
739
¼ 0:56950 and ¯¯ = 6197¡ 39
p
6001
5572
¼ 0:56996: (4.25)
Lemma 4.3. The mixed triopoly, Mff0g;f1g;f2gg, is blocked by the market structure of the public-
private merged firm 0i and the private firm j 6= i, Mff0;ig;fjgg¯ , if the ratio of shareholding ¯ in
the merged firm 0i is in the interval ¡¯; ¯¯¢.
Proof. In the Cournot equilibrium of each of the regimes (a) and (c), we have
V a0 =
99
338
a2; V c0 =
(68¡ 44¯ + 5¯2)
2(11¡ 4¯)2 a
2; V ai =
8
169
a2; and V ci =
9(3¡ 2¯)(1¡ ¯)
2(11¡ 4¯)2 a
2:
Thus, we obtain the following:(
0 · ¯ · ¯ ) V a0 ¸ V c0
¯ < ¯ · 1) V a0 < V c0
and
(
0 · ¯ < ¯¯) V ci > V ai
¯¯ · ¯ · 1) V ci · V ai :
Thus, each of the owners of 0 and i have an incentive to jointly found the merged firm 0i if the
shareholding ratio ¯ is in
£
0; ¯¯
¢ \ ¡¯; 1¤ = ¡¯; ¯¯¢.
As we have just shown in the proof of Lemma 4:3, if the ratio of shareholding by the gov-
ernment is more than ¯, i.e., ¯ > ¯, the government will agree to the merger with a private firm
i since she can achieve higher social welfare by the positive effect of productivity improvement.
On the other hand, the owner of the pre-merged private firm i can gain more payoff in the merged
firm 0i than in the mixed triopoly whenever ¯ < ¯¯. Therefore, for any ¯ 2 ¡¯; ¯¯¢, both of the
two owners have an incentive to merge into a new public-private firm 0i. From this observation,
we immediately obtain the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.4. The mixed triopoly, Mff0g;f1g;f2gg, blocks the market structure of the public-private
merged firm 0i and the private firm j 6= i, Mff0;ig;fjgg¯ , whenever the ratio of shareholding ¯ in
the merged firm 0i is in £0; ¯¢ or ¡ ¯¯; 1¤, i.e., ¯ 2 £0; ¯¢ [ ¡ ¯¯; 1¤.
Proof. This lemma immediately follows from the proof of Lemma 4:3 where we have shown
that if ¯ 2 ¡ ¯¯; 1¤ ¡resp. £0; ¯¢¢ then the owner of the private firm i (resp. the owner of the
public firm 0) has an incentive to deviate and change the present market structure into the mixed
triopoly.
From Lemmata 4:1 to 4:4, we now know that almost all market structures can not be in the
core. The market structures that belong to any of the regimes (a), (b), and (d) are not in the core.
Moreover, in the regime (c), the market structures with ¯ 2 £0; ¯¢ [ ¡ ¯¯; 1¤ can not belong to the
core, either. As a consequence, the remaining candidates that could belong to the core are the
market structures of the public-private merged firm 0i and the private firm j 6= i, with the ratio
of shareholding by the government ¯ 2 £¯; ¯¯¤. We now state our main result, which shows that
any of these market structures is in the core.
Proposition 4.1. The market structure of the public-private merged firm 0i and the private firm
j 6= i, Mff0;ig;fjgg¯ , is in the core whenever the ratio of shareholding in the merged firm 0i , ¯, is
in the closed interval
£
¯; ¯¯
¤
, i.e., Mff0;ig;fjgg¯ 2 Co, 8¯ 2
£
¯; ¯¯
¤
.
From this proposition, it can be concluded that the market structures of the public-private
merged firm 0i and the private firm j 6= i with ¯ 2 £¯; ¯¯¤ are stable in the sense that any of
these market structures is never blocked by the other market structures. In other words, once any
of these structures is realized, it will never be replaced by any of the other market structures. It
should be emphasized that the interval of the admissible ratio ¯ in the core
£
¯; ¯¯
¤
is very short,
¯¯¡ ¯ ¼ 0:00047. This result is fairly remarkable in that it shows a considerable contrast to the
result obtained in Kamijo and Nakamura (2009). In their paper, Kamijo and Nakamura analyzed
the industry composed by two symmetric private firms and a less efficient public firm. Assuming
that each of the three firms has constant marginal cost of production, Kamijo and Nakamura
showed that all of the four regimes, except for the regime (b), have the market structures that
belong to the core. Therefore, it can be said that the stable mergers in mixed oligopoly crucially
depend on the assumptions of firms’ technology.
Finally, we briefly examine the case where the industry is composed only of private firms,
i.e., private oligopoly, and compare the results between mixed oligopoly and private oligopoly.
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In the case of private oligopoly, we need to change the model summarized in Table 4:1 as follows:
Ua0 = Π0; V
a
0 = Π0(q
a¤); U b0 = Π0; V
b
0 = Π0(q
b¤); U c0i = Π0i; V
c
0 = ¯Π0i(q
c¤); Ud012 = Π012;
and V d0 = °Π012(qd¤). Consequently, the regimes (b) and (c) become the same ones, and we let
the regime (b) represent them. The Cournot equilibria of the regimes (a), (b) and (d) are obtained
as:
(qa¤i ; q
a¤
1 ; q
a¤
2 ) =
³a
6
;
a
6
;
a
6
´
; (qb¤0 ; q
b¤
12) =
µ
2
11
a;
3
11
a
¶
; and qd¤012 =
3
8
a:
Then, the payoffs to the owners are determined as follows:
(V a0 ; V
a
1 ; V
a
2 ) =
µ
a2
18
;
a2
18
;
a2
18
¶
; (V b0 ; V
b
1 ; V
b
2 ) =
µ
8
121
a2;
27
242
®a2;
27
242
(1¡ ®)a2
¶
; and
(V d0 ; V
d
1 ; V
d
2 ) =
µ
3
16
°a2;
3
16
(1¡ °)±a2; 3
16
(1¡ °)(1¡ ±)a2
¶
:
Given the above payoffs, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4.2. In the case where the industry is composed only of private firms, none of the
market structures belongs to the core, i.e., Co = ?.
Proof. The proof is similar to those of Lemmata 4:1 to 4:4. Thus, we limit ourselves to pro-
viding the examples of blocking market structures for each market structure. For the regime
(a), Mff0g;f1g;f2gg is blocked by Mff0g;f1;2gg® whenever ® 2 (121=243; 122=243). For the regime
(b), Mff0g;f1;2gg® is blocked (i) by Mff0g;f1g;f2gg if ® 2 [0; 121=243) or ® 2 (122=243; 1]; and
(ii) by Mff0;1;2gg°;± with ° = 9=25 and ± = 1=2 if ® 2 [121=243; 122=243]. For the regime (d),
M
ff0;1;2gg
°=1=3;±=1=2 is blocked by M
ff0g;f1;2gg
® with ® 2 [0; 1]. By the same argument as in the proof
of Lemma 4:1, the case of (°; ±) = (1=3; 1=2) is sufficient to complete the proof of the regime
(d).
The never-ending coalition formation increases transaction costs unboundedly. Furthermore,
it eliminates our ability to predict which of the market structure will actually occur, which also
means that it is hardly possible to prescribe economic policies in a effective way. Comparing
Propositions 4:1 and 4:2, we can conclude that the presence of the public firm has a stabilizing
effect in the current framework and allows us to avoid such undesirable costs.
4.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter explored the stable market structures in mixed oligopoly when a single public firm
and two symmetric private firms in the homogeneous good market are allowed to freely merge
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and freely break off the merger. We adopted the core as the solution concept to analyze the stabil-
ity of market structures. We showed that the core consists solely of the market structures derived
by the merger between a public firm and one of the two private firms with the shareholding ratio
by the public firm, ¯, which is greater than ¯ ¼ 0:56950 and less than ¯¯ ¼ 0:56996. These
market structures are stable in the sense that, by the definition of the core, once any of these
market structures is actually realized, it never be replaced by any of the other market structures.
The admissible interval of ¯ that ensures the stability of market structures is very short. This
strong result fairly relies on the assumption that a merger yields the improvement on productiv-
ity. Without such a positive effect of a merger, our result would change and the mixed triopoly
would be a unique stable market structure.2
Two interesting extensions of our model remain. The first is to consider the model in which
the foreign shareholders are taken into account. In the real world, some firms are foreign-owned.
In this case, social welfare that the government is to maximize should not include the profits
of the foreign-owned firms. Thus, the existence of the foreign shareholders will change the
public firm’s decision making and, consequently, the equilibrium outcomes as well. The other
possible extension is to introduce the asymmetricity among the production technologies of firms
in a way like C(q) = kiq2i . In this chapter, we assumed that all the three firms have identical
technologies (k0; k1; k2) = (1; 1; 1). It seems more natural to assume that a public firm shows
inefficient performance relatively to private firms, e.g. X-inefficiency in a public firm. In the case
of (k0; k1; k2) = (3; 1; 1), the reader may easily check that the core becomes empty in the similar
method to the proofs of Lemmata 4:1 to 4:4 and Proposition 4:2. The analysis of more general
cases of k = (k0; k1; k2) and the comparison among different values of the weight k is left for
future research.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 4.1
Let Mff0;ig;fjgg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] be the market structure of the merged firm 0i with a ratio of shareholding ¯ 2
[¯; ¯¯] and the private firm j (6= i). In a series of claims below, we will show that Mff0;ig;fjgg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] is
never blocked by any other market structure. We assume, without loss of generality, i = 1 and
j = 2.
Claim 4.1. Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] is never blocked by the mixed triopoly in any case of ¯ 2
£
¯; ¯¯
¤
.
2In the Appendix B, we present a theoretical analysis of the stable market structures after each firm’s merger
activity in the case wherein s/he adopts the FJSV delegation contract a` la Lambertini (2000) and Straume (2006).
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By Lemma 4:3, Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] is not blocked by the mixed triopoly if ¯ 2
¡
¯; ¯¯
¢
. Moreover, in the
proof of Lemma 4:3, we have shown that, in the case of ¯ = ¯, the government in Mff0;1g;f2gg¯=¯
can achieve the same level of social welfare as in the mixed triopoly, and thus the government
has no incentive to deviate from Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] , and also that the owner of the pre-merged firm 1
in Mff0;1g;f2gg¯=¯ gains more payoff than in the mixed triopoly. Thus, neither of these two owners
want to break off the merger. The case of ¯ = ¯¯ can be proved by the symmetric argument to the
case of ¯ = ¯.
Claim 4.2. Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] is never blocked by the market structure of the public firm 0 and the
private merged firm 12 with ® 2 [0; 1], Mff0g;f1;2gg®2[0;1] , in any case of ® 2 [0; 1].
By (4.16), V c2 (¯) is decreasing on [0; 1], and thus we have
min
¯2[¯; ¯¯]
V c2 (¯) = V
c
2 (
¯¯) =
(1649 + 13
p
6001)2
1352(234 +
p
6001)2
a2: (4.26)
When ¯ = ¯¯ in Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] , i.e., in M
ff0;1g;f2gg
¯=¯¯
, the owner of the private firm 2 will agree with
the merger between the two private firms if and only if
V b2 (®) > V
c
2 (
¯¯), 3
32
(1¡ ®)a2 > (1649 + 13
p
6001)2
1352(234 +
p
6001)2
a2 (4.27a)
, ® < 401707¡ 1768
p
6001
621075
¼ 0:4263: (4.27b)
On the other hand, we obtain the following result on the payoffs to the firm 1: for any ® <¡
401707¡ 1768p6001¢ =621075,
V b1 (®)¡ V c1 ( ¯¯) =
3
32
®a2 ¡ 8
169
a2 (4.28a)
<
3
32
®a2
¯¯¯
®= 401707¡1768
p
6001
621075
¡ 8
169
a2 (4.28b)
=
88107¡ 1768p6001
6624800
a2 ¼ ¡0:0074a2 < 0: (4.28c)
Thus, by (4.27b) and (4.28c), the joint deviation by the owners of the firms 1 and 2 can not be
realized if ¯ = ¯¯. Since V c2 is decreasing with respect to ¯, by (4.27a) to (4.28c) altogether, the
joint deviation by the owners of the private firms is still impossible in any case of ¯ 2 £¯; ¯¯¢.
Claim 4.3. Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] is never blocked by M
ff0;2g;f1gg
¯02[0;1] in any case of ¯0 2 [0; 1].
We start with the case of ¯ = ¯¯ in Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] . In this case, the owner of the firm 2 prefers
M
ff0;2g;f1gg
¯02[0;1] rather thanM
ff0;1g;f2gg
¯=¯¯
if and only if the payoff, i.e., the distributed profit, inMff0;2g;f1gg¯02[0;1]
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is strictly greater than the payoff, i.e., the stand-alone profit, gained in Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯=¯¯
, i.e., the fol-
lowing value, ∆(¯0), must be positive:
∆(¯0) := (1¡ ¯0)Πc02(¯0)¡ Πc2( ¯¯) (4.29a)
=
9(3¡ 2¯0)(1¡ ¯0)
2(11¡ 4¯0)2 a
2 ¡ (1649 + 13
p
6001)2
1352(234 +
p
6001)2
a2 (4.29b)
= a2 ¢ Ξ(¯0); (4.29c)
where Ξ(¯0) =
h
28(12134951+89440
p
6001)(¯0)2¡2(379922845+2615912p6001)¯0+328599497+
1677091
p
6001
i
=
h
676(234 +
p
6001)2(11 ¡ 4¯0)2
i
. Solving the equation ∆(¯0) = 0 subject
to ¯0 2 [0; 1], we obtain
¯0¤ =
³
379922845 + 2615912
p
6001¡ 39
p
31920488675573 + 391144962052
p
6001
´
339778628 + 2504320
p
6001
¼ 0:5151: (4.30)
Since
d∆(¯0)
d¯0
=
d((1¡ ¯0)Πc02(¯0))
d¯0
= ¡9(31¡ 24¯
0)
2(11¡ 4¯0)3 a
2 < 0; 8¯0 2 [0; 1]; (4.31)
we obtain the intermediate result that the owner of the firm 2 prefers Mff0;2g;f1gg¯02[0;1] to M
ff0;1g;f2gg
¯=¯¯
if and only if
¯0 2 [0; ¯0¤) : (4.32)
On the other hand, since we have
dV c0 (¯)
d¯
=
3(10¡ 11¯)
(11¡ 4¯)3 a
2 > 0; 8¯ 2 [0; ¯¯] ¡ ) [0; ¯0¤]¢; (4.33)
the owner of the public firm 0 strictly prefers Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯=¯¯
rather than Mff0;2g;f1gg¯0 if ¯0 < ¯0¤
(< ¯¯), and thus the joint deviation by the owners of the firms 0 and 2 from Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯=¯¯
can never
be realized. Note that, from (4.16), the profit (or payoff to the owner) of the firm 2 in Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯2[¯; ¯¯]
is decreasing with respect to ¯, which in turn implies that, by (4.29a) to (4.29c) and (4.31), a
decrease in ¯ leads to a decrease in ¯0¤. Thus, from the fact that ¯0¤ < ¯ and (4.33), the owner
of the firm 0 never agrees with the joint deviation with the owner of the firm 2 in any case of
¯ 2 [¯; ¯¯).
Claim 4.4. Mff0;1g;f2gg
¯2[¯; ¯¯] is never blocked by the merger among the three firms Mff0;1;2gg°2[0;1];±2[0;1] re-
gardless of what the ratios ° 2 [0; 1] and ± 2 [0; 1] are.
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We start with the case of ¯ = ¯. In this case, we have V c0 (¯) = 99a2=338. Since dV d0 (°)=d° =
27a2 (1¡ °) = (8¡ 3°)3 ¸ 0 for all ° 2 [0; 1] (equality holds only in the case of ° = 1),
V d0 (°)¡ V c0
¡
¯
¢
=
3(11¡ 9°)(¡23 + 33°)
338(8¡ 3°)2 a
2 > 0; 8° 2
µ
23
33
; 1
¸
: (4.34)
On the other hand, we obtain the following result on the payoff to the owner of the pre-merged
private firm 2:
d(V d2 (°; ±)j±=0)
d°
=
3(32¡ 27°)
(¡8 + 3°)3 a
2 < 0; 8° 2 [0; 1] (4.35)
and
V d2 (°; ±)
¯¯
°=23=33;±=0
¡ V c2 (¯) =
4(817¡ 260p31)
616005
a2 ¼ ¡0:0041a2 < 0: (4.36)
Note that the case of ± = 0 is the most favorable case of ± for the owner of the pre-merged private
firm 2. Hence, in the case of ¯ = ¯, by (4.34) to (4.36), the owners of the pre-merged public
firm 0 and pre-merged private firm 2 can never reach an agreement about the shareholding in the
merged firm 012, and thus the merger among the three firms can never be realized. Now, we
examine the other cases of ¯ 2 £¯; ¯¯¤, i.e., ¯ 2 ¡¯; ¯¯¤. By (4.33), the value of °¤ which solves
the equation V d0 (°) ¡ V c0 (¯) = 0 increases in any case of ¯ 2
¡
¯; ¯¯
¤
than in the case of ¯ = ¯,
i.e., °¤ > 23=33. From (4.16) and (4.35), we have
V d2 (°
¤; ±)j±=0 ¡ V c2 (¯)
¯¯
¯2(¯; ¯¯] < V
d
2 (°; ±)
¯¯
°=23=33;±=0
¡ V c2 ( ¯¯) (4.37a)
=
13739¡ 221p6001
828100
a2 ¼ ¡0:0041a2 < 0: (4.37b)
Therefore, by the same argument as in the case of ¯ = ¯, the merger among the three firms is
impossible in any case of ¯ 2 ¡¯; ¯¯¤.
From (4.33) and the fact that dV c1 (¯)=d¯ = ¡9a2 (31¡ 24¯) =2 (11¡ 4¯)3 < 0, 8¯ 2 [0; 1],
any alteration on the ratio ¯ never improves the payoffs to both owners of the firms 0 and 1
simultaneously. Therefore, combining the assertions of the claims, we have successfully shown
that Mff0;1g;f2gg¯ is in the core whenever ¯ is in the closed interval
£
¯; ¯¯
¤
.
Appendix B: Exention to a managerial delegation case
To formalize managerial delegation, we mainly follow Straume (2006).3 In each firm, an owner
delegates the output decision to a manager. Each manager sets the output to maximize her/his
3The analyses conducted in this Appendix is base od those provided by Kamaga and Nakamura (2008b).
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payoff defined by an incentive contract provided by the owner of the firm. Let qi and Πi denote
the output and profit of a firm i. In each firm i, an owner provides the following type of incentive
contract Ái to a manager:
Ái(Πi(qi); qi; µi) = µiΠi(qi) + (1¡ µi)qi: (4.38)
where µi is a contract parameter chosen by the owner (or owners in a merged firm). A manager of
a firm i can maximize her/his payoff by choosing the output qi which maximizes Ái. This can be
supported by the assumption that the payoff to a manager of a firm i is represented as ¸i + ¹iÁi
for some real number ¸i and some positive real number ¹i.
In our delegation model, owners and managers play the following two-stage game: in the first
stage, owners simultaneously choose incentive contracts for managers, then in the second stage,
the firms’ managers simultaneously set the outputs. The equilibrium outcomes of each regime
are those derived by the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
From the routine backward calculation, for a given list of contract parameters, managers’
equilibrium outputs, each denoted qmri , are determined as follows. In regime (a), the equilibrium
outputs set by the managers of the public firm 0 and private firms i (i = 1; 2) are
qma0 =
1
18
µ
3(a¡ 1) + 5
µa0
¡ 1
µa1
¡ 1
µa2
¶
and qmai =
1
18
µ
3(a¡ 1)¡ 1
µa0
+
5
µai
¡ 1
µaj
¶
; (4.39)
where j = 1; 2 and j 6= i. In regime (b), the equilibrium outputs of the managers of the public
firm 0 and the private merged firm 12 are given as
qmb0 =
1
11
µ
2(a¡ 1) + 3
µb0
¡ 1
µb12
¶
and qmb12 =
1
11
µ
3(a¡ 1)¡ 1
µb0
+
4
µb12
¶
: (4.40)
In regime (c), the equilibrium outputs set by the managers of the public-private merged firm 0i
and private firm j (i; j = 1; 2 with i 6= j) are
qmc0i =
1
11
µ
3(a¡ 1) + 4
µc0i
¡ 1
µcj
¶
and qmcj =
1
11
µ
2(a¡ 1)¡ 1
µc0i
+
3
µcj
¶
: (4.41)
Finally, in regime (d), the manager of the merged firm 012 sets the following output
qmd012 =
1
8
µ
3(a¡ 1) + 3
µd012
¶
: (4.42)
We are ready to present the equilibrium outcomes for each of the four market regimes. Taking
into account of the outputs subsequently realized in the second stage: (4.39), (4.40), (4.41), and
(4.42), the owners choose their optimal incentive contracts to maximize their (constituted) objec-
tives. Tables 4:2 and 4:3 summarize the equilibrium incentive contracts µr¤i and the equilibrium
outputs qr¤, profits Πr¤i , and social welfare W r¤ in each regime r.
Table 4:4 summarizes the payoffs to the owners for each regime (r).
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Table 4.2: Equilibrium incentive contracts in each regime (r)
(r) incentive contract µr¤i
(a) µa¤0 = 289289+47a µa¤i = 289289+20a (i = 1; 2)
(b) µb¤0 = 77+a µb¤12 = 1414+a
(c) µc¤0i = 109¡35¯109¡35¯+a(8+20¯) µc¤j = 109¡35¯109¡35¯+a(7¡3¯) (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j)
(d) µd¤012 = 8¡3°8¡3°+3a°
Table 4.3: Equilibrium outputs, profits, and social welfare in each regime (r)
(r) equilibrium outcomes
(a) qa¤0 = 59289a; qa¤i = 50289a (i = 1; 2) ;
Πa¤0 =
4189
83521
a2; Πa¤i =
4000
83521
a2 (i = 1; 2) ;
W a¤ = 49659
167042
a2
(b) qb¤0 = 314a; qb¤12 = 27a;
Πb¤0 =
3
49
a2; Πb¤12 =
5
49
a2;
W b¤ = 113
392
a2
(c) qc¤0i = 2a(16¡¯)109¡35¯ ; qc¤j = 3a(7¡3¯)109¡35¯ ; (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j) ;
Πc¤0i =
2a2(640¡408¯+23¯2)
(109¡35¯)2 ; Π
c¤
j =
15a2(7¡3¯)2
(109¡35¯)2 (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j) ;
W c¤ =
a2(6839¡4058¯+483¯2)
2(109¡35¯)2
(d) qd¤012 = 3a8¡3° ;
Πd¤012 =
3a2(4¡3°)
(8¡3°)2 ;
W d¤ = 3a
2(11¡6°)
2(8¡3°)2
From the equilibrium outcomes presented in Table 4:3, the payoffs to the owners, (V r0 ; V r1 ; V r2 ),
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Table 4.4: Owners’ payoffs V ri in each regime (r)
(r) payoffs (V r0 ; V r1 ; V r2 )
(a)
³
V a0 ; V
a
1 ; V
a
2
´
=
³
W a¤; Πa¤1 ; Π
a¤
2
´
(b)
³
V b0 ; V
b
1 ; V
b
2
´
=
³
W b¤; ®Πb¤12; (1¡ ®)Πb¤12
´
(c)
³
V c0 ; V
c
i ; V
c
j
´
=
³
W c¤; (1¡ ¯)Πc¤0i ; Πc¤j
´
; (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j)
(d)
³
V d0 ; V
d
1 ; V
d
2
´
=
³
W d¤; (1¡ °)±Πd¤012; (1¡ °)(1¡ ±)Πd¤012
´
are explicitly given as follows:
(V a0 ; V
a
1 ; V
a
2 ) =
Ã
49659
167042
a2;
4000
83521
a2;
4000
83521
a2
!
; (4.43a)
(V b0 ; V
b
1 ; V
b
2 ) =
Ã
113
392
a2;
5®
49
a2;
5 (1¡ ®)
49
a2
!
; (4.43b)
(V c0 ; V
c
i ; V
c
j ) =
Ã
(6839¡ 4058¯ + 483¯2)
2(109¡ 35¯)2 a
2;
2(1¡ ¯)(640¡ 408¯ + 23¯2)
(109¡ 35¯)2 a
2;
15(7¡ 3¯)2
(109¡ 35¯)2a
2
!
; (4.43c)
(V d0 ; V
d
1 ; V
d
2 ) =
Ã
3 (11¡ 6°)
2 (8¡ 3°)2 a
2;
3 (1¡ °) (4¡ 3°) ±
(8¡ 3°)2 a
2;
3 (1¡ °) (4¡ 3°) (1¡ ±)
(8¡ 3°)2 a
2
!
:
(4.43d)
The main body of this chapter has shown that the core is non-empty in the case of en-
trepreneurial firms, and that the core consists solely of the market structures of the merger be-
tween the public firm 0 and one of the two private firms with the share ratio near around 0.57.
In contrast to their result, we obtain the following striking but serious impossibility result in our
delegation model.
Proposition 4.3. None of the market structures belongs to the core, i.e., Co = ?.
Proof. The proof proceeds through a series of claims (a) to (d). In each claim (r) (= a, b, c, d), it
will be shown that, for any market structure M in the regime (r), we can find some other market
structure which blocks M via some coalition S µ f0; 1; 2g.
Claim (a): The mixed triopoly, Mff0g;f1g;f2gg is blocked by the market structure of the merger
between the private firms, Mff0g;f1;2gg® in any case of ® 2 (®; ®¯), where ® = 39200=83521 and
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®¯ = 44321=83521.
This claim is easily checked as follows:
V b1 (®)¡ V a1 =
¡5a2(39200¡ 83521®)
4092529
> 0 , ® > 39200
83521
; (4.44)
V b2 (®)¡ V a2 =
5a2(44321¡ 83521®)
4092529
> 0 , ® < 44321
83521
: (4.45)
Thus, the joint deviation by f0; 1g will take place if ® 2 (39200=83521; 44321=83521).
Claim (b): (i) The mixed triopoly, Mff0g;f1g;f2gg blocks the the market structure of the merger
between the private firms, Mff0g;f1;2gg® in any case of ® 2 [0; 39200=83521);
(ii) When ¯ = 1=3, the market structure of the public-private merged firm 0i and
the private firm j 6= i Mff0;ig;fjgg¯ blocks the the market structure of the merger between the
private firms, Mff0g;f1;2gg® in any case of ® 2 [39200=83521; 44321=83521];
(iii) The mixed triopoly, Mff0g;f1g;f2gg blocks the market structure of the merger
between the private firms, Mff0g;f1;2gg® in any case of ® 2 (44321=83521; 1].
The statements (i) and (iii) are straightforward from the fact that the equivalence assertions
in (4.44) and (4.45) still hold when we reverse the inequality signs. We provide the proof of (ii).
Let, without loss of generality, i = 1. For the owner 0, we have
V c0 (¯)¡ V b0 =
¡a2(2109¡ 66822¯ + 43757¯2)
392(109¡ 35¯)2 > 0, ¯ >
4773¡ 164p777
6251
¼ 0:0322422:
(4.46)
On the other hand, for the owner of the firm 1, we have
V c1 (¯)j¯= 1
3
¡ V b1 (®)j®= 44321
83521
=
4486643171a2
261709044492
> 0: (4.47)
Note that 44321=83521 = argmax®2[39200=83521;44321=83521] V b1 (®). Thus, by (4.46) and (4.47),
M
ff0;1g;f2gg
¯=1=3 Âf0;1g Mff0g;f1;2gg® in any case of ® 2 [39200=83521; 44321=83521].
Claim (c): (i) The mixed triopoly, Mff0g;f1g;f2gg blocks the market structure of the public-
private merged firm 0i and the private firm, j 6= i Mff0;ig;fjgg¯ in any case of ¯ 2 (3=5; 1];
(ii) The mixed triopoly, Mff0g;f1g;f2gg blocks the market structure of the public-
private merged firm 0i and the private firm j 6= i, Mff0;ig;fjgg¯ in any case of ¯ 2 [0; 3=5].
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Let, without loss of generality, i = 1. For the owner 1, we have
V a1 ¡ V c1 (¯) =
¡2a2(29691440¡ 72270008¯ + 33547551¯2 ¡ 1920983¯3)
83521(109¡ 35¯)2 > 0;
8¯ 2
³
0:543873; 1
i
¶
µ
3
5
; 1
¸
: (4.48)
On the other hand, taking into account that d (V a0 ¡ V c0 (¯)) =d¯ = ¡169a2 (111¡ 112¯) =
(109¡ 35¯)3 < 0 for all ¯ 2 [0; 3=5], we have
V a0 ¡ V c0 (¯) =
2a2(4699615¡ 9992488¯ + 5122908¯2)
83521(109¡ 35¯)2 > 0, 8¯ 2
·
0;
3
5
¸
; (4.49)
since V a0 ¡ V c0 (¯)j¯=3=5 = 13709227a2=8084832800 > 0. Thus, the statement (i) follows from
(4.48), and (ii) does from (4.49), respectively.
Claim (d): (i) When ¯ = °, the market structure of the public-private merged firm 01 and the
private firm 2, Mff0;1g;f2gg¯ blocks the market structure with the merger among all the three firms,
M
ff0;1;2gg
°;± in any case of ° 2 [0; 4=5) and ± 2 [0; 1];
(ii) When ¯ = °= [° + (1¡ °)±], the market structure of the public-private merged
firm 01 and the private firm 2, Mff0;1g;f2gg¯ blocks the market structure with the merger among all
the three firms, Mff0;1;2gg°;± in any case of ° 2 [4=5; 1] and ± 2 [0; 1].
We begin with the proof of (i). For the payoff to the owner of the public firm 0, we have
V c0 (¯)j¯=° ¡ V d0 (°) > 0; 8° <
4
5
; (4.50)
from the fact that d
¡
V c0 (¯)j¯=° ¡ V d0 (°)
¢
=d° = ¡a2¡25645335¡ 48758498° + 29986128°2 ¡
7514154°3 + 661689°4
¢
= (8¡ 3°)3 (109¡ 35°)3 < 0 for all ° 2 [0; 1] and V c0 (¯)j¯=4=5 ¡
V d0 (°)j°=4=5 = 202087a2=257191200 > 0. For the payoff to the owner of the private firm 1, we
also obtain,
V c1 (¯)j¯=° ¡ V d1 (°; ±)j±= 1
2
> 0; 8° < 4
5
; (4.51)
because we have
d
¡
V c1 (¯)j¯=° ¡ V d1 (°; ±)j±=1=2
¢
d°
=
¡a2
·
17873952¡ 52618843° + 67857663°2 ¡ 39401297°3
+11066013°4 ¡ 1507788°5 + 86940°6
¸
2(8¡ 3°)3(109¡ 35°)3 < 0; 8° 2 [0; 1]; (4.52)
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and V c1 (¯)j¯=4=5¡V d1 (°; ±)j°=4=5;±=1=2 = 28043a2=5953500 > 0. Thus, by (4.50) and (4.51), we
obtain Mff0;1g;f2gg¯=° Âf0;1g Mff0;1;2gg°<4=5;±=1=2. Since in the cases of ± 6= 1=2 either of the two owners 1
and 2 will receive smaller payoff than in the case of ± = 1=2, we can apply the above argument
to the owner with the smaller payoff and complete the proof of (i).
Next, we prove (ii). Because ± = 0 is the most favorable case of ± for the owner 2 and
dV c2 (¯) =d¯ = ¡2460a2 (7¡ 3¯) = (109¡ 35¯)3 < 0 for all ¯ 2 [0; 1], it is sufficient to show
that Mff0;1;2gg°¸4=5;±=0 is blocked by M
ff0;1g;f2gg
¯=°=[°+(1¡°)±], i.e., by M
ff0;1g;f2gg
¯=1 , via f2g. In Mff0;1;2gg°¸4=5;±=0, the
payoff to the owner of the private firm 2 is given as:
V d2 (°; ±)j±=0 =
3a2(1¡ °)(4¡ 3°)
(8¡ 3°)2 : (4.53)
From the fact that dV d2 (°; ±)j±=0=d° = ¡3a2 (32¡ 27°) = (8¡ 3°)3 < 0 for all ° 2 [4=5; 1],
max
°2[4=5;1]
V d2 (°; ±)j±=0 = V d
µ
4
5
; 0
¶
=
3a2
98
: (4.54)
On the other hand, in the market structure Mff0;1g;f2gg¯=1 , the payoff to the owner of the private firm
2 is
V c2 (¯)j¯=1 =
15a2(7¡ 3¯)2
(109¡ 35¯)2
¯¯¯
¯=1
=
60a2
1369
>
3a2
98
= max
°2[4=5;1]
V d2 (°; ±)j±=0; (4.55)
Thus, Mff0;1g;f2gg¯=1 Âf2g Mff0;1;2gg°;±=0 for any case of ° 2 [4=5; 1].
Similar to the case wherein only the private firms exist in the market, we obtained the result
that the core is empty.
By the definition of the core, none of the market structures is stable in the sense that there
always exists at least one owner who wants to deviate and induce a new market structure: in the
regime (a), the private owners 1 and 2; in (b), the coalition of the owners 0 and i (= 1; 2) or a
single private owner j (= 1; 2); in (c), either of the owners 0 and i (= 1; 2); and in (d), the two
owners 0 and i (= 1; 2), or a single private owner j (= 1; 2). In what follows, we explain the
reasoning behind the results we stated as claims in the proof of proposition 4:3.
Our claim (a) tells that the market structure of the mixed triopoly is blocked by those struc-
tures of the regime (b) with ® 2 (®; ®¯). In the regime (b), the private merged firm 12 en-
joys improved production technology represented by the cost function C12(q12) = (q12)2 =2
and competes with the public firm 0 whose production technology is less efficient than the
firm 12, while every firm in the regime (a) has a symmetric production technology. Faced
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with this asymmetry of technologies in the regime (b), the owner of the public firm, a wel-
fare maximizer, chooses the contract parameter µb0 larger than the one in the regime (a) (note that
µb0 ¡ µa0 = 40a=(7 + a)(289 + 47a) > 0) to induce more of the production by the merged firm
12 which is now operating more efficient production technology. Consequently, both of the two
owners of the merged firm 12 can achieve higher payoffs in the regime (b) than in the regime (a).
In the model of mixed triopoly of entrepreneurial firms, which was considered in the main
body in this chapter, it was shown that the market structures of the regime (c) with ¯ 2 [0:56950; 0:56996]
belong to the core, where 0:56996 (resp. 0:56950) is the highest (resp. lowest) value of ¯ that the
owner of the private firm i (resp. the public firm 0) agrees on the merger. Our claim (c), how-
ever, tells that, in the case of managerial firms, any market structure of the regime (c) is blocked
by the market structure of the mixed triopoly. To explain the reasoning behind this result, we
compare the equilibrium outcomes obtained in the entrepreneurial model which was considered
in the main body of this chapter and those in the managerial model here. We use a superscript e
to denote equilibrium outcomes in the entrepreneurial model. In the entrepreneurial model of the
main body of this chapter, the equilibrium outputs of the public firm 0 and private firm i and the
equilibrium profit of the private firm i in the regime (a) are obtained as follows:
qae0 =
3
13
a; qaei =
2
13
a; Πaei =
8
169
a2;
and the equilibrium outputs of the merged firm 0i and private firm j and the equilibrium profit of
the merged firm 0i in the regime (c) are given as:
qce0i =
3
11¡ 4¯a; q
ce
j =
2¡ ¯
11¡ 4¯a; Π
ae
0i =
9(3¡ 2¯)
2(11¡ 4¯)2a
2:
Comparing these outcomes with those obtained in the managerial model, we will observe the
following changes brought by managerial delegation: (i) in the regime (a), the output of the
private firm i increases (qa¤i ¡ qaei = 72a=3757) while the output of the public firm, now operated
by a manager whose objective is not welfare maximization, decreases (qa¤0 ¡qae0 = ¡100a=3757);
(ii) consequently, the profit of the private firm i in the regime (a) becomes higher in the managerial
case than in the entrepreneurial case (Πa¤i ¡ Πaei = 7832a2=14115049); (iii) but in the regime
(c) where the merged firm 0i increases the output for the case of relatively small ¯ (qc¤0i ¡ qce0i =
a(5¡ ¯)(5¡ 8¯)=(11¡ 4¯)(109¡ 35¯) > 0 for all ¯ 2 [0; 5=8)), the competitor of the merged
firm 0i is not a public firm but solely the private firm j which also increases the output (qc¤j ¡qcej =
a(13 ¡ 4¯ + ¯2)=(11 ¡ 4¯)(109 ¡ 35¯) > 0 for all ¯ 2 [0; 1]), and such an expansion of the
output by the private firm j will decrease the profit of the merged firm 0i for almost all cases of
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¯ (Πc¤0i ¡ Πae0i = ¡[a2(11027 + 2884¯ ¡ 25293¯2 + 12158¯3 ¡ 1472¯4)=2(11 ¡ 4¯)2(109 ¡
35¯)2] < 0 for all ¯ 2 [0; 0:959536)). As a consequence, the shareholding ratio by the owner
i, i.e. (1 ¡ ¯), need to become higher in the managerial case than in the entrepreneurial case
to induce an agreement of the owner i on the merger between the public firm 0 and private firm
i. In fact, as show in (4.48), the value of 1 ¡ ¯ must be larger than 0:456127, or equivalently ¯
smaller than 0:543873 in our managerial model, whereas ¯ must be smaller than 0:56996 in the
entrepreneurial case. However, as shown in (4.49), the owner of the public firm 0 never agrees
on the merger as long as ¯ is lower than 0:543873.
Although the market structures of the regime (b) with ® 2 [®; ®¯] blocks the mixed triopoly,
these market structures, as stated in (ii) of Claim (b), are blocked by those of the regime (c) with
¯ = 1=3. By (4.46), (4.47), and the derivative of V c1 (¯), it is easily checked that this result also
holds for any ¯ 2 ¡(4773¡ 164p777)=6251; 1=3¤. The reasoning behind this result is explained
as follows. Because of the regime (b) is less competitive than the regime (a), social welfare which
the owner of the public firm 0 wants to maximize becomes lower than the level in regime (a).
Consequently, while the owners of the public firm 0 and private firm i in the regime (a) never
reach an agreement on the merger between these two firms, the owner of the public firm 0 in the
regime (b) now has an incentive to make a conciliatory offer to the owner of the private firm i on
the merger of these two firms, and they can reach an agreement on the merger.
Finally, Claim (d) shows that the market structures in the regime (d) are blocked by those
in the regime (c). This result is due to the fact that the positive effect of the improvement on
productivity in a merged firm is relatively smaller in the case of the shift from the regime (c) (or
(b)) into (d) than in the cases of the shift from (a) into (c) (or (b)).
Chapter 5
Stable market structures from merger
activities in mixed oligopoly with
asymmetric costs
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a theoretical analysis of the merger activities in an industry composed of
one state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm and multiple profit-maximizing private firms
with constant marginal cost functions.1;2 We often observe mergers between public and private
firms in the real world, for example, in the European automobile industry; fewer efforts have been
made to study merger activities in a mixed oligopoly.3 Some exceptions include Ba´rcena-Ruiz
and Garzo´n (2003), Coloma (2006) and Me´ndez-Naya (2008).4 However, these three papers as-
sume a fixed number of merger participants. Applying a cooperative game theoretical approach,
the present chapter analyzes mergers in a mixed oligopoly without assuming who the merger
participants are. and takes into account of the fact that each firm is freely allowed to merge and
break off mergers.5
1All the analyses conducted in this chapter are based on those of Kamijo and Nakamura (2009).
2The literature on mixed oligopoly have tackled several economic issues. For example, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n
(2006), Kato (2006) and Ohori (2006) analyzed environmental policies. Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006), Nishimori
and Ogawa (2002) and Poyago-Theotoky (1998) investigated R&D competition between the public firm and the
private firm. Moreover, Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Matsumura and
Matsushima (2006) explored the international competition.
3Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) discusses the M&A of SEAT, a Spanish publicly-owned automobile enter-
prise, with Volkswagen in 1986 and the business cooperation between Renault, a French partially state-owned firm,
and Nissan, a Japanese private firm, as examples of mergers between public and private firms.
4Both Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) and Coloma (2006) tackle horizontal mergers in a mixed duopoly com-
posed of a public firm and a private firm. Me´ndez-Naya (2008) extends the scope of these papers to the analysis of
mergers in a more general mixed market in which one public firm and n private firms exist in the same market.
5We treat merger formation as a cooperative game for two reasons. First, we would like to emphasize that the
results in this chapter more generally predict the final outcomes of market structures after merger activities than the
previous literature on horizontal mergers in a mixed oligopoly. Second, by adopting the cooperative game approach,
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There are many papers on merger activities in a private oligopoly, and they take two different
analytical approaches. The first one – the classic analysis – is called the exogenous merger.
The works on exogenous mergers attempt to answer the question of why firms merge. In this
literature, researchers fix a group of firms whose members compare the benefits of merging with
the benefits of standing alone. Salant et al. (1983), the pioneering paper in this field, obtained
a result that contradicted several empirical examples that the formation of a merged entity will
be an equilibrium phenomenon only if numerous firms participate in the merge; this is called the
merger paradox. More recent literature on exogenous mergers theoretically tackles the resolution
of the phenomenon of the merger paradox and works with the merger profitability under several
economic environments, such as strategic delegation and strategic trade policy.6
The other type of analysis on merger activities is called the endogenous merger, which is
our approach in this chapter. The literature in this area focuses her/his attention on answering
the question of how firms merge, and to this end, it assumes that all firms are allowed to choose
whether or not to merge and how to react to a merger. Moreover, we can observe two strands
with respect to the manner of analysis in the literature on modeling endogenous merger forma-
tion. One strand comprises the works that use a non-cooperative game theoretical approach, and
these constitute the majority of the literature on endogenous mergers.7 The other strand is the
cooperative game theoretical approach to analyzing endogenous mergers. The literature in this
field analyzes whether a particular market structure can be the outcome of a merger process by
studying the situation where no firm wants to induce a new market structure; hence, it focuses
its attention on the stability of market structures. Although Barros (1998) and Horn and Persson
(2001a) similarly consider the outcome of merger formations using a cooperative game approach,
they each adopt slightly different solution concepts.8 Straume (2006) and Banal-Estan˜ol et al.
we can generalize the traditional criterion that determines the success of a merger on the basis of whether or not the
payoffs of the preliminary fixed merger participants improve after the merger.
6Perry and Porter (1985) proposes that convex cost functions provide a resolution to the merger paradox. How-
ever, most recently, Heywood and Mcginty (2007a) reconsiders this issue in several environments and show that
the convex costs are not as relevant as the resolution to the merger paradox. Moreover, in the literature on strategic
delegation, Gonza´lez-Maestre and Lo´pez-Cun˜at (2001) and Ziss (2001) examine how managerial delegation affects
the profitability of horizontal mergers, and in the context of strategic trade policy, Huck and Konrad (2004) shows
that the presence of a strategic trade policy can make otherwise unprofitable mergers profitable.
7Deneckere and Davidson (1983) was the first a multi-stage non-cooperative model of endogenous merger for-
mation. Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) and Fauli-Oller (2000) deal with the dynamics of merger processes, taking into
account that a merger might trigger other mergers. Gowrisankaran (1999) and Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004)
examine the dynamic model of endogenous mergers to explain the extent to which an industry in which mergers are
feasible will tend toward monopoly.
8Barros (1998) does not name the solution concept in which the conditions that are usually required with respect
to the core should be satisfied, while Horn and Persson (2001a) explicitly calls its solution concept the core. See
Brito and Gata (2006) for a detailed discussion about the difference between the definition adopted by Barros (1998)
and the one considered in Horn and Persson (2001a).
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(2008) adopt the core concept presented by Horn and Persson (2001a) as their solution concept.9
In this chapter, in order to consider the stability of market structures in a mixed triopoly,
we invoke the core concept considered in Barros (1998) in the context of a private oligopoly
and in Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) in the context of a mixed oligopoly.10 In our framework,
coalitions of firms (including singletons or stand-alone firms) compete in the market so that the
payoff of a firm relies on the coalitions composed of the other firms.11 Furthermore, in order
to achieve a merger, the merger participants have to agree with the shareholding ratios in the
merged firm, similar to Barros (1998) and Kamaga and Nakamura (2007), and when a public
firm and one private firm merge, the objective of the merged firm is to maximize the weighted
average of social welfare and the profit of the merged firm with respect to the share ratio of each
the pre-merged firm’s owner, similarly to Matsumura (1998). Then, the characteristic difficulty
of the case of a mixed oligopoly occurs in the analysis of endogenous mergers, which differs
from that of the private oligopoly in Barros (1998) and Horn and Persson (2001a). Along with
the merger between public and private firms, the market outcomes themselves, such as the price
and the output level of each firm, are influenced by the share ratios of the merged firm. Thus, the
analysis of the stability problem of merger activities in the context of a mixed oligopoly certainly
needs more elaboration than that of a private oligopoly.
Using the above theoretical approach, in this chapter, we reveal that the market structures that
belong to the core, i.e., stable market structures, change according to the value of the marginal
cost of the public firm; however, we also show that according to the value of the marginal cost of
the public firm, there always exists a pair of share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-merged)
public firm, i.e., the government, and the (pre-merged) private firm such that the market structure
with the merger between the public firm and one private firm belongs to the core.12 Moreover,
9Straume (2006) compares the equilibrium market structure with the socially preferred market structure in order
to establish the correspondence between the social and private incentives for horizontal mergers, taking both the
cases of entrepreneurial and managerial firms into consideration. Banal-Estan˜ol et al. (2008) analyzes the effects of
investment decisions and a firm’s internal organization on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers.
10More precisely, Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) considers the stability of horizontal merger activities under
economic environments where a technology of each firm is represented as a quadratic cost function in a mixed
triopoly. In their paper, Kamaga and Nakamura assume that a merger improves productivity on the basis of the
hypothesis that the merged firm adopts the most efficient operation plan among the merger participants, described
in McAfee and Williams (1992), Nakamura and Inoue (2007), and Heywood and Mcginty (2007a), and show that
only the stable market structure contains a merged public-private firm with about 57% of its shares owned by the
public firm. Furthermore, Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) finds that without any productivity-improving effect with
a merger, the mixed oligopoly is a unique stable market structure.
11Yi (1997) provides two cases in accordance with the influence of the formation of coalitions on the payoffs of
players who belong to other coalitions. Yi defines the case in which the formation of coalitions increases (decreases)
the payoffs of players within other coalitions as the one of positive (negative) effects.
12Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) considers the merger between a public firm and a private firm in the mixed
duopolistic industry (thus, the endogenous merger analysis is conducted), and it shows that the merger between a
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we newly define an achievable market structure as follows: When the initial market structure is
a mixed triopoly, the market structure blocks the mixed triopoly, and it is never blocked by other
market structures. This answers the question of which market structure(s) that belong(s) to the
core is/are most likely to occur. Then, we find that the stable and achievable market structure
exists only when there is a market one with the merger between one public firm and one private
firm. Furthermore, we consider a general mixed oligopolistic model to confirm the robustness of
the result in the mixed triopolistic model, and then we obtain the result that there exists a pair of
share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-merged) public and private firms such that the market
structure with the merger between one public firm and one public firms is stable and achievable.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5:2, we formulate our model
and describe four regimes: (a) no mergers, (b) merger between two private firms, (c) merger
between a private firm and a public firm, and (d) merger among all firms. Furthermore, we obtain
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium values of various variables and the equilibrium payoffs of the
owners in each regime. In Section 5:3, we discuss the stability problem for mergers among firms
in a mixed oligopoly by adopting the core as the solution concept. Moreover, we consider the
achievablity of the stable market structures, i.e., which of the structures is/are likely to emerge
from the mixed oligopoly. In Section 5:4, we present the analysis of the general model with
respect to the number of firms existing in the mixed market and confirm the robustness of the
result obtained in the mixed triopolistic model. Section 5:5 concludes the chapter.
5.2 The model
We consider an industry consisting of two identical private firms and one public firm, all with a
single homogeneous output. Let q0 and qi denote the quantities of the public firm and private firm
i, respectively (i = 1; 2) and let Q = q0 +
P2
i=1 qi denote the aggregate quantity of the market.
The market price is determined by the inverse demand function P = a ¡ Q, where we assume
that a is sufficiently large. Let cj(qj); j = 0; 1; 2 denote the cost function of firm j. While the
two private firms have constant and identical marginal costs of production normalized to 0, the
public firm is assumed to be less efficient than they are and its marginal cost is denoted by c > 0
public firm and a private firm is observed in equilibrium, depending on the values of the following two parameters:
the share ratio of the (pre-merged) public firm’s owner and the degree of differentiation of the goods produced by
both firms. Therefore, from the viewpoint that the merger between one public firm and one private firm is sustainable,
our result is similar to that in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003).
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and c · a=3.13;14 Thus, c0(q0) = cq0 and ci(qi) = 0 for i = 1; 2.15 Since entry decisions are not
considered, we assume that there are no fixed costs.
The profit of firm i is given by
¼0 = q0(a¡Q)¡ cq0; and ¼i = qi(a¡Q); i = 1; 2;
and social welfare W is defined as the sum of consumer surplus (CS = Q2=2) and the profits of
the firms (¼i) in the market.
Let the owner of firm i be referred to as owner i. By definition, owner 0 is from the public
sector and owners 1 and 2 are from the private sector. Following the literature, it is assumed that
the public sector is concerned with social welfare; thus public firm 0 is a welfare maximizer. On
the other hand, the private firms are assumed to be profit maximizers. When the public firm and
private firms decide to merge, the merged entity, m, is owned by two parties that have different
objectives. Thus, merged firmmmust consider both profit as well as social welfare. Let s 2 [0; 1]
denote the public sector’s shareholding proportion in the merged firm and (1¡ s) 2 [0; 1] denote
the private sector’s proportion. Then, following Matsumura (1998) and other studies related to
partial privatization,16 we assume that firm m maximizes
V (s; 1¡ s) = sW + (1¡ s)¼m;
where qm and ¼m = (a ¡ Q)qm ¡ cm(qm) are the amount of output and the profit of firm m,
respectively.17 Note that in this model, the production cost of any merged firm is always 0.18
13There are studies on a mixed oligopoly with a constant marginal cost setting, such as Mujumdar and Pal (1998),
Pal (1998), Matsumura (2003a), and Lu (2006).
14This implies that a is sufficiently large to the extent that a ¸ 3c > 0. This assumption guarantees that each of
the equilibrium outputs of the public firm in all four regimes is positive or equal to 0.
15It is assumed that the technologies of all the firms are represented by constant marginal cost functions; however,
the public firm is less efficient than the two private firms. Some theoretical works show that in mixed markets, public
firms are more inefficient than private firms. For example, see Matsumura and Matsushima (2004), which shows that
the private firm’s cost is lower than that of the public firm, because the private firm engages in excessive strategic
cost-reducing activities in a Hotelling-type spatial model. In the real world, it is well-known that the experiences
of some countries, such as New Zealand and Great Britain provide an adequate explanation for the assumption that
public firms have higher costs of production. See Mizutani and Uranishi (2003) for empirical studies.
16For example, Tomaru (2006) and Fujiwara (2006).
17The objective function of the merged public-private firm is supported by the fact that in European countries,
various types of coordination of public and private power interests are observed, such as regulation up and active
interference through state ownership and participation in mixed companies, as indicated in Staudinger (1937).
18This form of the cost function is supported by the assumption that the merged firm adopts the most efficient
operation plan among the merger participants. More precisely, the cost function of the merged firm is defined by the
following total cost minimization problem:
min
X
i2S
ci(qi) s.t.
X
i2S
qi = qm and qi ¸ 0 for i 2 S;
where S µ f0; 1; 2g is the set of merger participants.
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In what follows, we consider four types of regimes classified by the type of merger: (a) no
merger, i.e., in the case where three firms compete in the market, (b) merger between two private
firms, (c) merger between a private firm and a public firm, and (d) merger among all firms. Let us
denote the merged entity by mS , where S is the set of the participants in the merger, and denote
the shares of owner i in the merged entity by si 2 [0; 1], i 2 S,
P
i2S si = 1.
(a) Mixed triopoly ff0g ; f1g ; f2gg
First, we consider a mixed triopoly with one public firm and two private firms, assuming that
there is no merger (or that the merger has not yet occurred). In this case, private firm i chooses
qi to maximize its own profit ¼i while the public firm chooses q0 to maximize social welfare
W = (q0 + q1 + q2)
2=2 +
P2
i=0 ¼i. Solving these three problems simultaneously, we obtain the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome for case (a) as follows:
qa0 = a¡ 3c; qai = c; Qa = a¡ c; P a = c;
¼a0 = 0; ¼
a
i = c
2; W a =
a2 ¡ 2ac+ 5c2
2
:
Here, we use the symbol a to denote the equilibrium corresponding to regime (a). In addition,
in this case, the payoffs of owner 0 and private owner i (= 1; 2) are the equilibrium welfare
and equilibrium profit of firm i, respectively. Thus, the payoffs of owner 0 and private owner i
(= 1; 2) are given by
ua0 = W
a =
a2 ¡ 2ac+ 5c2
2
; and uai = ¼ai = c2; (i = 1; 2):
(b) Merger between two private firms ff0g ; f1;2gg
Second, we consider the case where two private firms (two private owners) decide to merge. The
market structure after the merger is a mixed duopoly consisting of the public firm and the new
“merged” private firm 12, where we use 12 instead of mf1;2g for convenience. Social welfare, i.e.,
the objective function of the public firm, is defined by W = (q0+ q12)2=2+ ¼0+ ¼12. According
to the ownership of the firm, the objective of firm 12 is defined as the profit of the merged firm,
¼12. In the equilibrium outcomes for regime (b), we obtain the following:
qb0 = a¡ 2c; qb12 = c; Qb = a¡ c; P b = c;
¼b0 = 0; ¼
b
12 = c
2; W b =
a2 ¡ 2ac+ 3c2
2
:
In addition, the payoff of owner 0 is given by
ub0(s1; s2) = W
b =
a2 ¡ 2ac+ 3c2
2
:
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Let s1 = t and s2 = 1¡ t. Then, the payoffs of private owners 1 and 2 are given by
ub1(s1; s2) = s1¼
b
12 = tc
2; and ub2(s1; s2) = s2¼b12 = (1¡ t)c2:
(c) Merger between a private firm and a public firm ff0; ig ; fjgg
Next, we consider the case in which a private firm and a public firm decide to merge. We assume
that public firm 0 merges with private firm i. Thus, firm j = 1; 2, j 6= i is outside the merger.
Social welfare is given by W = (q0i+ qj)2=2+¼0i+¼j . While firm j maximizes ¼j , the merged
firm, m0i, maximizes V (s0; si) = V (s; 1¡ s), where s0 = s and si = 1¡ s denote the ratios of
public owner 0 and private owner i, respectively, in the merged firm’s shareholding.
Solving the maximization problem given shares s, we now obtain the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium in regime (c) as follows:
qc0i =
a
3¡ 2s; q
c
j =
a (1¡ s)
3¡ 2s ; Q
c =
a (2¡ s)
3¡ 2s ; P
c =
a (1¡ s)
3¡ 2s ;
¼c0i =
a2 (1¡ s)
(3¡ 2s)2 ; ¼
c
j =
a2 (1¡ s)2
(3¡ 2s)2 ; W
c =
a2 (2¡ s) (4¡ 3s)
2 (3¡ 2s)2 ;
The payoffs of owner 0 and private owner i, who is inside the merger, are given by
uc0(s0; si) = W
c =
a2 (2¡ s) (4¡ 3s)
2 (3¡ 2s)2 ; and u
c
i(s0; si) = (1¡ s0)¼c0i =
a2 (1¡ s)2
(3¡ 2s)2 :
In addition, since the payoff of private owner j, who is outside the merger, is the equilibrium
profit of firm j, it is given by
ucj(s0; si) = ¼
c
j =
a2 (1¡ s)2
(3¡ 2s)2 :
Here, we find an interesting property. The payoff of the private owner i, who is a participant
in the merger, coincides with the payoff of another private owner, j, who is outside the merger.
This property plays an important role when the stability problem is considered.19
(d) Merger among all firms ff0;1;2gg
Finally, we consider the case where all firms merge. Thus, the market becomes a public monopoly.20
In this regime, social welfare is defined by W = (q012)2=2 + ¼012. The merged firm 012 maxi-
mizes V (s0; s1 + s2) = V (s; 1¡ s), where si denotes the shares of owner i and s = s0. Solving
19This property holds as long as all private firms have symmetric constant marginal costs of production even if
there are more than two private firms. To be more precise, when there are n private firms and one public firm, and
the public firm and some of the private firms agree to merge, then, the distributed profits of the private owners of the
merged firm coincide with the profits of each outsider of this merger. (See Section 5:4)
20Barros (1998) excludes merger for monopoly by assuming that the antitrust authority would not give clearance
to such a merger. However, we do not eliminate this case, because our focus is on stable states resulting from merger
activities.
81
the maximization problem, we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in regime (d) as follows:
qd012 =
a
2¡ s; P
d =
a (1¡ s)
2¡ s ; ¼
d
012 =
a2 (1¡ s)
(2¡ s)2 ; W
d =
a2 (3¡ 2s)
2 (2¡ s)2 :
Given shares s, the payoff of owner 0 is defined as
ud0(s0; s1; s2) = W
d
012 =
a2 (3¡ 2s)
2 (2¡ s)2 :
On the other hand, let t = s1=(1¡ s). Then, the payoffs of private owners 1 and 2, are given by
ud1(s0; s1; s2) = (1¡ s)t¼d012 =
a2 (1¡ s)2 t
(2¡ s)2 ;
and
ud2(s0; s1; s2) = (1¡ s)(1¡ t)¼d012 =
a2 (1¡ s)2 (1¡ t)
(2¡ s)2 ;
respectively.
5.3 The core and stable market structures
Except for the mixed triopoly, each regime of (b), (c), and (d) includes more than one market
structure. Each market structure can be identified in terms of the merger participants and share
ratios. For example, in (c), we observe a situation composed of merged public-private firm 01
with the government’s shareholding ratio s = 0:5 and private firm 2 as one market structure.
In the following analysis, we consider the stability problem that exists between market struc-
tures, using the concept of the core, since the persistence of the market structures is important in
the study of horizontal mergers in the industry that comprises more than two firms.21 To define
the cores of the market structures, we start with the definition of a blocking market structure, M ,
if there exists a deviant coalition of owners (firms) such that
1. M can be constructed from M 0 solely based on the decisions made by the owners in the
deviant coalition, and
2. every owner in the coalition achieves a strictly higher payoff in M than in M 0.
An example will help to explain blocking. Let M ijs be the market structure composed of the
merged firm ij with i’s shareholding ratio s and j’s shareholding ratio 1¡ s. Consider M010:5, i.e.,
21In the literature on applied economics, the core concept is broadly used, e.g., in Riezman (1985) in the context
of customs unions in international economics, and in Okada (2003), which analyzes international CO2 emissions
trading in environmental economics.
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the market structure composed of merged firm 01 with shareholding ratio s = 0:5 and firm 2.
In this case, for example, the coalition of owners 0 and 2 can choose to construct a new market
structure that consists of merged firm 02 with shareholding ratio s = 0:6 and firm 1, denoted as
M020:6. If both owners 0 and 2 achieve higher payoffs in M020:6 than in M010:5, then M020:6 blocks M010:5.
Note that it is also possible for a deviant coalition to have a single owner. In the example, it is
possible for owner 0 (or owner 2) to deviate from M020:6 by breaking off the merger and to operate
her/his own firm (i.e., to shift into the mixed triopoly, which is denoted by M;) as well. Note that
each firm’s owner freely merges her/his firm with (an)other firm(s) and can break off the merger
without any cost.22 Note also that only the reallocation of their shareholding in the merged firm
is considered by the deviation of the merger participants themselves.
The core of the market structure is defined as the set of market structures that are never
blocked by any other market structure. We denote the core of the market structure as Co. If
a market structure is in the core, no participant has the incentive to shift to a different market
structure. In this sense, the market structure(s) in the core can be regarded as stable.
We now explore the stable market structures, i.e., the core Co. Our arguments proceed by
proving several lemmas. The first lemma shows that there are no shares of two private owners so
that the state where two private firms merge is in the core, Co.
Lemma 5.1. For any t 2 [0; 1], market structure M12t does not belong to the core, Co.
Proof. From the results of regime (b) in Section 5:2, private owners 1 and 2 obtain tc2 and
(1¡ t)c2, respectively, in M12t . On the other hand, each of the two private owners receives c2 in
market structure M;. Thus, either of them certainly prefers M; to M12t , and is able to induce M;
from M12t . Therefore, market structure M12t is blocked by M; through the coalition of the two
private owners.
Lemma 5:1 shows that the merger of the two private firms brings no advantage to their owners,
because it only leads to the expansion of the market shares of the public firm.23
22Even though breaking off a merger is generally costly, this assumption is quite reasonable if we interpret the
merger activity problem as a negotiation that can be terminated without any cost and that is carried out before
realizing the merger. For example, if the present market structure is a mixed triopoly, each firm’s owner negotiates
(with no cost) whether her/his firm will be part of the merger, taking her/his payoff after the merger into account. In
our model, the stable market structure can be regarded as a consequence of some sort of thought experiment between
each firm’s owner. Thus, in our model, it is not unnatural that breaking off a merger does not yield any positive cost.
Moreover, in the following analysis, we additionally assume that the initial market structure is a mixed triopoly and
consider which of stable market structure(s) belonging to the core will most likely be realized. This point is analyzed
through the notion of “achievablity” after Proposition 5:1.
23This result is closely related to that in Salant et al. (1983) that a merger tends to be unprofitable, unless many
firms take part in the merger. Moreover, Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) shows that in the context of a mixed
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Next, we determine whether the market structure where all the three firms merge is in the core,
Co. Let M012s;t denote the market structure wherein firms 0, 1, and 2 merge, and the share ratios
in the merged firm of the government and the owners of the two private firms are s, (1¡ s)t, and
(1¡s)(1¡t), respectively. The next lemma shows that there exist some shareholding proportions
of the three owners such that the market structure with the merger among the three firms is in the
core, Co.
Lemma 5.2. When a
¡
3¡p3¢ =9 · c · a=3, there exist s 2 [0; 1] and t 2 [0; 1] such that the
market structureM012s;t belongs to the core, Co. Thus, s is less than or equal to s¯ = (5¡3
p
2)=7 ¼
0:11 and the shareholding proportion of private owner 1 is negligibly different from that of private
owner 2.24 On the other hand, when c < a
¡
3¡p3¢ =9, for any s; t 2 [0; 1], market structure
M012s;t does not belong to the core.
Proof. The following analyses are performed with the aid of Figure 5:1. Let curve AD in Figure
5:1 denote the locus between the payoff of owner 0 uc0 (horizontal axis) and the payoff of private
owner 1 uc1 (vertical axis) in market structure M01s when s varies in the interval [0; 1] (A and D
represent the states where s = 0 and s = 1, respectively). In addition, let curve BD express
the locus between the payoff of the public owner ud0 (horizontal axis) and ud12=2 := (ud1 + ud2)=2
(vertical axis), i.e., the value when private owners 1 and 2 equally share (1¡ s)¼d012 and s varies
in the interval [0; 1] (B and D indicate the states where s = 0 and s = 1, respectively). Moreover,
the share ratio of owner 0, i.e., s, at point E is s¯ = (5¡ 3p2)=7 ¼ 0:11.
Step 1. First we show that when s > s¯, market structure M012s;t is blocked by the coalition of
owner 0 and one of the private owners.
In Figure 5:1, market structure M012s;t with s > s¯ corresponds to the region on curve ED,
except for point E (note that in curve ED, the two private owners obtain equal payoffs). From
the figure, for any point on ED, there exist points on curve AD, which is located in the region
upper right from these points. Thus, in the case where the proportions of two private owners’
shareholdings are equal, both public owner 0 and private owner 1 (or 2) can obtain better payoffs
by establishing merged firm 01 and adjusting the proportions of their shareholdings in the firm
after deviating from the market structure M012s;t . Hence, when s > s¯, market structure M012s=0:5 is
oligopoly, a merger between private firms is never beneficial, even if there exists a relevant productivity-improving
effect in the merged firm.
24The concrete region of s and t in which market structure M012s;t is present in the core, Co, is given in Figure 5:2.
More precisely, as indicated behind the proof of Lemma 5:2, the range of the share ratios in the merged firm of all
the pre-merged firms’ owners such that M012s;t belongs to the core is larger, as the value of the marginal cost of the
public firm increases.
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Figure 5.1: Relationship among the payoffs of the three owners in regimes (b), (c), and (d)
blocked by market structure M0is through the coalition of the government and private owner i, (i
= 1 or 2). In addition, in the case where the shareholding proportions of the two private owners
are different, we select the coalition of the public owner and a private owner who has fewer shares
in the firm. Then, the locus between the payoffs of both the public owner and the private owner
is located under curve ED. After all, the market structure with an all-firms merger is blocked
by the public owner and the private owner with lower shareholdings. Therefore, market structure
M012s;t is blocked if s > s¯ and t 2 [0; 1].
Step 2. We will show that there exist s · s¯ and t 2 [0; 1] such that the market structure M012s;t is
not blocked by any coalition of owners, if c 2 [a(3 ¡ p3)=9; a=3]. To show this, we consider
the following five cases.
Case 1: The deviation of all the owners. The three owners of firm 012 can change their
shareholding ratios in the merged firm. It is easily verified that ud0 is increasing in s and udi (i =
1; 2) is decreasing in s. Moreover, ud1 is increasing in t and ud2 is decreasing in t. Thus, such a
deviation does not succeed.
Case 2: The deviation of the public owner and one of the two private owners. If s · s¯, we
find from Figure 5:1 that public owner 0 prefers M01s0 (or M02s0 ) to M012s;t , irrespective of the values
of s, t, and s0. Therefore, we investigate only whether there is an incentive for private owner 1 (or
2) to merge her/his firm with the public firm by deviating with the public owner. The payoff of
private owner 1 (or 2) is a2=9 at the maximum when private firm 1 (or 2) merges with the public
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firm. Thus, for s · s¯, if either
ud1 = (1¡ s)t¼d012 <
1
9
a2 or ud2 = (1¡ s)(1¡ t)¼d012 <
1
9
a2
holds, M012s;t is blocked by the deviation of the public owner and one of the private owners, and
thus, the state is not in the core. On the other hand, if the following two conditions hold:
ud1 ¸
1
9
a2 and ud2 ¸
1
9
a2;
then M012s;t is not blocked by the deviation of the two.25 The pairs of s and t that satisfy the above
conditions are found in the shaded area of Figure 5:2.
s
s¯
t
5=9
1=2
4=9
(1¡ s)(1¡ t)¼d012 ¸ 19a2
(1¡ s)t¼d012 ¸ 19a2
Figure 5.2: The domain of s and t such that the state where the three firms merge is in the core
In the following three cases, we assume that the pair (s; t) is selected from the shaded area of
Figure 5:2.
Case 3: The deviation of two private owners. Since both private owners 1 and 2 obtain c2
in M; and the payoffs are less than or equal to c2 in M12t , it blocks the market structure of the
merger among all three firms only if ud1 < c2 and ud2 < c2. However, in market structure M012s;t ,
both private owners 1 and 2 can obtain payoffs that are greater than or equal to a2=9 (¸ c2) by
the assumption of the marginal cost of the public firm, c 2 [0; a=3]. Thus, M012s;t is not blocked if
(s; t) are chosen in the shaded area of Figure 5:2.
25These two conditions also hold since each of the two private owners cannot obtain the payoff more than a2=9
by assuming the marginal cost of the public firm, 0 < c · a=3, even if the public owner 0 and private owner 1 (or
2) induce the state M after assuming from M012s;t , taking into account that uai = c2, (i = 1; 2), as in the following
analysis.
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Case 4: The deviation of one private owner. Suppose private owner 2 deviates and induces a
new market structure, M01s . Her/His payoff in M02s is uc2 = a2(1 ¡ s)2=(3 ¡ 2s)2, which is less
than or equal to a2=9. Thus, M012 is not blocked by the deviation of one private owner.
Case 5: The deviation of one public owner. After the deviation of the public owner from
M012s;t , the new market becomes M12t . Social welfare depends on the marginal cost of public firm
c in market structure M12t . Let curve CD in Figure 5:1 denote the locus between the payoff of
public owner 0, ub0, and the sum of those of two private owners ub12 := ub1 + ub2 = c2 in market
structure M12t , when the marginal cost of public firm c changes in the interval (0; a=3] (C and D
represent the states where c = a=3 and c = 0, respectively). When the value of c varies on curve
FD (note that F is not included), we find that the state in the shaded area in Figure 5:2 is blocked
by market structure M12t , which is induced by the public owner. On the contrary, when the value
of c changes on curve CF , the state where the public owner’s shareholding proportion, s, is near
s¯ (e.g., s = s¯; t = 0:5) is not blocked and is in Co. We obtain c = a(3¡p3)=9 as the value of c
on F by solving (a2 ¡ 2ac + 3c2)=2 = 7a2=18. That is, if c ¸ a(3 ¡p3)=9, there exists a pair
of s and t such that M012s;t is not blocked by any other market structures.
Step 3. Finally, we show that if c 2 (0; a(3 ¡ p3)), for any s 2 [0; 1] and t 2 [0; 1], market
structure M012s;t is blocked.
This is easily proved as follows. From Step 1, when s > s¯, M012s;t is blocked by the deviation
of one public owner and one private owner. On the other hand, when s · s¯, from the proof of
Case 5, M012s;t is blocked by the deviation of one public owner because c < a(3¡
p
3). This step
concludes the proof.
Lemma 5:2 outlines the fact that the shareholding proportions of the three owners in firm 012
such that M012s;t is in the core vary depending on the value of the marginal cost of the public firm,
c. The larger the value of c 2 [a(3 ¡ p3)=9; a=3] is, the weaker the incentive for deviation of
the public owner is; thus, as the value of c approaches a=3, the domain of the pairs of s and t in
which market structure M012s;t is in the core is broader than the one in which c is relatively small
as compared to a=3. Note that the public owner prefers the merger between a single private firm
and a public firm to the merger of three firms because relative to the merger with one private
firm, an all-firms merger only results in further deteriorating the competitive pressure without
improving the production efficiency. However, once the market structure M012s;t with the values
of s and t in Figure 5:2 is established, neither of the private owners has an incentive to accept
the proposal of the deviation by the public owner, since they obtain relatively high payoffs. On
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the other hand, the deviation of the public owner from M012s;t does not increase social welfare
when the values of s and t are in the shaded area of Figure 5:2 and s is sufficiently near to s¯, if
c 2 £a(3¡p3)=9; a=3¤. This is so because the negative effect of the inefficiency of the public
firm overshadows the positive effect of the increase of the competitive pressure in the market.
Next, we explore whether the market structure where a single private firm and a public firm
merge is in the core, Co. The following lemma holds, and we obtain a positive result.
Lemma 5.3. When 0 < c · a=3, there exists s 2 [0; 1] such that market structure M0is (i = 1; 2)
belongs to the core, Co.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that i = 1 in advance of the proof of this lemma.
We prove this lemma by showing that the deviation of any coalition does not succeed if s is
appropriately chosen.
Case 1: The deviation of the three owners. Let us consider a point on curve AD in Figure
5:3 and call it F . Note that F corresponds to a pair of payoffs of public owner 0 and private
owner 1 in regime (c) for some of their shares. By the definition of blocking, the payoff of the
public owner has to be strictly improved by the merger of the three firms. Note again that curve
BD denotes the locus between the payoff of public owner ud0 and ud12 := (ud1 + ud2)=2 in the
market structure of the merger of the three firms. Thus, to enhance the payoff of the public owner
through the merger of the three firms, its shares and payoff in the merged firm must correspond
to the point on curve BD, which is lower right to point F (see Figure 5:3). Let us consider
such a point and call it point G. Here, we find that the value of the vertical axis of point G is
always lower than that of point F . This implies that the payoff of the private owner 1 in the initial
situation (on point F ) is greater than the average of the payoffs of private owners 1 and 2 in the
market structure with the three-firms merger corresponding to point G. In market structure M0is ,
since private owner 2 obtains the same payoff as that of private owner 1 (see regime (c) in Section
5:2), the payoff of one of the two private owners certainly decreases by the deviation from F to
G. Therefore, M0is is not blocked by the deviation of the three owners.
Case 2: The deviation of public owner 0 or private owner 1. The arguments presented below
proceed with the aid of Figure 5:4. Let the upper right curve connecting A and D in Figure 5:4
denote the locus between the payoff of the public owner and that of private owner 1 in regime
(c) when s varies from 0 to 1. On the other hand, let the left under curve connecting A and D
express the locus between the payoff of the public owner and that of the private owners in regime
(a) when marginal cost c varies from 0 to a=3 (A represents the state wherein c = a=3 and D is
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Figure 5.3: Relationship among the payoffs of the three owners in the regimes (c) and (d)
the one where c = 0). Here, note that c2 · a2=9 by the assumption of the marginal cost of the
public firm.
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Figure 5.4: Relationship among the payoffs of the three owners in regimes (a), (c), and (d)
From Figure 5:4, we find that for any point on the left under curve AD, there exist points on
the upper right of curve AD, which is located upper right to or at the same point. This means that
for any value of c, there exists some s 2 [0; 1] such that the market structure M0is is not blocked
by a single player deviation of public owner 0 or private owner 1.
Case 3: The deviation of two private owners. It is obvious that the market structure with
the merger between a private firm and a public firm with the shareholding proportions defined
in Case 2 is also unblocked by the deviation of the two private owners, because the payoff of a
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private owner in M12t is less than or equal to that in M;.
Case 4: The deviation of public owner 0 and private owner 1. We investigate the deviation
such that the public and private owners in the merged firm simply changes their shareholding ra-
tios. From the results in regime (c) in the previous section, it is easily shown that uc0 is increasing
in s and uc1 is decreasing in s. Thus, the deviation of the two owners in the merged firm does not
succeed.
Case 5: The deviation of public owner 0 and private owner 2. Note that by observing regime
(c) in the previous section, private owner 2 obtains the same payoff as that of private owner 1 in
the market structure M0is . By the proof of Case 4, such a deviation does not succeed. This case
concludes the proof.
From Lemma 5:3, we can infer that for any c 2 (0; a=3), there exist pairs of share proportions
of public owner 0 and private owner i such that market structure M0is (i = 1; 2) belongs to
the core. When the marginal cost of public firm c is higher, the market structures, which is
advantageous to a private owner in terms of the share ratio after the merger, will be in the core, Co.
On the other hand, as c decreases, the structures where the two owners’ shareholding proportions
in the merged firm are favorable to the government are introduced in the core Co. The payoff of
the public owner (or social welfare) in regime (c) is higher than or equal to the one in regime (d),
which is the same as the value of s.26 Therefore, to improve the payoff of the public owner by
inducing the structure wherein all three firms merge, the value of s must be higher than that of
the original state, i.e., the structure where a private firm and a public firm merge. However, this
results in a decrease in the payoff of at least one private owner. This is the reason why market
structure M0is (i = 1; 2) is unblocked through the structure wherein the three firms merge. On
the other hand, in a mixed triopoly, the existence of a public firm whose productivity is worse as
compared to that of the two private firms will be a structure wherein social welfare is relatively
low. In addition, in the structure where a private and a public firm merge, both the pre-merged
private owners can acquire the payoffs that are equal to and higher than the structures in regime
(a) by coordinating the shareholding proportions of the public owner and the private owner in
the merged firm. Thus, market structure M0is (i = 1; 2) is not blocked by the deviation of a single
player, i.e., the public owner or the private owner.
26This property is confirmed by the following easy calculation.
uc0 ¡ ud0 =
a2(1¡ s)3(5¡ 3s)
2(6¡ 7s+ 2s2)2 ¸ 0; 8s 2 [0; 1]:
Note that uc0 ¡ ud0 is equal to zero only when s = 1.
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Finally, we confirm whether the market structure M; belongs to the core, Co.
Lemma 5.4. When c = a=3, market structure M; belongs to the core, Co. On the other hand,
when c < a=3, M; does not belong to the core.
Proof. When 0 < c < a=3, from Figure 5:4, we find that market structure M; is blocked by M0is
through the coalition of public owner 0 and private owner i (i = 1; 2). Point A in Figure 5:4
denotes each of the owners’ payoffs in the mixed triopoly when c = a=3. Thus, the payoff of
the public owner is 4a2=9, whereas those of both the private owners are a2=9. It is easily verified
that the mixed triopoly is unblocked by any other market structure induced by all deviations of
owners.
In the mixed triopoly, when c = a=3, each of the two private owners obtains the highest
payoff equal to a2=9, because the public firm exits the market. Thus, to enhance the payoffs of
the two private owners, it is necessary that the shares of the public owner in the three-firm merger
are low enough. However, it is inevitable that the decrease of s results in a deterioration in social
welfare, i.e., the payoff of the public owner. Therefore, the mixed triopoly is not blocked by any
other market structure.
To state the following proposition, we note the following. If a market structure is in the
core, we call it a stable market structure. In addition, merger fi; jg is stable if there exists some
s 2 [0; 1] such that M ijs 2 Co, merger f0; 1; 2g is stable if there exist some s 2 [0; 1] and t 2 [0; 1]
such that M012s;t 2 Co, and M; is stable if M; 2 Co.
We obtain the next proposition according to the abovementioned analyses.
Proposition 5.1. Stable mergers are classified into three cases depending on the value of the
marginal cost of the public firm c.
1. When c = a=3, four states of M;, merger f0; ig, (i = 1; 2) and f0; 1; 2g are stable.
2. When a(3 ¡ p3)=9 · c < a=3, three states of merger f0; ig (i = 1; 2) and f0; 1; 2g are
stable.
3. When 0 < c < a(3¡p3)=9, two states of merger f0; ig (i = 1; 2) are stable.
We explain the intuitions behind Proposition 5:1 as follows. First, market structure M; is
stable only if the marginal cost of the public firm is the highest, i.e., c = a=3 to the degree
that the public firm exits the market. In this state, the two private owners obtain relatively high
payoffs because of the existence of the public firm with low productivity. Thus, the public owner
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desires a merger with a private firm to improve its productivity, however, when c = a=3, both
private owners disagree on the merger, no matter how much of a concession the public owner
makes to the shareholding proportion in the merged firm. As the marginal cost of the public firm
is lower than c = a=3, market structure M; is blocked by M0is through a coalition of two players,
i.e., public owner 0 and private owner i (i = 1; 2), and is not in the core. In addition, from the
viewpoint of the public owner, the productivity of the public firm is higher when it merges with
a single private firm, because the merger with two private firms deteriorates social welfare by
reducing the competitive pressure. Considering this fact, we can determine why market structure
M012s;t is in the core when the marginal cost of the public firm is under the high and middle levels.
If the sum of the two private owners’ shareholding proportions is high, a single private owner can
share a relatively high payoff with another private owner. Thus, there are no incentives for both
private owners to deviate with the public owner and induce the market structure wherein a private
firm and a public firm merge, although the public owner wants to merge with a single private firm.
Moreover, when the productivity of the public firm is low, social welfare deteriorates even if the
public owner deviates on her/his loan from the market structure wherein the three firms merge. In
other words, when c is relatively high and the shares of the public owner in the three-firm merger
are low, it is a clever choice for the public owner to leave the situation as it stands, because the
public owner is too inefficient to deviate on her/his own from the state wherein all three firms
merge. However, market structure M012s;t does not belong to the core when the marginal cost of
the public firm is below the low level, because the public owner does not have any incentive to
merge with the two private firms due to the cutdown on the improvement of its productivity.
Finally, we check which of the market structures in the core is/are most likely to occur. Al-
though this is quite a difficult question theoretically, we can provide a reasonable answer because
we obtain additional information on the initial situation by viewing a merger as a form of “pri-
vatization.” Since the initial situation is a mixed triopoly composed of one public firm and two
private firms, we focus our attention on the elements of the core that block the initial mixed tri-
opoly and then consider the market structure that blocks the mixed triopoly and is never blocked
by other market structures. We call such a market structure achievable. The following propo-
sition shows that only the two-firm merger between a public firm and a private firm is likely to
occur as a result of the merger activity from the mixed triopoly.
Corollary 5.1. For any c 2 (0; a=3), only the two-firm merger f0; ig, i = 1; 2, is stable and
achievable from an initial mixed triopoly.
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Proof. By the proof of Lemmas 5:3 and 5:4, if M0is belongs to the core, it blocks M; for any
c 2 (0; a=3).
Next, we show that any market structure except for M0is in the core, Co, is not achievable
from M;. By Lemma 5:2, the three-firms merger in the core, M012s;t 2 Co, is on curved segment
BE of Figure 5.4. Because the pair of payoffs of the public and private owners in the initial
mixed triopoly M; is expressed by the under left curve AD, the public owner always prefers M;
to M012s;t on curved segment BE.
5.4 Extension
In this section, we consider a general mixed oligopoly with respect to the number of (private)
firms, a mixed oligopoly with one public firm and n (n ¸ 3), private firms, and analyze the
stable market structure in this setting in order to confirm the validity of the results in the previous
sections. All of the settings except for the number of private firms are the same as in the previous
sections. Here, we assume that a > (n+ 1)c.
In the Cournot equilibrium of the mixed market of one public firm and n private firms, we
have
Π¤u(n) = 0;
Π¤r(n) = c
2;
W ¤(n) =
1
2
£
a2 ¡ 2ac+ (2n+ 1)c2¤;
where Π¤u(n) and Π¤r(n) denote the profits of a public firm and n private firms, respectively.
To investigate the market outcome after firms merge, it is convenient to consider a market
with one partially privatized firm (a merged public-private firm) with the government’s share s
and m (= 1; 2; : : : ; n ¡ 1) private firms. Then, the equilibrium profits of the partially privatized
firm and private firms and the equilibrium social welfare are given as follows:
Π¤¤u (s;m) =
a2(1¡ s)
[m(1¡ s) + 2¡ s]2 ;
Π¤¤r (s;m) =
a2(1¡ s)2
[m(1¡ s) + 2¡ s]2 ;
W ¤¤(s;m) =
a2(1 +m¡ms)(3 +m¡ 2s¡ms)
2 [2 +m¡ s(1¡m)]2 ;
where Π¤¤u (s;m) and Π¤¤r (s;m) denote the profits of a partially privatized firm and a private
firm when there are m private firms and one partially privatized firm, respectively, in the case
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where the government’s shareholding ratio in the partially privatized firm is s. Note that (1 ¡
s)Π¤¤u (s;m) = Π
¤¤
r (s;m), and it is easy to verify that @Π¤¤u =@m < 0, @Π¤¤r =@m < 0, @Π¤¤r =@s <
0, @W ¤¤=@m > 0, and @W ¤¤=@s > 0.
We consider the value of s that equalizes the profit of a private firm in the mixed oligopoly
with one public firm and n private firm and the profit of the private owner in the partially priva-
tized firm with the government’s share s. This value is obtained as a solution of the following
equation:
(1¡ s)Π¤¤u (s; n¡ 1) = Π¤r(n) = c2:
Then, the solution of this equation is
s = s¤ :=
a¡ c(n+ 1)
a¡ cn 2 (0; 1):
Moreover, we know that (1 ¡ s)Π¤¤u (s; n ¡ 1) ¸ Π¤r(n) if and only if s · s¤. This implies that
private owner i does not have an incentive for single deviation from the merger between firms 0
and i if and only if s · s¤.
Proposition 5.2. For any c less than some critical value c¯, a state where the public firm merges
with one private firm and other private firms remain single becomes a stable market structure.
Proof. We conduct the proof by showing that when one public firm merges with one private firm
with the government’s share s¤ and other private firms remain single, such a market structure is
not blocked by any coalition of firms, if c is less than some value c¯. Let private firm i be the one
that merges with the public firm throughout the rest of this proof.
Step 1. We will show that any coalition composed of private owners other than i does not have
an incentive to merge if c is less than some value c¯1. Because a merger is conducted only when it
benefits all of the participants, k (= 2; 3; : : : ; n¡ 1), private firms do not merge with each other
if
Π¤¤r (s; n¡ 1) ¸
Π¤¤r (s; n¡ k)
k
Here, note that f(k) = Π¤¤r (s; n¡ k)=k is a U -shape function in the range from 1 to n¡ 1.27
Thus, if Π¤¤r (s; n¡1) ¸ Π¤¤r (s; 1)=(n¡1); the above condition holds for any k. After performing
27This is proved as follows: Differentiate f(k) with k and we have
f 0(k) = ¡a
2(1¡ s)2(2¡ 3k + n¡ s+ 3ks¡ ns)
k2(2¡ k + n¡ s+ ks¡ ns)3 :
From the above fact, we understand that f(k) is decreasing in the range from 1 to n+2¡s¡sn3(1¡s) with respect to the
value of k and increasing from n+2¡s¡sn3(1¡s) to
n+2¡s¡sn
1¡s > n with respect to the value of k.
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some calculations, we obtain the following result:
s > sˆ ) Π¤¤r (s; n¡ 1) >
Π¤¤r (s; 1)
n¡ 1 ;
where
sˆ =
n¡ 3¡pn¡ 1
n¡ 2 :
Let c¯1 be defined by
c¯1 =
a(1¡ sˆ)
n(1¡ sˆ) + 1 :
Then, c < c¯1 guarantees that s¤ > sˆ. Thus, if c < c¯1, any coalition composed of private firms
(owners) other than i does not deviate and the firms merge with each other when the public firm
and private firm i found the merged public-private firm 0i with share s¤.28
Step 2. We will show that any coalition composed of private owners including i does not have an
incentive to merge. The deviation of private owner i and other k private owners induces the new
market structure, which consists of one public firm and (n ¡ k) private firms including the new
merged (private firm) firm. The profit of the merged firm in the new market structure is c2. On
the other hand, in the initial situation where only public owner 0 and private owner i found the
merged public-private firm with share s¤, the payoffs of private owner i are
(1¡ s¤)Π¤¤u (s¤; n¡ 1) = c2;
and the profits of the other private owners are
Π¤¤r (s
¤; n¡ 1) = c2:
Since (k + 1)c2 is strictly greater than c2 when c > 0, taking into account that the merged firm’s
profit must be distributed between private owners whose firms participate in the merger, such a
merger does not occur.
Step 3. We will show that the public owner her/himself does not have an incentive to deviate
from the merger and induce an mixed oligopoly with one public firm and n private firms. It is
easily to verify that
W ¤¤(s¤; n¡ 1) > W ¤(n):
28More precisely, from an easy calculation, we obtain the following result:
sˆ < 0; if n 2 [3; 5) :
Thus, since s¤ > sˆ holds for any c < a (n¡ 1), if n 2 [3; 5), we find that for any value of c, any coalition composed
of private firms (owners) other than i does not deviate and merge when the public firm and private firm i found the
merged public-private firm 0i with share s¤.
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Thus, the public owner does not have an incentive to deviate and remain single.29
Step 4. We will show that any coalition composed of one public owner and multiple private
owners does not have an incentive to (re-)merge with each other if c < c¯2. As shown in Step
2, in the initial market structure composed of the merged public-private firm and (n¡ 1) private
firms, all the private owners obtain c2. This implies that k private owners accept the merger with
the public firm only if
(1¡ s)Π¤¤u (s; n¡ k) > kc2:
The above inequality is satisfied if
s > s˜(k) =
a¡ cpk(2¡ k + n)
a¡ cpk(1¡ k + n)
Here, we have
s¤ ¡ s˜(k) = c(
p
k ¡ 1)(a¡ cpk ¡ ck)
(a¡ cn)(a¡ cpk(1¡ k + n)) :
Therefore, for sufficiently small c > 0, s¤ ¡ s˜(k) becomes non-negative. Thus, there exist some
c¯2 such that for any c < c¯2, s¤ ¡ s˜(k) is non-negative for any k = 1; : : : ; n. On the other hand,
this implies that
W ¤¤(s¤; n¡ 1) ¸ W ¤¤(s¤; n¡ k) ¸ W ¤¤(s˜ (k) ; n¡ k);
where the first and second inequalities follow from @W ¤¤=@m > 0 and @W ¤¤=@s > 0, respec-
tively. Thus, the public owner does not become better off as a result of the merger, even if the
merger is accepted by the private owners. Therefore, when c < c¯2, any coalition composed of
one public owner and multiple private owners does not deviate from the initial situation where
one public firm merges with one private firm with the government’s share s¤ and other private
firms remain single.
From Steps 1 to 4, we conclude that when c < c¯ = minfc¯1; c¯2g, a state where the public
firm merges with one private firm with share s¤ and the other private firms remain single is not
blocked by other market structures through any coalition.
From the proof of the above proposition, the continuity of both the equilibrium profit of each
firm and the equilibrium welfare with respect to share s means that a state where the public firm
29More precisely, we find that
W ¤¤ (s¤; n¡ 1)¡W ¤ (n) = c [a¡ c (n+ 1)] > 0:
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merges with one private firm with share s0, (s0 < s¤), and other private firms remain single is
not blocked by any coalition, if s0 is sufficiently close to s¤. When a public firm merges with a
private firm with share s0, the profit of this private owner after the merger is strictly greater than
c2, which means that the private owner accepts the merger proposal of the public firm if the initial
market structure is composed of one public firm and n private firms. From this observation, we
obtain the following statement as the corollary of Proposition 5:2.
Corollary 5.2. For any c less than some critical value c¯, a state where the public firm merges
with one private firm and the other private firms remain single is a stable and achievable market
structure from the initial mixed oligopoly with one public and n private firms.
5.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we used the core concept to investigate which market structures are stable when
firms are freely allowed to merge with each other and break off mergers in a mixed oligopoly
consisting of one public firm and two symmetric private firms. First, we classified that the stable
market structures in the core into three cases depending on the degree of inefficiency of the public
firm. Then, although multiple types of mergers are stable for some range of the marginal cost
of the public firm (a(3 ¡ p3)=9 · c · a=3), it is only the market structure with the merger
between one public firm and one private firm that blocks the mixed triopoly and is never blocked
by other market structures when it is additionally assumed that the initial market structure is a
mixed triopoly. Thus, the structure with the merger between one public firm and one private firm
is stable and achievable. Furthermore, in the general mixed oligopolistic model where multiple
private firms exist in the market, we also obtained a similar result to the one described above.
We discussed three features of stable market structures that belong to the core. First, the
market structure wherein a single private firm and a public firm merge belonged to the core
in all three cases, classified on the basis of the value of the marginal cost of the public firm.
According to this fact, we were able to recognize the market structure wherein the public firm is
merged and acquired by the private firm at a constant rate as stable. Therefore, we succeeded in
showing that “the (partial) acquisition of an inefficient public firm by a private firm” is certainly
adequate. Second, the market structure wherein all three firms merge belonged to the core when
the marginal cost of the public firm was under the high and middle levels. This is so because the
government, whose payoff is social welfare, wishes to enhance the productivity of the public firm
through the merger at the expense of deteriorating consumer surplus by declining the aggregate
97
quantity, resulting in the monopoly of the merged public-private firm. This clearly demonstrates
that the enhancement of the productivity of the public firm through the merger with private firms
is more important for the government than the disadvantage of the monopoly, i.e., relatively low
consumer surplus, when the marginal cost of the public firm is relatively high. Finally, the mixed
triopoly belonged to the core only if the marginal cost of the public firm was the highest, i.e.,
c = a=3, to the extent that the public firm exited the market. In such a case, the market structure
that is actually observed is a private duopoly. We find that each owner of the two private firms
does not assent to all deviations from the mixed triopoly since they both obtain comparatively
high payoffs due to the disparity between productivity of the private and public firms.
Three interesting extensions remain. The first extension, which has been already described
in Concluding remarks of chapter 4, is examining the model in which the foreign shareholders
are taken into account. In the real world economy, some firms are foreign-owned.30 In this case,
the social welfare that the public owner (i.e., the government) maximizes may not include the
profits of foreign firms, if the market is confined to the domestic country.31 Thus, the presence of
foreign shareholders will change not only the public firm’s decision-making but also the equilib-
rium market outcomes. Taking into account the above facts, under the assumption that each firm
has the quadratic cost function with respect to her/his quantity, Nakamura (2009b) dealt with the
problem of horizontal mergers including firms existing in different countries with each other in an
international mixed oligopoly. He showed that ruling out the monopoly with the merger among
all the in the market, in the entrepreneurial case wherein every managerial decision-making is
done by each firm’s owner, both the market structure with a merger between the public firm and
the domestic private firm and the market structure with a merger between the public firm and
the foreign private firm can belong to the core, whereas in the managerial case, only the market
structure with the merger between the public firm and the foreign private firm can belong to the
core. Thus, the latter result obtained in the managerial case between his two findings corresponds
to the example in the real world economy that in the mixed oligopolistic industry, the large en-
terprises with the separation between ownership and management, which exist in the different
country with each other, participate in such a merger. However, as described above, Nakamura
(2009b) supposed the following two assumptions: (1) the monopoly with the merger among all
the existing firms is eliminated; (2) each firm can export her/his output without any physical
30In the real world example of (partial) horizontal mergers in mixed oligopolistic industries, as indicated in
Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003), Renault, which is a French (parastatal) public firm, holds a 36:8% equity stake in
Nissan Motor and a 22:5% stake in Nissan Diesel.
31This assumption is often supposed in the literature on mixed oligopoly in the context of open economy, such as
Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Fjell and Heywood (2002).
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trade cost.32 In conducting the theoretical analyses on horizontal mergers between the public
firm and the private firm in an international mixed oligopoly, although we must consider both
the possibility of the monopoly with the merger among all the existing firms and the physical
trade cost to export their output to their foreign countries in order to sufficiently reflect the exam-
ples in the real world economy, it is difficult for us to obtain the general result on what market
structure(s) is/are stable in such analyses. Thus, when we investigate the cross-border merger
between the public firm and the private firm under the such a setting, we must conduct the simu-
lation analysis regarding the difference between the demand scale and the physical trade cost by
using relevant computer softwares. In addition, similar to the analysis in chapter 4, Nakamura
(2009b) considered the situation wherein each firm’s production cost is quadratic with respect to
her/his quantity. Thus, of course, taking into account the presence of foreign firms, we should
also tackle the problem of what market structure(s) is/are stable under the same setting as that in
this chapter that the technologies of both the public firm and the private firm are represented as
the constant marginal cost functions with respect to their output levels and the public firm is less
efficient that the private firm.
The second remaining extension is determining how the cost function of a merged firm should
be treated. In our analysis, we assumed that when a private firm and a public firm merge, the
merged firm can utilize the technology of the private firm, whose productivity is higher, indepen-
dently of the public owner’s shareholding proportion in the merged firm. This assumption on the
cost function of the merged firm may be adequate when it represents the production technology
of the firm itself (for example, the performance of machines in the plant, etc.). However, we also
assumed that a public firm is more inefficient than a private one. If the inefficiency of a public
firm is intrinsic, such as X-inefficiency, the assumption that the merged firm can use the more ef-
ficient technology may not be appropriate. In this case, one may consider that the assumption that
the productivity of the merged firm has deteriorated in response to the increase in the proportion
of the public owner’s shareholding is adequate.
32Nakamura (2009b) supposed that the market exists in the domestic country only, and thus foreign private firms
always engage in exporting their outputs to the market. Hence, under such a setting, it may be natural that foreign
firms can export their output without any physical trade, analogous to Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998),
and Fjell and Heywood (2002). However, most recently, the works on cross-border mergers including Fumagalli
and Vasconcelos (2009) have been significantly emphasizing the so-called tariff-jumping effect that the cross-border
mergers enables the merged firm to serve her/his output to both the markets without incurring any physical trade
cost. In addition, like Horn and Persson (2001b) and Fumagalli and Vasconcelos (2009), if the segmented market
hypothesis is adopted and thus there exists one market in each country, the tariff-jumping effect plays further impor-
tant role on each firm’s merger incentive and its welfare implications. Especially, there does not exist any literature
on horizontal mergers in the context of mixed oligopoly under the segmented market hypothesis. Therefore, as a
plausible next step, we should consider such a tariff-jumping effect on social welfare in each country and total social
welfare.
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More interestingly, we should tackle the problem of what figures of the core of market struc-
tures are characterized in the case wherein each firm adopts her/his FJSV delegation contract.
In the entrepreneurial case considered in this chapter wherein each firm’s owner chooses her/his
output level with respect to her/his objective function, we derived the core by using the several
particular properties, e.g., the payoff of the private owner who participates in the merger with the
public firm coincides with the payoff of another private owner who is outside the merger. Thus, in
the case wherein each firm’s adopts the FJSV delegation contract, it is difficult to derive the core
of market structures after each firm allows for her/his free mergers on the bases of the coopera-
tive game approach which was introduced in this chapter. However, in particular, in the general
mixed oligopoly wherein one public firm and n private firms exist, it is very interesting whether
or not the market structure with the merger between one public firm and one private firm belong
the core, i.e., whether or not the result obtained in the entrepreneurial case is robust against the
use of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract. As our future research, in the case wherein each firm
adopts her/his FJSV delegation contract, we must consider whether or not the market structure
with the merger between one public firm and one private firm becomes stable and achievable.33
Extending our model in these directions remains a subject for future research.
33On the figures of the core of market structures before and after each firm’s merger activity when s/he adopts
her/his FJSV delegation contract, we would like to state the following predictions: White (2001) showed the effect
of the use of the FJSV delegation contracts within both the public firm and the private firm on the equilibrium
market outcomes under the same assumption as that in this chapter, which their technologies are represented as their
constant marginal cost functions and the public firm is less efficient than the private firm. More precisely, in his 2001
paper, White found that in a market with linear costs and Cournot competition between a public firm and n private
firms, both the private firm’s profit and social welfare become higher with using their FJSV delegation contracts than
without using them. Therefore, since the use of the FJSV delegation contracts within the public firm and the private
firm increases the payoffs of the owners of both the firms, the figure of the core of market structures is not likely
to drastically change against the introduction of the FJSV delegation contract within each firm, as compared to that
in the case wherein every managerial decision makings are carried out by the owners of both the firms. Note that
as described in chapter 4, the use of the FJSV delegation contracts within both the firms may increase the merger
profitability with the merger between private firms, and thus, in such a case, we can consider that it is difficult for
the status quo mixed oligopoly belongs to the core of market structures, since the market structure with the merger
between the private firms tends to dominate its mixed oligopoly.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis tackled several topics in horizontal mergers in not only a private oligopoly where only
profit-maximizing private firms exist, in but also a mixed oligopoly where a welfare-maximizing
public firm and profit-maximizing private firms coexist and compete in the same market. More
concretely, in the context of the private oligopoly, we examined how managerial delegation con-
tracts within each firm affect the correspondence between the equilibrium ownership structure
and the most preferred ownership structure with respect to social welfare. In the context of
the mixed oligopoly, on the basis of the non-cooperative game approach adopted in the existing
literature in this area such as Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) and Me´ndez-Naya (2008), we
scrutinized the effect of the productivity-improving with some sort of merger, which was not
considered in their previous works, on the achievablity of the merger between a public firm and a
private firm. Furthermore, taking into account the above-mentioned productivity-improving with
mergers, we derived the market structure which finally occurs after each firm’s free merger activ-
ity by focusing the stability of market structures on the basis of the cooperative game approach.
Speficically, in the last two chapters of this thesis, we derived the core of market structures in the
cases wherein the technology of each firm is represented as the quadratic cost function and the
constant marginal cost function, respectively.
More precisely, after in chapter 1 we discussed the relationship between the results obtained in
the previous literature and those in this thesis, in chapter 2, in the context of the private oligopoly
which is composed of asymmetric firms with respect to their marginal costs, taking into account
the managerial delegation contract a` la Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers
(1985) (the FJSV delegation contract) which is entered into between the owner and the manager
within each firm, we analyzed the mergers from the viewpoint of the stability of market structures
which take place after each firm’s free merger activity. In particular, we focused our attention on
the fact that modern corporate governance codes include clauses requiring the disclosure of man-
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agerial delegation contract to protect shareholders’ objectives from the opportunistic behaviors
of their managers. In order to model such a situation, we considered the influence of the bargain-
ing process over the content of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract between her/his owner and
manager a` la van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) on the equilibrium ownership structure founded af-
ter her/his merger activity. In chapter 2, as the equilibrium solution concept which describes the
equilibrium ownership structure(s) (EOS(s)) after each firm’s horizontal merger, we adopted the
core concept introduced in Horn and Persson (2001a) by regarding each firm’s merger activity
as the application of the coalition formation in the cooperative game. Although Straume (2006),
which considered the situation wherein the content of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract is de-
termined for the viewpoint of her/his owner objective, i.e., her/his profit, showed that the EOSs
do not coincide with the most preferred ownership structures with respect to the equilibrium so-
cial welfare for any value of the degree of asymmetry among the existing firms, in chapter 2
of this thesis, we contrastingly found that for a comparatively large area of the relative bargain-
ing power of the maneger to her/his owner within each firm, the EOSs can coincide with the
most preferred structures with respect to the equilibrium social welfare. This result indicates that
the bargaining over the content of the FJSV delegation contract between each firm’s owner and
manager is likely to lead the most socially preferred ownership structure, in contrast to the case
wherein it is determinated for the viewpoint of her/his profit which is her/his owner’s objective
function. Consequently, the result obtained in chapter 2 implies that the necessity of an active
merger policy can decrease through the bargaining of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract, dif-
ferent from thoses shown in Gonza´lez-Maestre and Lo´pez-Cun˜at (2001) and in Straume (2006)
which the owner directly determines the content of her/his FJSV delegation contract. On the
other hand, the disclosure of each firm’s managerial delegation contract, which is prescribed in
modern corporate governance code, can be regarded as increasing the relative bargaining power
of her/his owner. Therefore, from a couple of the result obtained in Straume (2006) and that
in chapter 2, it is found that if the authority must excessively seek to adhere such a governance
code to each firm, the more active merger policy should be newly needed. Furtheremore, we
here must add several comments on the solution concept to measure the stability on each firm’s
merger incentive among ownership structures. As described above, in order to measure the sta-
bility on each firm’s merger incentive among ownership structures, in the analysis of chapter 2,
we adopted the core of ownership structures introduced in Horn and Persson (2001a) as the solu-
tion concept, different from those in chapters 4 and 5. More concretely, in the case wherein each
firm’s owner deviates from any merger, we assumed that in the new founded ownership structure,
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s/he must take into account the payoff(s) of the other owner(s) who is deviated by her/him, and
hence the decisive owners are composed of the owners of all the three firms, when the ownership
structure with some sort of merger is induced from the ownership structure with another merger.1
Then, when in the analysis of chapter 2, the domination relation adopted in chapters 4 and 5 is
employed, it is our duty to reply the question of what figures of the core of ownership structure
are. However, since in such an analysis, we must newly add one parameter which represents the
shareholding ratio of each pre-merger firm’s owner in the merged firm in each ownership struc-
ture, it is too difficult to characterize the core of ownership structures owing to the computational
problem. Note that we fortunately realize that in the comparison between the status quo private
triopoly and the private duopoly with some sort of merger, the domination relation between such
two ownership structures is determined on the basis of the payoffs of the owners whose firms
participate in the merger, and further, since the shareholding ratio of each firm’s owner works in
order to only distribute the merged firm’s profit between the owners whose firms participate in
the merger without influencing the value of each firm’s profit directly, the numerical way in such
a comparison is in essence unchanged between the two different domination relations. Therefore,
the result that the status quo private oligopoly never belongs to the core of ownership structures
for the arbitrary values of both the direct measure of production efficiency in the industry and
the bargaining power of the manager within each firm relative to her/his owner is not changed
1On the other hand, in chapters 4 and 5, the domination relation was defined as the fact of whether only the
payoff(s) of the owner(s) who deviate(s) from the present market structure increase(s) in the new founded market
structure or not, relative to the past market structure.
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between the two domination relations.2 Consequently, in definition of the core of ownership
structures adopted in chapters 4 and 5, we obtain the similar result to that in the definition in
chapter 2 that the ownership structure with the merger participating in the least efficient firm 3
not only become the equilibrium ownership structure belonging to the core, but also achieves the
highest social welfare among the four market structures.3
In chapter 3, in the context of mixed oligopoly, on the basis of the non-cooperative game ap-
proach which is similar to those adopted in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) and Me´ndez-Naya
(2008) as the seminal works in this field, we considered the achievablity of the merger between a
public firm and a private firm in equilibrium.4 In particular, in chapter 3 of this thesis, we focused
2When we introduce three parameters, ®, °, and ± to denote the shareholding ratio of the owner of firm 1 in
pre-merged firm 12 in (a) merger between the low-cost and medium-cost firms, the shareholding ratio of the owner
of pre-merged firm 1 in firm 13 in (b) merger between the high-cost and low-cost firms, and the shareholding ratio of
the owner of pre-merged firm 2 in firm 23 in (c) merger between the high-cost and medium-cost firms, respectively,
we obtain the following result on the domination relations between the status quo private triopoly and the private
duopoly with some sort of merger: For any c 2 (0; c¯), if ¯ 2 [0; 1),
Comparison between Ma and Mo
(
®Π12 (Ma)¡Π1 (Mo) > 0, ® > ®;
(1¡ ®)Π12 (Ma)¡Π2 (Mo) > 0, ® < ®¯;
Comparison between Mb and Mo
(
°Π13 (Mb)¡Π1 (Mo) > 0, ° > °;
(1¡ °)Π13 (Mb)¡Π3 (Mo) > 0, ° < °¯;
Comparison between Mc and Mo
(
±Π23 (Mc)¡Π2 (Mo) > 0, ± > ±;
(1¡ ±)Π23 (Mc)¡Π3 (Mo) > 0, ± < ±¯;
where ® = 3 (5 + 3¯)2 [1¡ ¯ + 9c (1 + ¯)]2 =8 (5 + 4¯)2 [1¡ ¯ + 4c (1 + ¯)]2, ®¯ =£
(1¡ ¯)2 ¡125 + 230¯ + 101¯2¢ + 2c ¡875 + 1220¯ ¡ 366¯2 ¡ 1244¯3 ¡ 485¯4¢ +
c2
¡
3125 + 11580¯ + 15566¯2 + 9180¯3 + 2021¯4
¢ ¤
=8 (5 + 4¯)2 [1¡ ¯ + 4c (1 + ¯)]2,
° = 3 (5 + 3¯)2 [1¡ ¯ + 9c (1 + ¯)]2 =8 (5 + 4¯)2 [1¡ ¯ + 2c (1 + ¯)]2, °¯ =£
(1¡ ¯)2 ¡125 + 230¯ + 101¯2¢ + 2c ¡1225 + 1330¯ ¡ 732¯2 ¡ 1378¯3 ¡ 445¯4¢ ¡
c2
¡
8275 + 19560¯ + 16930¯2 + 6264¯3 + 811¯4
¢ ¤
=8 (5 + 4¯)2 [1¡ ¯ + 2c (1 + ¯)]2,
± = 3 (1¡ c)2 (1¡ ¯)2 (5 + 3¯)2 =8 (5 + 4¯)2 [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (3 + ¯)]2, and ±¯ =£
(1¡ ¯)2 ¡125 + 230¯ + 101¯2¢ + 2c ¡225 + 130¯ ¡ 132¯2 ¡ 162¯3 ¡ 61¯4¢ ¡
5c2
¡
1455 + 3672¯ + 3506¯2 + 1496¯3 + 239¯4
¢ ¤
=8 (5 + 4¯)2 [1¡ ¯ ¡ c (3 + ¯)]2. Thus, for any ¯ 2 [0; 1)
and c 2 (0; c¯), the status quo private triopoly Mo = ff1g ; f2g ; f3gg is blocked by Ma = ff1; 2g ; f3gg,
Mb = ff1; 3g ; f2gg, and Mc = ff1g ; f2; 3gg for any ® 2 (®; ®¯), ° 2
¡
°; °¯
¢
, and ± 2 ¡±; ±¯¢, respectively.
3For example, in the case of ° = °, we obtain the following result: Mb = ff1; 3g ; f2gg belongs to the
core of ownership structures for any c · c° := £725 + 1030¯ ¡ 312¯2 ¡ 1046¯3 ¡ 397¯4 ¡ 2p2(5 ¡ ¯ ¡
4¯2)
p
875 + 4720¯ + 7734¯2 + 5080¯3 + 1175¯4
¤
=
¡
4675 + 12000¯ + 10626¯2 + 3536¯3 + 267¯4
¢
, when
¯ 2 [0; 1). Moreover, Mb not only becomes the equilibrium ownership structure belonging to the core, but
also achieves the highest social welfare (i) for any c 2 (c¤; c¤¤), when ¯ 2 (0:174504; 0:211923] and (ii)
for any c 2 (c¤; c° ], when ¯ 2 (0:211923; 1), where c¤ = £1275 + 950¯ ¡ 852¯2 ¡ 1062¯3 ¡ 311¯4 ¡
4
p
¡39 + 194¯ + 169¯2 ¡25 + 10¯ ¡ 23¯2 ¡ 12¯3¢ ¤= ¡26875 + 71510¯ + 71692¯2 + 31962¯3 + 5321¯4¢
and c¤¤ =
£
1275+950¯¡852¯2¡1062¯3¡311¯4+4
p
¡39 + 194¯ + 169¯2 ¡25 + 10¯ ¡ 23¯2 ¡ 12¯3¢ ¤=¡26875+
71510¯ + 71692¯2 + 31962¯3 + 5321¯4
¢
.
4Although Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) considered the decision to merge by a public firm and a private
firm in a mixed duopolistic market that they produce the differentiated goods, Me´ndez-Naya (2008) subsequently
analyzed the achievablity of the merger between a public firm and a private firm in the mixed oligopoly where the
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our attention on the productivity-improving effect after some sort of merger, which was supposed
in McAfee and Williams (1992), when the technology of each firm is represented as the quadratic
cost function with respect to her/his output level.5 Although the productivity-improving effect of
the merged firm a` la McAfee and Williams (1992) is supported by the assumption that s/he adopts
the most efficient operation plan among the merger participants, we derived the relationship be-
tween the ratio of shareholding of the public sector in the merged firm and the number of the
existing private firms, when the merger between one public firm and one private firm is achieved.
In chapter 3, by explaining the merger incentives for the owners of both the public firm and the
private firm through the two following effects; the share effect with in/decreasing the ratio of
shareholding of the pre-merged public firm’s owner in the merged firm, ®; the competition effect
with in/decreasing the number of the existing private firms, n, we found that if any merger yields
the productivity-improving of the merged firm a` la McAfee and Williams (1992), there exists an
area of the (n; ®)-plane to have that the owners of both the public firm and the private firm would
like to merge in the case wherein more than one private firm exist. Furthermore, we showed that
the area of the (n; ®)-plane to have that the owners of both the firms would like to merge broad-
ens, as n increases. In addition, in chapter 3, we discussed the two situations: (1) the merger
between the public firm and the private firm yields no effect of the productivity-improving in the
merged firm; (2) their cost functions are asymmetric, i.e., the public firm is less efficient than the
private firm.
In chapter 4 of this thesis, taking into account the productivity-improving effect with any
merger considered in the previous chapter, which was introduced in McAfee and Williams (1992)
and applied in Nakamura and Inoue (2007), we attempted to derive the stable market structure(s)
belonging to the core after each firm’s free merger activities in the mixed triopolistic industry
composed of one welfare-maximizing public firm and two profit-maximizing private firms with
the production technology which is represented as their quadratic cost functions. Then, we fo-
cused our attention on the ratio of shareholding in the merged firm among merger participants.
In chapter 4, we showed that only the market structure including the merger between one public
firm and one private firm with about 57% of shares in the merged firm owned by the owner of
the public firm belongs to the core and becomes the stable market structure in the case wherein
all the three firms have their symmetric quadratic cost functions. Although we realize that from
public firm and n private firms exist in a quantity-setting mixed oligopolistic market with a homogeneous goods.
5Although similar to our setting, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) and Me´ndez-Naya (2008) considered the
economic situation wherein each firm has a quadratic cost function with respect to her/his quantity, they did not take
into account the efficiency gains after the merger between the public firm and the private firm.
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the above result, the market structure with the merger between one public firm and one private
firm wherein the owner of the public firm shares about 57% of the stocks in the merged (partially
privatized) firm is strongly stable against free deviations of firms’ owners, in chapter 4, it was
simultaneously shown that none of market structures belongs to the core in the case wherein only
private firms exist in the market (one may regard its market situation as the market structure oc-
curring after the full privatization of the public firm). The fact that the core of market structures
is empty is of course problematic, since the never-ending coalition formation yields transaction
costs up to infinity, which was described in Myerson (1991). However, the reason why the core
of market structures is empty is that we assume that the deviating firms can freely induce a new
market structure without compensating to the deviated firms. One may consider that in the real
world economy, the owner of the deviated firm proposes some counter offer to such a deviation,
unless at least, the payoff obtained in the previous market structure is also achieved in the new
market structure. Reflecting the above idea that the deviating firm must compensate for the pay-
off of the deviated firm when s/he deviates from a market structure, if we attempt to derive the
core after each firm’s merger activity, such a hypothesis leads to the result that the core can be
larger with such a compensation than without it, since such a compensation straightforwardly
means that the deviation of each firm becomes somewhat difficult. In addition, in chapter 4, we
found that without an improvement in productivity with any merger a` la McAfee and Williams
(1992), the mixed triopoly would be the unique market structure, and further if the public firm is
less efficient than the private firms, the core of market structures can be become empty.6
In chapter 5, on the basis of the same cooperative game approach as that employed in chap-
ter 4, we presented a theoretical analysis of the horizontal merger activity in the mixed oligopoly
wherein the technology of each firm is represented as the constant marginal cost function. First, in
the mixed triopoly that one welfare-maximizing public firm and two symmetric profit-maximizing
private firms exist, we derived the core after each firm’s merger activity. Diffrerent from the result
obtained in the case wherein the cost function of each firm is quadratic with respect to her/his
quantity, we showed that in accordance with the value of the marginal cost of the public firm,
several market structures can belong to the core. Especially, in chapter 5, we obtained the result
that there certainly exists a pair of the shareholding ratios of the owners of both the public firm
and private firm in the merged (partially privatized) firm such that irrespective of the level of
the marginal cost of the public firm, the market structure with the merger between one public
6Similar to the case wherein only the private firms exist, in the Appndix B of chapter 4, we obtained the result
that the core of market structures can be empty, when each firm adopts her/his FJSV delegation contract.
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firm and one private firm can belong to the core. Second, although in the case wherein each
firm has her/his quadratic cost function, which was considered in chapter 4, we can not conduct
the stability analysis of market structures after each firm’s merger activity in the general mixed
oligopoly with respect to the number of the existing private firms, in chapter 5, we extended our
attention on the stability problem of horizontal mergers in the mixed triopoly into the one in the
mixed oligopoly that the generalized-numbered private firms exist in the market. Even if there
exist multiple private firms in a mixed oligopolistic industry, we obtained the result that as long
as the marginal cost of the public firm is sufficiently low, the market structure with the merger
between one public firm and one private firm can belong to the core, which becomes the stable
market structure. Although in the general mixed oligopoly wherein one public firms and n private
firms exist, we can not characterize the figure of the core of market structures after each firm’s
merger activity, we believe that it is very significant that we found that the merger between one
public firm and one private firm can be supported not only on the basis of the non-cooperative
game approach as in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) and Me´ndez-Naya (2008) but also on the
basis of our cooperative game approach. In addition, by defining the new notion, the achievablity
which means the market structure not only belonging to the core and but also blocking a mixed
oligopolistic industry, when the initial state is the mixed oligopoly, we attempted to provide an
appropriate reply to the question of which of the market structure(s) in the core is/are likely to
occur. In chapter 5, we showed that only the market structure with the merger between one public
firm and one private firm can be stable and achievable in both the contexts of the mixed triopoly
and oligopoly. Furtheremore, in chapter 5, among the analyses in both the contexts of the pri-
vate oligopoly and the mixed oligopoly, we first presented the theoretical analysis of horizontal
mergers in the general (mixed) oligopoly that the number of firms existing in the market is not
restricted, which belongs to the analysis of the endogenous merger formation on the basis of the
cooperative game approach.
Similar to the discussion in chapter 2, we must provide several discussions on the definitions
of both the domination relation and the core of market structures to describe the stable market
structures before and after each firm’s merger activity. As described above, in chapters 4 and 5,
we derived the core of market structures by the domination relation based on the fact of whether
only the payoff(s) of the owner(s) who deviate(s) from the present market structure and found(s)
the new market structure increase(s) or not, which is different from that adopted in chapter 2. If
we conduct the stability analysis on each firm’s merger incentive in mixed oligopoly which is
composed of the public firm and the private firms by adopting the definition of the domination
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relation in chapter 2, we must judge each firm’s merger incentive on the basis of the sum of
social welfare which is the objective function of the public firm’s owner and the payoffs of the
private firms’ owners, in the comparison of the market structures with the merger including the
public firm.7 However, in the context of mixed oligopoly, it is somewhat unnatural that each
firm’s merger incentive is evaluated on in the basis of the ranking order of the sum of social
welfare and the payoffs of the private firms’ owners, whereas in the context of private oligopoly,
it is natural that the sum of each firm’s profit is divided between the owners of the firms. This
is so because it is likely to be opaque that the value including social welfare is divided among
firms’ owners. If we adopt the domination relation in chapter 2 in deriving the core of market
structures on the problem of horizontal mergers in the mixed oligopoly, we obtain the following
result: (i) Merger between a private firm and a public firm Mff0;ig;fjgg¯ can belong to the core
of market structures for any ¯ · ¡4921¡ 117p489¢ =4094 ¼ 0:570039, (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j), and
(ii) Mixed triopoly Mff0g;f1g;f2gg can belong to the core of market structures for arbitrary values
of ¯ ¸ ¡4921¡ 117p489¢ =4094 ¼ 0:570039 and ° ¸ ¡214¡ 13p101¢ =207 ¼ 0:402665.
Note that the parameters of ¯ and ° denote the shareholding ratios of the public firm’s owner in
the merged firm 12 and the merged firm 012, respectively.8 Different from the result obtained in
main body of chapter 4 of this thesis, from the above result, we find that by using the domination
relation adopted in chapter 2, the mixed triopoly can belong to the core of market structures,
subject to the values of the shareholding ratios of the public firm’s owner in both the merged firm
0i and the merged firm 012, ¯ and °, respectively, since W c+(1¡ ¯)Πc0i and W d+(1¡ °)Πd012
stay low in the case wherein both the values of ¯ and ° are also low, (i = 1; 2).9 We must pay our
attention to the facts that whether the mixed triopoly becomes the equilibrium market structure
belonging to the core depends on the values of ¯ and ° and that whether the market structure with
the merger between a public firm and a private firm becomes the equilibrium market structure
7For example, in the comparison between (a) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg and (c) Mff0;1g;f2gg¯ , the domination relation is
evaluated through the ranking order of the values of W a +Πa1 and W c + (1¡ ¯)Πc01. Note that the notations here
are the same as those in chapter 4.
8On the other hand, the two types of market structures, Merger between two private firms Mff0g;f1;2gg® and
Merger among all firms Mff0;1;2gg°;± do not belong to the core of market structures, since Mff0g;f1;2gg® is blocked by
Mff0g;f1g;f2gg and Mff0;1;2gg°;± is blocked by M
ff0;ig;fjgg
¯ , i.e., Πa1 + Πa2 > ®Πb12 + (1¡ ®)Πb12 = Πb12 for any
® 2 [0; 1] and £W c + (1¡ ¯)Πc0i +Πcj¤ j¯=° > W d+(1¡ °) ±Πd012+(1¡ °) (1¡ ±)Πd012 = W d+(1¡ °)Πd012
for any ° 2 [0; 1], respectively, (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j).
9From easy calculations, we find thatW c+(1¡ ¯)Πc0i andW d+(1¡ °)Πd012 decrease in ¯ and °, respectively,
as follows:(
@ [W c + (1¡ ¯)Πc0i] =@¯ = ¡3a2 (73¡ 50¯) =2 (11¡ 4¯)3 < 0; 8¯ 2 [0; 1] ;
@
£
W d + (1¡ °)Πd012
¤
=@° = ¡3a2 (23¡ 18°) = (8¡ 3°)3 < 0; 8° 2 [0; 1] ; (i = 1; 2) :
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depends on ¯ only. Thus, in the sense that the market structure with the merger between public
firm 0 and the private firm i can belong to the core by coordinating the shareholding ratio of the
public firm’s owner in the merged firm 0i founded in its market structure, the market structure
with the firm 0i can belong to the core easier than the mixed triopoly, (i = 1; 2).
Finally, we finish this thesis by discussing several issues which we should tackle as our fu-
ture researches in the context of horizontal mergers in both the private oligopoly and the mixed
oligopoly. First, we discuss our future researches on the theoretical analysis of the horizon-
tal mergers in the context of the private oligopoly. In chapter 2 of this thesis, on the basis of
the cooperative game approach, in the asymmetric private oligopoly with respect to each firm’s
marginal cost, we presented the relationship between the equilibrium ownership structure and the
most preferred ownership structure with respect to the equilibrium social welfare for the view-
point of the stability of ownership structures that occur after her/his horizontal merger activity in
a closed economy wherein all the firms exist in the same and single region and country. We must
extend our attention to the horizontal merger activity in the international private oligopoly that the
existing firms have different nationalities. Nakamura (2010) has already investigated the effect of
the bargaining over each firm’s FJSV delegation contract between her/his owner and manager on
the possibility of cross-border mergers and its welfare implications on total social welfare which
is defined as the sum of each country’s social welfare. However, he did not reveal the relation-
ship between the equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred structure with respect to
social welfare in each country.10 Then, we should scrutinize both the domestic and cross-border
mergers not only with respect to total social welfare which is defined as the sum of social welfare
in both the countries but also with respect to social welfare in the relevant country.11 In addition,
Nakamura (2010) assumed that all the existing firms can produce at zero costs in order to restrict
our attention into clarifying the effect of saving trade costs with the cross-border mergers, and
10By considering the relationship between the equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred structure
with respect to total social welfare, Nakamura (2010) showed that in sufficiently large areas of the physical trade cost
to export each firm’s output and the manager’s bargaining power relative to her/his owner, the duopoly structure with
two international mergers that the highest total social welfare is achieved is observed in equilibrium. On the other
hand, if both of them are sufficiently large, only the duopoly with two national mergers becomes the equilibrium
market structure, though it simultaneously cannot become the most preferred market structure with respect to the
total social welfare.
11In the private oligopoly, cross-border mergers are increasingly important phenomena. For example, by conduct-
ing the largest cross-national comparison of the effects of mergers to date, Gugler et al. (2003) found that there is an
upward trend in the percentage of mergers which are cross-border, and specifically, this upward trend is pronounced
for EU countries, where the percentage of all mergers in the sample which were cross-border rose from 24:2% in
1991–92 to 39:8% in 1997–98. Therefore, in the context of the international private oligopoly, we consider that it
is very important to disclose the relationship between the equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred
ownership structure with respect to each country’s social welfare in order for not only the supra-national authority
like EU but also each country’s government to prescribe an more appropriate merger policy.
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thus, his analysis did not reflect the influence of the asymmetry of each firm’s marginal cost on
the equilibrium ownership structure and its welfare implications, different from that in chapter 2.
Thus, in particular, as our next step, taking into account the asymmetry of their marginal costs,
we should investigate the problem of cross-border mergers in the context of the international pri-
vate oligopoly. Note that we consider that the general result on the figure of the core of ownership
structures may not be obtained easily, and thus, in such a problematic case, the simulation anal-
ysis regarding the difference between each firm’s productivity relative to her/his physical trade
cost must be conducted. Even from the simulation analysis, we may be able to obtain the ten-
dency of the change of the figure of the core of ownership structures with respect to that in the the
difference between each firm’s productivity relative to her/his physical trade cost.12 Moreover,
although we must confirm the result on the stable ownership structure(s) belonging to the core of
ownership structures in the case wherein n asymmetric firms exist in the market, we consider that
the analysis in such a case is difficult because of the computational problem.13 Thus, we should
conduct the simulation and numerical analysis on the number of the firms existing in the market,
n. Second, we discuss our future researches in the context of the mixed oligopoly. We must
take into account the features of the horizontal mergers between a public firm and a private firm
in the real world, when we theoretically model their merger activities in the mixed oligopolistic
industry: (i) such a merger in the real world is frequently cross-bordered; (ii) sufficiently large
enterprises are involved in such a merger. From (i), we should consider the theoretical model of
the merger between the public firm and the private firm in the context of the international mixed
oligopoly wherein they exist in different countries with each other. Once we extend the theo-
retical model of the horizontal mergers between the public firm and the private firm in a closed
economic situation into the model in the context of the international mixed oligopoly, we can
consider many topics which have not been considered in the existing literature of this field yet.
First, as supposed in Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Fjell and Heywood (2002),
we must consider the mergers between the public firm and the private firm in the economic envi-
ronment wherein only private firms export to a country or region containing one public firm and
several private firms.14 After conducting such analyses, in the context of an international mixed
12From the same reason on the computational problem, we may have to conduct the simulation and numerical
analysis using computer softwares, if we would like to reveal the figure of the core of ownership structures before and
after each firm’s merger activity, when s/he adopts the other delegation regimes such as the market share delegation
regime a` la Jansen et al. (2007) and Ritz (2008) and the relative performance delegation regime a` la Miller and
Pazgal (2001, 2002) and Salas Fumas (1992).
13If all the n firms are asymmetric with respect to their marginal costs, taking into account all the ownership
structures, it is too difficult for us to derive the figure of the core of ownership structures.
14Nakamura (2009b) considered the problem of horizontal mergers in the economic environment wherein a public
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oligopoly with the strategic interaction between public firms existing in different countries, which
was investigated in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005a), Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005b), and
Dadpay and Heywood (2006), we should pay our attention to investigating multiple merger phe-
nomena between the public firm and the private firm that have different nationalities with each
other, which are observed in the real world automobile industry.15 In particular, the latter analysis
can give us an adequate reply to the question of whether or not the merger between the different-
nationalityed public and private firms is appropriate not only with respect to social welfare in the
single country but also with respect to the total social welfare. This analysis is very important and
relevant to the case wherein the supra-national authority, for examples, EU, judges the merger
between the public firm and the private firm which have different nationality with each other from
diversified standpoints.16 Moreover, from (ii), we must consider the internal structure of both the
public firm and the private firm, i.e., the separation of ownership and management within them.
As one of theoretical ways in order to focus their attention on each firm’s internal structure in an
oligopolistic industry, one may consider the strategic delegation a` la Fershtman and Judd (1987),
Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985), so-called the FJSV delegation contract, which was explicitly
taken into account in chapter 2 of this thesis. Although it is difficult to deal with large enterprises
firm and a private firm exist in the domestic country and a private firm exists the foreign country, and the market
is in the domestic country. Furthermore, he assumed that all the three firms have the quadratic cost functions with
respect to their output levels. Under such a setting, Nakamura (2009b) derived the stable market structures in both
the entrepreneurial case wherein every managerial decision-making is done by each firm’s owner and the managerial
case wherein each firm with the separation between ownership and management adopts her/his FJSV delegation
contract between her/his owner and manager, and in particular, he obtained the results that in the managerial case,
only the market structure with the merger between the public firm and the foreign private firm can belong to the core
of market structures, which is relevant to the example of the merger among large enterprises observed in the real
world mixed oligopoly. However, as described in Concluding remarks of chapter 5 in this thesis, Nakamura (2009b)
did not consider the economic situation wherein each firm export her/his output with any physical trade cost. Of
course, the setting in Nakamura (2009b) is same as those in Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Fjell
and Heywood (2002), and thus we do not consider that it is unnatural. However, the most recent works on horizontal
mergers emphasize the tariff-jumping effect that the cross-bordered merged firm can export her/his output without
any physical trade cost, since in the real world economy, each firm has an incentive to merged with the different-
nationalityed firm in order to avoid paying the trade physical cost. In order to consider such a tariff-jumping effect
in the mixed oligopoly, as our future research, we should suppose the physical trade cost to export each firm’s output
to her/his foreign country.
15In the real world automobile industry, we can observe multiple mergers involving the public firms and the private
firms that exist in different country with each other. For example, in 1986, SEAT which is a Spanish public enterprise
was merged with Volkswagen which is a German enterprises, and further, as described in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n
(2003), the French firm, Renault acquired a 36.8% equity stake in Nissan Motor and a 22.5% stake in Nissan Diesel.
16Although Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005a), Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2005b), and Dadpay and Heywood
(2006) supposed one market comprising two countries which is regarded as a world market, the literature on in-
ternational horizontal mergers in the private oligopoly including Horn and Persson (2001b) and Fumagalli and
Vasconcelos (2009) adopted the segmented market hypothesis in order to reveal the effect of tariff-jumping that
the merged firms with the cross-border mergers can avoid paying the trade physical cost. As our future research,
we should also tackle the problem of international horizontal mergers in the mixed oligopoly under the segmented
market assumption, supposing the physical trade cost to export each firm’s output to her/his foreign country and/or
the tariff-jumping effect.
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in the theoretical economic analysis including theoretical horizontal mergers, as our first step to
explicitly investigate the merger between large public and private enterprises in mixed oligopoly,
we would like to begin with taking into the effect of the FJSV delegation contract within each
firm on the equilibrium market structure after her/his merger activity. In particular, as one of
our future researches, we must derive the core of market structures occurring after each firm’s
merger activity in the general mixed oligopoly with the use of her/his FJSV delegation contract
wherein her/his technology is represented as her/his constant marginal cost function, which was
considered in chapter 5 of this thesis.17 In the private oligopoly, although in the previous lit-
erature on horizontal mergers, it is known that the use of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract
yields the increase of merger profitability and the decrease of social welfare owing to sufficiently
high market concentration, the analysis of chapter 2 in this thesis revealed that the introduction
of the bargaining over the content of each firm’s delegation contract between her/his owner and
manager can lead to the result that the equilibrium market structure with the merger including
the least efficient firm coincides with the most preferred structure with respect to social welfare,
and thus, the merger authority should pay her/his attention to the degree of the power balance
between each firm’s owner and her/his manager in order to prescribe an appropriate merger pol-
icy. Therefore, in the analysis on cross-border mergers in international oligopoly as our future
researches, we must focus our attention on whether any welfare-improving merger occurs or not,
and if it occurs, what conditions should be satisfied regarding the degree of asymmetry among
the existing firms and the levels of their physical trade costs, and so on. In the mixed oligopoly
on horizontal mergers between the public firm and the private firm, the analyses of chapters 4
and 5 were the first challenges in the endogenous merger formation that the decision-makings of
whether to merger for all the firms’ owners are endogenously considered within the model, and
thus, as our further meaningful step, we should examine horizontal mergers between the public
firm and the private firm, taking into account the merger examples of in the real world economy
that large enterprises exist in the different countries with each other. Thus, in order to reflect
17Under the setting that the technologies of both the public firm and the private firm are represented as the con-
stant marginal cost functions with respect to their output levels and the public firm is less efficient than the private
firm, White (2001) investigated the effect of the use of their FJSV delegation contracts on the equilibrium market
outcomes, and he showed that the use of each firm’s delegation contract yields her/his higher profit and higher social
welfare, relative to the non-use of such a delegation contract. Thus, we consider that the figure of the core of market
structures on the basis of each firm’s merger incentive will be unchanged since the payoffs of the owners of both
the public firm and the private firm increase through the use of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract. Note that as
shown in Appendix B of chapter 4 in this thesis, the use of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract yields the increase
of the merger profitability between private firms. Thus, we consider that the status quo mixed oligopoly is likely not
to become the stable market structure, since it may be dominated by the market structure with the merger between
the private firms.
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most adequately the examples of horizontal mergers in the real world mixed oligopoly, we must
simultaneously take into account the two factors: (1) the possibility of cross-border mergers and
(2) the use of each firm’s FJSV delegation contract within the separation between ownership
and management in the more general settings, for example, the number of the private firms and
the existence of the physical trade cost. Such a theoretical analysis become the unswerving evi-
dence in order both the supra-national authority including EU and each country’s government to
prescribe more appropriate merger policies in the mixed oligopolistic industry.18 Extending our
analyses in this thesis into these directions is left for our future researches.
18If such an analysis is difficult owing to the computational problem, we must conduct the computational analysis
through the relevant PC software.
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